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From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States
and Human Rights Treaty Bodies∗
tara j. melish∗∗

In the battle for democracy and human rights, words matter, but what we do matters
much more.1

It is frequently said that the United States has a paradoxical human rights
policy.2 On the one hand, the United States embraces human rights principles as a founding national ideology3 and has supported the enhancement of
human rights and democracy as a core premise of its foreign policy since
the end of World War II, when it played a leading role in birthing the
international human rights regime.4 Indeed, the promotion of human rights
and democracy abroad is a central motivating tenet of U.S. foreign policy,
∗

∗∗

1

2

3

4

The original version of this chapter was published in the Yale Journal of International Law
(YJIL), volume 34, pp. 389–462 (2009). It has been adapted and substantively modiﬁed for
inclusion in this book by permission of YJIL.
Visiting Professor, University of Notre Dame School of Law, Spring 2009. Associate Professor of
Law, University at Buffalo School of Law, SUNY. JD, Yale Law School; BA, Brown University.
I extend my gratitude to Robert K. Harris, Steven R. Hill, and Mark P. Lagon of the U.S.
Department of State for their helpful conversations on issues discussed in this chapter, as
well as to Sean Murphy, Susan Benesch, Rick Wilson, and Cesare Romano for their valuable
comments on an earlier draft. All views expressed herein are those of the author alone.
Warren Christopher, “Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands,” transcript of
U.S. Secretary of State’s address to 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, June 21, 1993,
in U.S. State Dep’t Dispatch No. 25, June 23, 1993 [hereinafter Christopher].
See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” in Michael Ignatieff,
ed., American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005),
147–97.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy (1988), 24 (“The cause
of human rights forms the core of American foreign policy [as] it is central to America’s
conception of itself.”); Christopher, op. cit. (“America’s identity as a nation derives from our
dedication to the proposition ‘that all Men are created equal and endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights.’”).
See Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001).

210

From Paradox to Subsidiarity

211

manifested in the nation’s extensive foreign assistance commitments, political
and ﬁnancial support of international human rights bodies, linking of bilateral
aid to human rights improvements, and annual reporting on the human rights
situation of 194 nations of the world.5 National public opinion polls, moreover,
suggest that roughly eighty percent of Americans believe that human rights
inhere in every human being, whether the government formally recognizes
those rights or not.6 Equal numbers express not only their support for U.S.
ratiﬁcation of human rights treaties but also their belief that international
supervision over those treaty commitments, by a court or other independent
body, is necessary.7
Yet despite strong external and internal human rights commitments, the
United States has appeared to ﬂinch, even recoil, when it comes to direct
domestic application of human rights treaty norms, especially as those norms
are interpreted by international supervisory bodies. Whether through the executive, the legislature, or the courts, the nation has insisted that human rights
treaties are non-self-executing domestically and has remained ambivalent
toward international adjudicatory fora that may judge it on its own human
rights treaty commitments. The United States has renounced international
bodies that have issued judgments against it on human rights matters, declined
to afﬁrmatively accept the contentious jurisdiction of human rights bodies,
and even fought the creation of new international bodies with adjudicatory
5

6

7

The U.S. Department of State, under congressional mandate, has been reporting annually on
human rights conditions in countries around the world since 1976. Since 2002, these Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices have been supplemented by an annual report to Congress
on the speciﬁc actions taken by the U.S. government to encourage respect for human rights
around the world, in compliance with section 665 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1350 (codiﬁed as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2151n, 2304 (2000 & Supp. VII 2007)). See, e.g., U.S. State Department, Supporting Human
Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006 (2006). Of course, U.S. foreign policy has also
served over the years to consolidate the power of many dictators and repressive governments
responsible for systematic human rights abuse.
See The Opportunity Agenda, “Human Rights in the United States: Findings from a National
Survey,” Public Opinion Research on Human Rights in the U.S. (by Belden Russonello &
Stewart), Aug. 2007, at 12 (ﬁnding that 80 percent of Americans support this proposition,
whereas only 18 percent endorse view that “rights are given to an individual by his or her
government”).
See, e.g., Steven Kull et al., “Americans on International Courts and Their Jurisdiction over
the US,” The WorldPublicOpinion.org/Knowledge Networks Poll, May 11, 2006, at 3. The
poll ﬁnds that 79 percent of Americans believe that there should be an independent international body, such as a court, to judge whether the United States and other states parties are
abiding by the international human rights treaties they ratify. Indeed, of all subject matters
commonly governed by treaty (i.e., border disputes, ﬁshing rights, environment, human rights,
trade, labor, investments, and protection of aliens), human rights treaties received the highest
percentage of support for the proposition that independent international tribunal supervision
over compliance was necessary. Id.

212

Tara J. Melish

competence over its citizens. It is this apparent paradox of U.S. human rights
policy – outwardly prodigious, inwardly niggardly – and its underlying set of
“antinomies”8 that a growing literature has sought to document and explain,
often through the lens of U.S. exceptionalism.9
This chapter offers a new narrative based in interest-group management. It
does so by taking a closer look at the U.S. human rights paradox from the perspective of U.S. engagement with the international human rights treaty bodies
that exercise formal supervisory jurisdiction over it.10 This engagement, once
negligible, has expanded quite signiﬁcantly over the last decade, a byproduct of
the United States’ careful navigation through a diverse set of political pressures.
It is thus useful to view the distinct ways and degrees in which this engagement
manifests itself, especially with respect to the varied competences that treaty
bodies exercise along the supervisory spectrum. Doing so allows us to take a
closer look at the actual reasons why the United States may shrink from full
engagement with certain international processes, while accepting others fully.
Such a frame can, in turn, reveal important insights for predicting what the
United States can and will do in the future, why, and under what preconditions
or constraining guidelines. Importantly, it also allows us to begin to imagine a
set of institutional arrangements and coordinating mechanisms that can help
to address the underlying concerns, particularly as they relate to recurrently
raised federalism, separation of powers, and countermajoritarian objections.
My central claim is that a closer, more searching look at the nature and
scope of U.S. treaty-body engagement policy – especially at the plurality of
disaggregated policy interests that determine its evolving and often asymmetric
contours – reveals that the U.S. human rights paradox may not in fact be so
paradoxical. To the contrary, given U.S. engagement policy’s modern doctrinal anchoring in one of international human rights law’s most foundational
principles – the principle of subsidiarity11 – it may be precisely the foundation

8

9

10

11

Sean D. Murphy, “The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies,” Chapter 4 in this volume (deﬁning antinomies as “equally rational but conﬂicting
principles” and discussing three that underlie U.S. foreign policy: realism vs. institutionalism, exceptionalism vs. sovereign equality, and autonomous national law vs. internationally
embedded domestic law).
See, in particular, contributions in Michael Ignatieff, ed. American Exceptionalism and Human
Rights, op. cit.; Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” op. cit. (presented as
conference paper in proceedings giving rise to this book project).
Human rights treaty bodies refer to the committees or commissions of independent experts set
up under key human rights treaties to supervise, through quasi-adjudicatory and promotional
powers, state-party compliance with treaty undertakings.
The principle of subsidiarity, discussed further in this chapter, governs the appropriate relationship among international, national, and subnational levels of supervision in the shared project
of ensuring human rights protection for all individuals. Foundational to international human
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necessary to build a strong and sustainable domestic human rights policy over
the long term. Achieving this, however, will require a fundamental shift in
thinking and strategy among many domestic advocates. That shift is one that
draws from the insights of an interest mediation perspective to transform the
current U.S. engagement emphasis on the negative dimension of the subsidiarity principle from a shield into a sword. That is, the tools of the subsidiarity
principle must not be permitted to be used only defensively by U.S. actors to
shield domestic legislative and judicial processes from international intervention. They must also be used offensively to routinize, within the bounds of
U.S. federalism, an internal process of domestic self-reﬂection and localized
democratic deliberation on how we, in our own local communities, wish to
protect internationally recognized human rights to best ensure the dignity of
the human person.
The challenge for domestic human rights advocates, I argue, is not to reject
the negative dimensions of subsidiarity (as is the tendency today), dimensions that are core to U.S. interest-management techniques, but rather to
ﬁrmly embrace them, while likewise ﬁnding new ways of working ﬂexibly
and effectively within the subsidiarity paradigm to institutionalize a framework for respecting the positive half. In this way, advocates may ensure that
U.S. engagement policy is directed not only outward, toward an international
audience, but, just as critically, inward to our own domestic constituencies at
home. It is this vital shift in U.S. human rights policy – from partial subsidiarity
(paradox) to genuine subsidiarity – that is the focus of this chapter.
Yet a doctrinally anchored, interest-mediation perspective on U.S. human
rights policy does not only help to chart a path toward the future. It also helps to
explain the present and past. It offers, in this regard, a fuller, more empirically
plausible and realistic account of U.S. human rights policy than can parallel
accounts sounding in “U.S. exceptionalism,” whether of a “rights cultural”
or “structural” variety.12 Indeed, a closer look at the actual ways in which the
United States engages with human rights treaty bodies – and, speciﬁcally, at the
varying mediating techniques13 it employs to ensure its engagement comports

12

13

rights law, it has been broadly deﬁned as “the principle that each social and political group
should help smaller or more local ones accomplish their respective ends without, however,
arrogating those tasks to itself.” Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of
International Human Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 38, 38 n.1 (2003) (providing a “simpliﬁed
working deﬁnition”).
See Moravcsik, op. cit. (discussing “rights cultural” and “structural” narratives of U.S. exceptionalism, and defending the latter).
The term “mediating techniques” is used here in relation to the tactics, methods, and postures
employed by the U.S. government in modulating its human rights engagement policy to take
into account the countervailing pressures faced from a diversity of interest groups, at both
domestic and foreign policy levels, each urging greater or lesser levels of U.S. engagement.
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with evolving U.S. domestic and foreign policy interests – suggests that academic prognostications that the United States will resist further engagement
with human rights bodies may be short-sighted. Whereas prominent observers
of the “U.S. human rights paradox” have suggested that we should not be
optimistic about further U.S. engagement in the international human rights
regime, given certain structural conditions that set the United States apart
from other nations,14 I argue that this view may be overly static in its portrayal
of the predicted behavior of relevant social actors, even under unreservedly
correct, “thicker” explanations of U.S. ambivalence to human rights law.15
Speciﬁcally, while correctly focusing on domestic special interest politics and
the unique ability of veto players in the United States’ highly decentralized
and fragmented political structure to block treaty ratiﬁcation notwithstanding
supportive domestic majorities (especially under Republican Senate majorities), such a view fails to take account of the diverse and dynamic ways that
civil society advocates – of both liberal and conservative persuasions – take
advantage of changing positions and new strategic openings for advancing
their substantive policy preferences.
In particular, by focusing too narrowly on conservative politics, veto players, and formal treaty ratiﬁcation procedures, the view fails to take account

14

15

This usage differs slightly from the term’s primary use in the scholarly literature to describe
the justiciability doctrines and other judicial restraint techniques used by courts and tribunals,
at both national and international levels, to accommodate separation of powers, federalism,
subsidiarity, and sovereignty concerns. See, e.g., Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch
112 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (discussing domestic judiciary’s “passive virtues” and quoting Justice
Brandeis’s assertion that the “mediating techniques of not doing” were the most important
thing the U.S. Supreme Court did); Murphy, op. cit. (discussing and citing other scholarly
discussions of “mediating techniques” used by international tribunals to promote engagement
by States).
See Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” op. cit. Professor Moravcsik
identiﬁes four such structural conditions (external power, democratic stability, conservative
minorities, and fragmented political institutions), concluding that “[t]he United States is exceptional primarily because it occupies an extreme position in [these] four structural dimensions
of human rights politics, from which we would expect extreme behavior on the part of any
government.” Id. at 150–51.
See id. Professor Moravcsik argues convincingly that a “thicker,” “pluralist” explanation that
focuses on the instrumentality of partisan politics and conservative policy agendas in explaining
U.S. human rights behavior is more plausible empirically than “thinner” accounts that attribute
U.S. ambivalence to a unique American “rights culture,” one predisposing Americans to oppose
human rights treaty commitments. He nonetheless reads his analysis as suggesting a “sobering
conclusion”: “U.S. ambivalence toward international human rights commitments is not a shortterm contingent aspect of speciﬁc American policies, but it is woven into the deep structural
reality of American political life.” Id. at 197. Consequently, “The institutional odds against any
fundamental change in Madison’s republic are high. To reverse current trends would require
an epochal constitutional rupture – an Ackermanian ‘constitutional moment’. . . . Short of that,
this particular brand of American ambivalence toward the domestic application of international
human rights norms is unlikely to change anytime soon.” Id.

From Paradox to Subsidiarity

215

of the equally relevant strategies and campaigns of liberal politics, including
their regular employ of the many “deblocking” opportunities presented by the
fragmented U.S. political structure. Likewise, it insufﬁciently addresses the
ways the U.S. government acts in a mediating role between these countervailing persuasions, including those operating at the foreign policy level: bowing
more or less to one or the other, yet always within the bounds of a principled,
rule-bound policy position. Under this light, any prediction that the United
States will not further engage with human rights treaty bodies may be missing
critical domestic movements and changing visions of political agency that
suggest the contrary.
This is particularly true as advocates and interest groups adapt their strategies
to the hard reality of U.S. ratiﬁcation of an increasing number of human rights
treaties and persistent engagement with international supervisory procedures.
The fundamental domestic debate has in many ways thus changed. It is no
longer whether the United States will ratify, but rather how domestic advocates
will use U.S. ratiﬁcation and international engagement to achieve their distinct
domestic policy agendas at home and what measures or methodologies the
U.S. government will adopt to mediate these countervailing pressures.
To address these important issues, this chapter proceeds in six parts. Following this introduction and a brief explanation of the subsidiarity principle,
Part A provides an overview of the legal framework that structures current U.S.
human rights treaty body engagements at the national and international levels. Part B supplements this review by examining the speciﬁc ways the United
States16 in fact engages with the three principal competences exercised by the
UN, OAS, and ILO supervisory treaty body systems: periodic reporting, quasiadjudication, and promotional activities. It concludes that U.S. engagement
with these competences is in fact far more robust than popular notions of the
“U.S. human rights paradox” would suggest.
Part C seeks then to explain this discrepancy. It suggests that U.S. engagement policy is best viewed not as a static or structural given, but rather as a
complex mediation among a variety of pressures exerted on policy makers by
powerful actors at both the foreign and domestic policy levels. Disaggregating those pressures, the analysis emphasizes the role of four distinct groups
that contribute to the pragmatic calculus undertaken in shaping U.S. human
rights policy. These include “realists” and “institutionalists” at the foreign
policy level and groups I call “insulationists” and “incorporationists” at the

16

Throughout this chapter, “United States” is used to refer to the state agents who express the
policy position of the nation before international treaty bodies. Although frequently represented
by the U.S. State Department, the position asserted represents that of the “State” and is informed
by many complex processes.
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domestic policy level, each seeking alternately greater or lesser substantive
and procedural engagement with human rights bodies, in accordance with
their group-speciﬁc policy interests. While scholars in the various camps of
international relations theory tend to explain U.S. engagement policy with
primary emphasis on one of these four groups,17 it is the complex interaction
and competing interests of each of them, I argue, that determine the precise
coordinates at which U.S. policy can most accurately be mapped.
To explain how this complex management process is effectuated, Part D
identiﬁes the principal mediating techniques employed by the United States in
its current treaty body engagements, each designed to accommodate distinct
sets of competing interest-group pressures. While each of these mediating
techniques is solidly anchored in foundational international law doctrines
of sovereignty and subsidiarity, each nonetheless draws on only the negative
dimensions of those doctrines. Corresponding to doctrines of non-interference
and deference to domestic political processes, this selective posture allows the
United States to effectively manage competing interest group pressures, pursuing an engagement policy that at once permits active U.S. engagement with
international procedures, appeases the most vocal critiques of such engagement (at both domestic and foreign-policy levels), and allows the United States
to remain in formal compliance with the external procedural obligations it has
assumed under international law through treaty ratiﬁcation.
What it does not do, as currently pursued, is facilitate internal domestic
reﬂection on the nation’s treaty-based human rights commitments. Indeed,
responsive to the dominant pressures exerted at present on U.S. policy makers
from both within and without government, these mediating techniques draw
on only half of subsidiarity’s blueprint. This partial and selective embrace of the
tools envisioned by international human rights law’s subsidiarity principle has
conduced to a signal, yet predictable, outcome: U.S. engagement policy has to
date been pursued principally, if not wholly, as a foreign policy objective, not as
a domestic policy one. That is, contrary to the primary purposes of international
human rights law, the United States engages with international human rights
bodies not with an eye toward better protecting human rights within its own
jurisdictional boundaries but rather with a view toward inﬂuencing the policies
of other sovereign states and the international community generally. Part E
17

These camps include those dedicated to realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism. For a general descriptive overview, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002). Though neither liberalism nor constructivism
refers in name to “insulationists” or “incorporationists,” the emphasis of liberalism on domestic political structures and processes focuses it on the veto-player politics of the former, just
as constructivism’s privileging of the role of non-state actors and their persuasive discourses
focuses it on the tactics and strategies of the latter.
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discusses this conﬂict, the structural opportunities for addressing it, and the
importance of giving the principle of subsidiarity its full and intended meaning
in international human rights law. The piece continues by looking at where
U.S. policy can be expected to lead in coming years, as U.S. policy makers
continue to chart a middle course through difﬁcult and shifting pressures.
This middle course is one that does not reject but rather solidly embraces
supervisory human rights treaty body processes, albeit under a vision of their
jurisdiction as strictly subsidiary to domestic decision-making processes. The
challenge for domestic advocates, I argue, is to ensure that this subsidiarity
principle is embraced in its full dimensionality, not only in its negative facets.
An outline of how this might be institutionally pursued and structured in the
United States is discussed in Part E.
∗

∗

∗

Before turning to these important issues, a brief reﬂection on the subsidiarity
principle in international human rights law is warranted.18 First off, this principle should not be confused with the narrower, more rigid rule of the same name
that has developed since 1993 in the European Union to govern the constitutional relationship between the Union and its member states.19 Often equated
with U.S. federalism,20 which draws from but does not replicate subsidiarity’s
18
19

20

For the fullest account of this principle, see Carozza, op. cit.
This principle is reﬂected in Articles 1, 2, and 5 of the (Maastricht) Treaty on European
Union, as updated by the Protocol of Amsterdam. Although the broad essence of subsidiarity
is reﬂected in Article 1, which requires that “decisions [be] taken . . . as close as possible to the
citizen,” it is the practical operationalization of the principle in article 5 that has been the
focus of the EU subsidiarity “rule”: “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers
conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufﬁciently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.”
The similarities between EU subsidiarity and U.S. constitutional federalism have spawned
a vast comparative literature. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:
Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 332 (1994);
W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law – American Federalism
Compared, 27 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 61 (1995); Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, Harmonization, and Their Values: Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2
Colum J. Eur. L. 573 (1996); Cary Coglianese and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Securing Subsidiarity:
The Institutional Design of Federalism in the United States and Europe,” in The Federal
Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (K.
Nicolaidis & R. Howse, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Other literature has explored the nuances and complexities of the concept across subject
matters and jurisdictions. See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State,
and Nation in the European Commonwealth 151–55 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)
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premises, the rule is directed to dividing legislative competences21 between vertically overlapping sovereignties, with the higher level preempting the lower
in its carefully prescribed ﬁelds of authority.22 The principle of subsidiarity
that structurally underlies international human rights law is both broader and
less rigid than its modern European namesake.23 This is true even as it is fully
consistent with, and complementary to, both the narrower EU subsidiarity
rule and American constitutional federalism.
The primary differentiating feature between the two lies in their respective
objects of protection. Unlike its narrower rule-based instantiation, the safeguarded object of which is the sovereignty interests of formal political units
within a given constitutional structure, the principle of subsidiarity begins and
ends with the human person – speciﬁcally, with the inherent dignity of the
socially situated human being. Society and government are thus viewed as integrated into a protective layering of facilitative support, or subsidium, designed
to ensure that such dignity ﬁnds genuine expression in meaningful, appropriate, context-speciﬁc ways. Such support does not aim to preempt “lower”
competences but rather to assist and strengthen them such that they are capable of meeting needs directly where and when they arise, at the level closest

21

22

23

(distinguishing “market subsidiarity,” “communal subsidiarity,” “rational legislative subsidiarity,” and “comprehensive subsidiarity”); Giandomenico Majone, “Regulatory Legitimacy in
the United States and the European Union,” in The Federal Vision, op. cit. at 252 (noting
increased demand in the EU for local control in the nineties led to shift in subsidiarity’s
interpretation from “total” harmonization to “optional” and “minimum” harmonization, just
as similar demands in the United States in the seventies and eighties led to a shift from
“preemptive” to “cooperative federalism”).
For an argument that subsidiarity should likewise be incorporated into the judicial doctrine of
the European Court of Justice, which has so far resisted Maastricht’s governing principle, see
Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice,
41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1 (2000); Florian Sander, Subsidiarity Infringements before the European
Court of Justice: Futile Interference with Politics or a Substantial Step Towards EU Federalism,
12 Colum. J. Eur. L. 517 (2006).
Lower political units, bound by the higher, are thus required to harmonize their laws to
conform to the rules and directives of the higher authority, whenever higher action is expressly
authorized or, given its scale or effects, sanctioned as “necessary” and proportional to achieve
treaty objectives. See Maastricht Treaty, op. cit. art. 5.
See Carozza, op. cit. at 52 (underscoring that “[i]t would truly impoverish our discourse and
reduce our capacity for understanding to limit subsidiarity to a technical European rule that
does not grow up out of that ground”). Carozza provides the long history to the concept, which
dates back to classical Greece, tracing its intellectual history through medieval scholasticism;
seventeenth-century securalist theory; the work of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century titans
such as Montesquieu, Locke, Tocqueville, Lincoln, and Proudhon; and nineteenth-century
Catholic social theory, until ﬁnally transposed from social philosophy into positive law by
Germany in its post–World War II drive to undo the massive centralization of national socialism
and to devolve power to the Länder. It was formally enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty in
1992 (and further proceduralized in the 1996 Protocol of Amsterdam), taking on a particularly
European meaning that is nonetheless still quite contested.
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to the affected individual. In this way, subsidiarity represents the constitutive
scaffolding to what may usefully be visualized as a series of nested circles, with
the individual human person sitting at the center, surrounded concentrically
by progressively larger social groupings of family, civic solidarity associations,
local government, nation-state, and, ultimately, intergovernmental bodies and
transnational social networks.
To best ensure the dignity interests of their constituent members, each of
these connective layers holds concurrent duties of both non-interference and
assistance to their interior or smaller units. On the one hand, larger, more
comprehensive organizations have a “negative” duty not to interfere in the
freedom of inner groupings to meet their own human dignity needs in ways
that accord with their own realities. “It requires that problems be solved where
they occur, by those who understand them best, and by those who are most
affected by them.”24 It thus mandates that a respectful degree of latitude and
discretion be given to smaller communities to interpret and implement human
rights in ways that authentically accord with local understandings, mores, and
particularized conditions. This follows not only from the fact that local needs
are best appreciated by local actors but also from the fact that we live in a plural
world in which the value of human dignity can be instantiated in a diversity of
ways, each of which may fully accord with the broad purposes to which human
rights aim. It is the formalized tools of this negative aspect of subsidiarity that the
United States tends to invoke exclusively, often in conjunction with appeals to
U.S. federalism, in defending its domestic human rights record and insulating
it from outside pressures or inﬂuences.
Yet just as the subsidiarity principle does not tolerate preemption of smaller
social or political units, neither does it support wholesale devolution to them.25
Accordingly, whenever interior bodies cannot accomplish the good to which
human rights aim without assistance, exterior groupings have a “positive”
responsibility to intervene – by, for example, “directing, watching, urging,
restraining, as occasion requires and necessity demands”26 – to assist them
24

25

26

J. E. Linnan, Subsidiarity, Collegiality, Catholic Diversity, and Their Relevance to Apostolic
Visitations, 49 The Jurist 399, 403 (1989), cited in Dinah Shelton, “Subsidiarity, Democracy
and Human Rights,” in Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of
Asbjorn Eide 43 (Donna Gomien ed., Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1993). The passage
continues: “Only when their efforts fail should the matter be placed before a higher authority.”
Id. at 43–44.
See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution,
35 Ind. L. Rev. 103 (2001) (arguing that the “compassionate conservatism” platform of the
Republican Party purports to enact the lessons of Catholic teachings on subsidiarity but in so
doing advocates wholesale devolution to local authorities, neglecting subsidiarity’s core focus
on assistance from higher authorities).
Carozza, op. cit. at 41, quoting Pius XI’s 1931 papal encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical
Letter on Reconstruction of Social Order.
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in fulﬁlling the objectives of the common good. This requires that comprehensive monitoring mechanisms be set up – separately, at local, national,
and international levels – that can track progress and setbacks at lower levels, providing support, an external check, and facilitative assistance whenever
locally unremedied abuses or systemic problems are perceived. International
human rights law, accordingly, envisions a constitutive framework of monitoring, supervision, and facilitation that allows this subsidiary relationship to
play itself out ﬂexibly within a broad variety of institutional structures and
mediating procedures.27 This is true not only at the international level but
also, just as importantly, at the national and subnational levels.
In short, the subsidiarity principle in human rights law is directed at ensuring that the heavy lifting of human rights interpretation and implementation
occurs at the domestic level, as close as possible to affected individuals. International treaty bodies correspondingly see their role as inherently supplemental, designed not to usurp or preempt but to facilitate, assist, and strengthen
indigenous and localized implementation efforts. The principle of subsidiarity
thus provides an important middle way through the polarizing tensions and
cross-talk that currently dominate U.S. discourse on domestic human rights
incorporation, particularly in its unhelpful setting of sovereignty and federalism in opposition to internationalism and human rights.28 These dueling
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Modern international human rights treaty bodies, for example, exercise this subsidiary responsibility through each of their recognized competences. Thus, periodic reporting processes are
designed precisely to stimulate and regularize domestic monitoring, enforcement, and selfappraisal processes, with the broad participation of all members of society. See, e.g., Comm.
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 1, Reporting by States Parties
(Third session, 1989), U.N. Doc. E/1989/22, annex III at 87 (1989) (identifying objectives of periodic reporting). The issuance of general comments aims to offer advice and guidance, drawn
from the comparative experience of other states, for state consideration in implementing, modifying, and enforcing their own policies. Special rapporteurs work to identify best practices
and common pitfalls across jurisdictions, stimulating and promoting issue-speciﬁc dialogue
among a multiplicity of actors working on a common problem. Further, individual complaint
processes, activated only when domestic remedies have proved ineffective in addressing a
concrete human rights abuse, aim at ensuring, through a variety of tools, that an appropriate
remedial scheme is effected by local actors. In fact, to ensure that such interventions are
proportional and offered only where necessary, a series of institutional restraint doctrines have
been adopted to guide treaty body conduct, particularly where complaints procedures are
at issue. These include, among others, the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule, the margin of appreciation doctrine, “reasonableness” and other appropriate interest-balancing and
proportionality tests, the fourth instance formula, and friendly settlement and “good ofﬁces”
conciliation, all of which are important tools of subsidiarity. They also include recognition of
the permissibility of reservations, understandings, and declarations and, speciﬁcally, respect
for the non-self-execution doctrine.
This discourse, which extends over an enormous literature, is in many ways succinctly encapsulated in the popular-media exchange between Peter Spiro, Jack Goldsmith, and Curtis Bradley
in Foreign Affairs, in which “sovereignty” and “internationalism” are antagonized. See Peter J.
Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, Foreign Affairs,
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postures, through their tendency to minimize the important constitutional
values and democratic insights offered by the opposing position, tend toward
communicative deadlock and heel-digging.29 Subsidiarity, by contrast, merges
the core democratic insights of both positions.30 It values the procedural facilitation of international bodies and national monitoring, while respecting the
primacy of localized process in determining appropriate means toward common ends. That is, it sees as its objective the authentic instantiation of human
rights values in locally relevant, contingent, and meaningful ways, by local
actors – not as cookie-cutter transplants determined and imposed by international experts, as is frequently claimed by those who resist human rights treaty
incorporation on sovereignty, federalism, or majoritarian grounds.31
Subsidiarity, in this way, rejects the notion that respect for universal human
rights is synonymous with singular or absolutist outcomes or interpretations,
which only an international body is competent to deﬁne.32 To the contrary,
it understands that, given the plurality of human communities, the broad
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Nov./Dec. 2000, at 1 (describing sovereigntists as “insulationist” and “anti-international”); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Letter to the Editor, Foreign Affairs, Mar./Apr. 2001, at
188 (rejecting Spiro’s “unalloyed internationalism” as ignoring importance of state consent);
Peter J. Spiro, “What Happened to the “New Sovereigntists?” Foreign Affairs, foreignaffairs.org,
July 28, 2004 (predicting that the United States will ﬁnally be forced to “bend to international
norms” after Iraq War debacle). See also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390 (1998) (concluding that U.S. government must “make a
choice”: human rights treaties or American federalism).
See generally Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399, 468 (2000) (noting that “the exaggeration and
impatience that characterize the opposition to RUDs [reservations, understandings, and declarations] threaten to make U.S. ofﬁcials less inclined, not more inclined, to continue their
involvement with international institutions”).
The constitutive relationship among democracy, subsidiarity, and human rights has been
initially explored in Dinah Shelton, op. cit.
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law?
1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 327, 338–39 (2000). As Professor Carozza has underscored, “A subsidiarityoriented understanding of human rights and international law does not care to ask whether
‘state sovereignty’ must either resist or give way to international harmonization and intervention
but, instead, whether the good that human rights aim at realizing can be accomplished at the
local level, and if not, what assistance is necessary from a more comprehensive association to
enable a smaller unit to realize its role.” Carozza, op. cit. at 66.
This is equally true for quasi-adjudicatory treaty bodies, such as the UN treaty body committees,
and for supranational “courts,” such as the European Court of Human Rights and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. Although court rulings and remedial orders are binding
on the parties to the litigation, they tend to be drafted in sufﬁciently broad terms to permit
signiﬁcant latitude to states in determining the contours of appropriate implementation at the
domestic level. The remedial orders of the Inter-American Court, for example, increasingly
require the participation of victims in the determination of the speciﬁc concrete measures
that will give effect to the broad principles laid down by the Court. See Tara J. Melish, “InterAmerican Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity,” in Malcolm Langford, ed., Social
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative and International Law (New York:
Cambridge University Press 2008).
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purposes of human dignity that human rights norms encapsulate must be given
concrete form in locally relevant ways and that these instantiations will take
a wide diversity of forms across the culturally rich tapestry of human society.
As such, international processes are designed ﬁrst and foremost to require that
processes are established and routinized at the domestic level to resolve human
rights complaints locally and to ensure that these are operating effectively and
reliably. International bodies will intervene only when domestic institutions
prove ineffective in resolving human rights issues, and then with the primary
objective of strengthening local processes through constantly innovating forms
of facilitative assistance, or subsidium.
Whether human rights treaty law becomes a more permanent ﬁxture in
U.S. law and policy making in the coming years will depend in large measure
on the extent to which this positive dimension of the subsidiarity principle
is constructively embraced by U.S. policy makers and, most importantly, by
domestic interest groups – actively employed to formalize and institutionalize
domestic supervisory and monitoring processes, at local, state, and federal levels, as a national project (rather than an international one). Such internally
reﬂective processes – supported by a national institutional framework – must
aim to continually assess and reassess national and local progress and setbacks
in human rights achievement, debate the normative content of those rights,
listen to citizen views on where deﬁciencies arise and how potential solutions
might be crafted, and chart locally and nationally relevant paths toward fuller
domestic human rights achievement. The promotion of such internal deliberative processes around the normative meaning of rights is in fact precisely
the object to which international human rights law is directed.33
It is important to underscore, in this respect, that the United States’ historic
ambivalence to human rights treaty body engagements does not relate to
either human rights or international supervisory regimes per se; both are
fully consistent with and complementary to U.S. democracy, federalism, and
rights culture. Rather, U.S. ambivalence is responsive to a particular static and
absolutist way of conceiving human rights and international supervision that
has been propagated and popularized over the past half-century by partisan
U.S. interest groups. Although this rights absolutism is key to the rhetoric
and group-mobilization strategies of many domestic advocates (of both liberal
and conservative persuasion), it fails to acknowledge two of the principal
underlying tenets of international human rights treaty law and supervision:
First, its subsidiary nature vis-à-vis domestic protection efforts and, second, its
33

It has been observed, for example, that “from a Liberal perspective, a – if not the – primary
function of public international law is . . . to inﬂuence and improve the functioning of domestic institutions” and that, accordingly, “human rights law is the core of international law.”
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 ASIL Proc. 240, 246 (2000)
(emphasis in original).
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focus on domestic process and progressivity, not universalized or standardized,
top-to-bottom policy prescriptions or outcomes. A renewed focus on these
tenets would reveal that the U.S. human rights paradox, at least in its modern
manifestation and as applied within the U.S. territorial jurisdiction, is not in
fact so paradoxical. To the contrary, once given an institutional framework to
express itself domestically, it may be precisely the foundation for ensuring a
sustainable domestic U.S. human rights policy over the long term.34
A. LEGAL CONTEXT: THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED STATES

It is frequently contended that the United States ratiﬁes few international
human rights treaties. Although this may be true in relative terms, it does
not accurately reﬂect the scope of commitments the United States has in
fact undertaken under international human rights law, particularly over the
past two decades. Under growing pressure from domestic and international
constituents and with strong bipartisan support, the United States has ratiﬁed
an increasingly broad spectrum of human rights treaties, under Republican
and Democratic administrations alike. Thus, under the administrations of
George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush, the United
States has ratiﬁed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),35 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),36 the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),37 the
Genocide Convention,38 a series of ILO treaties on labor rights,39 and the two
Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the areas
34
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It may also provide important insights for a more sustainable U.S. policy toward other international tribunal engagements, such as with the International Court of Justice.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR was ratiﬁed by the United States
on June 8, 1992.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
The CAT was ratiﬁed by the United States on October 21, 1994.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212 [hereinafter CERD]. The CERD
was ratiﬁed by the United States on October 21, 1994.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Convention was ratiﬁed
by the United States on November 25, 1988.
See, e.g., Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, S. Treaty
Doc. 88-11, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (ratiﬁed by the United States on September 25, 1991); Convention
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (ratiﬁed by the United States on December 2,
1999). As of 2008, the United States has ratiﬁed a total of fourteen ILO treaties.
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of children in armed conﬂict and the sale of children, child prostitution, and
child pornography.40 The United States has also ratiﬁed human rights treaties
relating to slavery,41 refugees,42 and the political rights of women,43 among
others,44 and has ratiﬁed the OAS Charter, which subjects it to the promotional
and quasi-adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights with respect to the full scope of internationally recognized
rights enshrined in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.
Taken together, these treaties cover a vast spectrum of rights – of a civil,
cultural, economic, political, and social nature – and extend horizontally
under three distinct supranational supervisory systems, each with its own set
of promotional and quasi-adjudicatory powers. In this sense, although critical
attention is often focused on the U.S. failure to ratify certain internationally
popular treaties, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), the American Convention on Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
it must be recognized that the scope of international commitments implicated
by these treaties has already, in large measure, been undertaken by the United
States pursuant to the treaties that it has ratiﬁed.45 This reality complicates
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Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
in armed conﬂict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 (ratiﬁed by the United States on December
23, 2002); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of
children, child prostitution and child pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, at 6, 54 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000) (ratiﬁed by the United States on December
23, 2002).
See, e.g., Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926 (Slavery Convention of 1926), 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Protocol Amending the Slavery
Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 226
U.N.T.S. 3.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, July 7, 1954, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Inter-American
Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. T.S. No. 3
(ratiﬁed by the United States on March 22, 1976).
The United States has ratiﬁed all four Geneva Conventions. As it recognizes, it has also “entered
into many bilateral treaties (including consular treaties and treaties of friendship, commerce,
and navigation) that contain provisions guaranteeing various rights and protections to nationals
of foreign countries on a reciprocal basis,” some of which may be invoked directly in U.S.
courts. See Ofﬁce of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, “Core Document Forming
Part of the Reports of States Parties: United States,” ¶ 151, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/USA/2005,
Jan. 16, 2006.
There is indeed wide overlap in the rights protected in distinct human rights treaties. This is
apparent in the substantial substantive overlap (both direct and indirect) in the rights enshrined
in the ICCPR and ICESCR, as well as by the express inclusion of varying numbers of both
sets of rights in virtually all other human rights treaties, including the European Convention,
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the utility to partisan actors of wholesale opposition to currently nonratiﬁed
treaties.46 It also undermines claims that the United States fails to ratify human
rights treaties out of a cultural commitment to “negative” or libertarian conceptions of rights or, relatedly, a cultural aversion to economic, social, and cultural rights, two frequently raised but factually uncompelling explanations.47

46

47

American Convention, African Charter, CERD, CEDAW, and CRC. Although it is therefore undoubtedly correct that the oft-purported “cultural aversion to socioeconomic (‘positive’)
rights in the strong sense of welfare entitlements or labor rights,” is not a credible reason for U.S.
ambivalence to human rights (see Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,”
op. cit. at 163), the proffered reasons for reaching that conclusion are misdirected. Id. (concluding that because “the international human rights system strictly separates civil and political
rights from socioeconomic ones,” the “United States could, therefore, at any time simply ignore
socioeconomic documents, while ratifying and implementing civil and political ones”).
Indeed, CEDAW, CRC, and ICESCR subject matters are regularly taken up through ICCPR,
CERD, CAT, and ILO convention supervisory procedures.
U.S. law, at local, state, and federal levels, provides signiﬁcant and far-reaching protections for
economic and social rights, including the rights to housing, health, education, work, social
security, unionization, and other basic labor guarantees. National opinion polls, moreover,
reﬂect that the majority of Americans identify many of these guarantees not as mere “privileges” but as personally held, individual rights, secured as part of the American heritage and in
fact constitutive of the rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unﬁnished Revolution and Why We Need it More than Ever
(Basic Books 2004) (noting that the majority of Americans would be surprised to learn that
the rights to social security and education were not constitutionally protected), 62–63 (noting,
too, a 1991 survey of U.S. citizens in which strong majorities identiﬁed adequate housing,
a reasonable amount of leisure time, adequate provision for retirement years, an adequate
standard of living, and adequate medical care as “a right to which he is entitled as a citizen”
and not as “a privilege that a person should have to earn.”).
A 2007 national survey similarly found that strong majorities of Americans not only believe
but “strongly believe” that a core set of social rights are human rights. These include equal
access to quality public education (82%), access to health care (72%), living in a clean environment (68%), fair pay for workers to meet the basic needs for food and housing (68%), freedom
from extreme poverty (52%), and adequate housing (51%). Only slim minorities believe these
are not human rights. The Opportunity Agenda, “Human Rights in the United States: Findings
from a National Survey,” op. cit. at 3–4.
Although currently lacking a direct federal constitutional basis, such rights are guaranteed
in many state constitutions and came close to federal constitutional incorporation in the late
1960s and early 1970s. See, e.g., Sunstein, op. cit. at 5; William E. Forbath, Constitutional
Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1821, 1823 (2001);
William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969–Present,
39 Tulsa L. Rev. 597, 612 (2004) (noting U.S. Supreme Court on verge of recognizing constitutional basis for array of economic and social rights, in line with domestic social views, when
the slim Nixon victory in 1968 ushered in judicial appointments that stopped process).
At the same time, traditional distinctions between “negative” and “positive” rights, particularly as reiﬁed in classic “sets” of rights, have never been tenable as a factual matter, all rights
possessing both negative and positive dimensions in the sense of duties to act reasonably and
duties not to act arbitrarily. See, e.g., Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of
Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (W.W. Norton 1999); Tara J. Melish, Rethinking the
“Less as More” Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in
the Americas, 39 NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 171 (2006).

226

Tara J. Melish

These are pretexts for other interests at play.48 Indeed, in its interactions with
international treaty bodies the United States regularly addresses the “positive”
dimensions of its human rights obligations as well as a wide spectrum of economic, social, and cultural rights,49 as it does in its own domestic legislation.
In this regard, it is also useful to note that although the United States
has been slow to ratify many treaties – primarily because of the blocking
opportunities presented by the fragmentation of the U.S. political structure –
virtually all core human rights treaties have, since the late 1970s, been signed
by the U.S. executive, indicating at least a political commitment to the rights
and obligations enshrined therein and a present, if revocable, intent to be
bound in the future.50 President Carter signed the ICESCR, ICCPR, CERD,
and the American Convention in 1977 and CEDAW in 1980. President Reagan
signed the Genocide Convention in 1986, and President Clinton signed the
CRC and its two Optional Protocols in 1995 and 2000, respectively.
Likewise, the administration of George H. W. Bush presided over U.S.
ratiﬁcation of the ICCPR in 1992, having urged Senate consent in 1991, and
President Clinton, who presided over U.S. ratiﬁcation of the CERD and CAT
in 1994 and ILO Convention 182 in 1999, strongly promoted U.S. ratiﬁcation
of the ICESCR, CEDAW, and CRC from the beginning of his administration
in 1993.51 The George W. Bush administration, moreover, not only presided
48

49

50
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This is not to say that those who perpetuate them as part of a cultural myth of America are
using them as pretext but rather that their underlying motivations rest on political-ideological
foundations of a more partisan nature. For discussion, see Part C.2 infra.
This is particularly true in U.S. reporting under the ICCPR and CERD, in which the United
States regularly addresses the positive measures it has taken to respect and ensure the rights
to nondiscrimination, equal protection, due process, and judicial protection with respect to
health, housing, education, and employment. See, e.g., U.S. State Department, “Periodic
Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination Concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, April 2007,” at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/race/cerd_report/ (visited
Apr. 25, 2007) [hereinafter “U.S. CERD Report 2007”], ¶¶219–78 (addressing the right to work;
the right to form and join trade unions; the right to housing; the right to public health, medical
care, social security, and social services; the right to education and training; and the right to
equal participation in cultural activities). The United States also addresses these dimensions
of economic and social rights with respect to contentious cases lodged against it with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which has jurisdiction over all of the rights
in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, including the rights to health,
education, unionization, housing, and social security.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (stating that signature obliges certain conduct until a State’s
intention not to ratify is made clear). In 2002 the Bush administration “unsigned” a treaty
to indicate its lack of both obligations thereunder and intent to ratify. See Edward Swaine,
Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061 (2003).
See, e.g., Christopher, op. cit. at 1. There is wide recognition that Senate consent failed because
of the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994.
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over the ratiﬁcation of the two Optional Protocols to the CRC in 2002 but, after
an initial decision to step back from the negotiation process, reinitiated active
engagement in the ﬁnal stages of the substantive drafting of the newly adopted
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).52 It did
so under active pressure from both domestic constituencies53 and members
of the U.S. House of Representatives.54 CEDAW, for its part, has consistently
garnered strong, even bipartisan, support in Congress, with Senate Democratic leaders committing in 2008 to bring it to a full Senate vote as soon as
politically opportune. Although likely to face intense targeted opposition from
antiabortion lobbies, which by continuing to politicize it in absolutist terms
may succeed in blocking it still, CEDAW is expected to receive supermajority
support.
This treaty-related behavior, from Republican and Democratic administrations alike, suggests two important conclusions. First, it suggests that, despite
popular rhetoric to the contrary, the United States does not in principle
perceive inherent contradictions between such regimes and U.S. domestic
law, policy, or interests. If it did, such treaties would neither be signed by
the President nor ratiﬁed by Senate supermajorities. Second, given the established track-record of speedy human rights treaty ratiﬁcation with Democratic
control of the Senate and Executive, it can be concluded that the nation’s
52

53
54

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]. The CRPD received eighty-four signatures
on the opening day, more than any human rights treaty in history. Although the United States
formally participated in all eight sessions of the UN Ad Hoc Committee charged with drafting
the CRPD, it announced its intention not to ratify at the second session in June 2003. See Statement of Ralph F. Boyd, U.S. assistant attorney general for civil rights, to the UN General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, June 18, 2003,
USUN Press Release #89 (03), at http:www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/03print_089.htm (visited Apr. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Boyd Statement]. The U.S. delegation thereafter ceased to
make substantive proposals, reinitiating its active engagement in the drafting process only at
the seventh session in January 2006.
See discussion in Part C.2.III infra.
See House Concurrent Resolution 134 (expressing the sense of Congress that the United States
should support a UN convention on disability rights and thereby urging: “(1) the United States
to play a leading role in the drafting of a United Nations convention and to work toward its
adoption . . . and (2) urg[ing] the President to instruct the Secretary of State to send to the
UN Ad Hoc Committee meetings a U.S. delegation that includes individuals with disabilities
who are recognized leaders in the U.S. disability rights movement.”) (emphasis added). The
resolution was unanimously adopted by the House International Relations Committee in 2004
but failed to be scheduled for a vote on the House ﬂoor by majority leader Tom Delay (R-TX).
Members of the House committee, together with the Congressional Human Rights Caucus,
met directly with members of the U.S. State Department to express their sense of urgency that
the United States reinitiate a leadership role in the CRPD drafting process, given the United
States’ historic protagonism in advancing disability rights.

228

Tara J. Melish

political branches reasonably anticipate being subject to human rights treaty
regimes as an inevitable outcome of swings in the political process.55 Within
this context, any view that says the United States institutionally or “culturally”
resists human rights commitments appears incomplete.
The better explanation, as advanced by Professor Moravcsik, rests in the
distinct ways that conservative minority special interest groups exert their inﬂuence over veto players in the ratiﬁcation process, particularly within the U.S.
Senate.56 Through rhetorical resort to stereotypes and “rights absolutism”57
that portray international procedures as undemocratic, authoritarian, communistic, and hence “anti-American,” these interest groups have historically
succeeded in turning the rhetorical debate into one related to American rights
culture and states’ rights, rather than simply as a rough-and-tumble domestic
wrestling match over the shape of distinct social policy outcomes, within the
methodological framework of human rights commitments and supervisory monitoring procedures. This “thicker” explanation should not, however, lead to
dire predictions that the status quo will persist58 but rather to a more searching
look at what special interest groups are doing and how their interests intersect
or fail to intersect with the promotion of international human rights law.
Special interest groups traditionally at the forefront of the ﬁght against U.S.
adherence to international human rights treaties over the past two decades
appear in fact to have begun to reassess their positions and modify their
strategies, ﬁnding ways that recurrence to such treaties may in fact advance
their domestic and international agendas. They have increasingly demanded
greater U.S. participation in drafting the terms of international human rights
55

56
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58

Strong Democratic control of the Senate has historically been an important facilitating condition for the ratiﬁcation of human rights treaties. Moravscik calls it a “necessary condition”
based on a review of a set of core treaties ratiﬁed from 1945 to 2000. See Moravcsik, op. cit.,
at 184 (“[T]he Senate has never ratiﬁed an international human rights treaty (even with reservations) when Democrats held fewer than 55 seats.”). It is important to recall, however, that ILO
Convention 182 as well as the two CRC optional protocols were ratiﬁed under Republican
Senate majorities in 1999 and 2002, respectively.
Id. at 186–87 (noting that “[a]ll other things being equal, the greater the number of ‘veto
players,’ as political scientists refer to those who can impede or block a particular government
action, the more difﬁcult it is for a national government to accept international obligations”
and highlighting three characteristics of the U.S. political system that engender veto players:
“super-majoritarian voting rules and the committee structure of the Senate, federalism, and
the salient role of the judiciary in adjudicating questions of human rights”).
Rights absolutism can be deﬁned as an unwillingness to recognize that human rights law
permits reasonable restrictions on all individual rights and that states are granted a (variable,
but generally quite wide) margin of discretion in determining their nature and scope in distinct
contextual settings.
Moravcsik, op. cit., at 197 (predicting no change absent some unexpected “epochal constitutional rupture – an Ackermanian ‘constitutional moment’”).
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agreements and even sought U.S. ratiﬁcation of certain human rights treaties.59
This activity, taken together with the renewed mobilization of groups traditionally in favor of human rights treaty compliance – particularly through the
coordination of the U.S. Human Rights Network60 – is leading to a distinctly
new situation for U.S. engagement with international human rights supervisory bodies and will lead to growing opportunities and challenges for all parties
involved.
Increased civil society engagement (from both sides of the political spectrum) is being met, moreover, by growing institutionalization of human rights
coordination within the U.S. government, particularly from the U.S. State
Department, which is increasingly broadening its oversight from an exclusive
focus on the human rights situation in other countries to domestic human rights
achievement. In this regard, it is useful to recall that it was not in fact until
1976 – the year the ICCPR and ICESCR entered into force – that the U.S.
government began to systematically monitor human rights achievement at all,
in any country. In that year, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act
to require the Secretary of State to transmit to it “a full and complete report”
every year concerning “respect for internationally recognized human rights in
each country proposed as a recipient of U.S. assistance.”61 The next year, the
ﬁrst forebear to the current position of Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor was appointed,62 and an Interagency Working
Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance was established.63 Yet these
focal points were mandated exclusively to report on the human rights situation
59
60

61

62

63

See discussion infra Part C.2.
Founded in 2003, the U.S. Human Rights Network is a loosely coordinated community
of more than 250 human rights organizations and 1,000 individuals committed to ensuring that U.S. human rights treaty commitments have effect for domestic communities. See
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/ (visited Apr. 20, 2007).
This limited reporting requirement was authorized in the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729, which included an
amendment to § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424
(codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). The requirement was expanded in
1978’s International Development and Food Assistance Act, Pub. L. 95-424, 92 Stat. 937, to
include each member of the United Nations. The report was to be based on the internationally
recognized human rights ideals detailed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). In 1998, the mandate was
extended to religious freedom. See International Religious Freedom Act, § 102(b)(1), 22 U.S.C.
§ 6412 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
It was at the time called coordinator (and then assistant secretary) for human rights and
humanitarian affairs. The latter named bureau was renamed the Bureau for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor under the Clinton administration.
See Hauke Hartmann, U.S. Human Rights Policy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1981, 23 Hum.
Rts. Q. 402, 417 (2001).
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of other countries, particularly those receiving U.S. foreign assistance.64 They
had no mandate to report on the human rights situation within the United
States itself. It was not until two decades later – on the ﬁftieth anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – that an interagency group was
speciﬁcally mandated to coordinate executive agency response to domestic
human rights concerns.65
Although that body, the Interagency Working Group on Human Rights
Treaties (IAWG), functioned in that form for only two brief years, it represented a fundamental turning point for the orientation of U.S. human rights
policy. Created by Executive Order 13107, issued by President Clinton on
December 10, 1998, it was mandated to promote coordination among U.S.
executive agencies in ensuring compliance with the human rights treaties the
United States has ratiﬁed and supporting the work of international human
rights mechanisms, including the UN, ILO, and OAS.66 The order states
that “[i]t shall be the policy and practice of the Government of the United
States, being committed to the protection and promotion of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, fully to respect and implement its obligations under
the international human rights treaties to which it is a party, including the
ICCPR, the CAT, and the CERD.”67 Critically, it further charges all executive departments and agencies to “maintain a current awareness of United
States international human rights obligations” relevant to their functions and
to ensure that such functions are performed “so as to respect and implement
those obligations fully.”68 This duty includes “responding to inquiries, requests
for information and complaints about violations of human rights obligations
that fall within [each agency’s] areas of responsibility.”69
The IAWG, for its part, was given a series of concrete coordination and oversight functions. These included coordinating the preparation of both treaty
compliance reports to the UN, OAS, and other international organizations and
responses to contentious complaints lodged therewith, as well as overseeing a
review of all proposed legislation to ensure its conformity with international
human rights obligations. It was also mandated to ensure that plans for public
outreach and education on human rights provisions in treaty-based and domestic law were broadly undertaken and to ensure that an annual review of U.S.
64

65
66
67
68
69

See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codiﬁed as amended in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) § 502(B); see also Hartmann, op. cit., at 417 (describing limited
economic focus of Human Rights Bureau’s Interagency Group).
Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (1998), 38 ILM 493 (1999).
Id. §1.
Id. §1(a) (emphasis added).
Id. §2.
Id. §§2–3.
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reservations, declarations, and understandings to human rights treaties takes
place. Finally, and notably, the Working Group was charged with ensuring
that all nontrivial complaints or allegations of inconsistency with or breach of
international human rights obligations be reviewed to determine whether any
modiﬁcations to U.S. practice or laws are in order.70
The change of administrations in January 2001 meant that the work of the
IAWG was never fully institutionalized. On February 13, 2001, it was superseded – in form, if not function – by President George W. Bush’s National
Security Presidential Directive, which reorganized the National Security
Council system.71 Speciﬁcally, the Bush Directive transferred the duties of
the Human Rights Treaties IAWG established under Executive Order 13107
to a newly established Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Democracy,
Human Rights, and International Operations, to be directed by the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs.72 With the national security structure thrown into disarray by the September 11 attacks later that year, the PCC
was not, however, formally constituted. It was not until 2003 that the staffs
of the State Department and National Security Council, aware of a growing
number of overdue periodic reports, began to work again on an ad hoc basis
in preparing the relevant reports.73
Since then, U.S. responses to international human rights treaty bodies have
been coordinated by the Ofﬁce of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department, with the assistance, when necessary, of legal consultants with expertise
in the area and of other executive agencies and departments, particularly the
National Security Council and the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, the Interior, Defense, Health and Human Services, and Labor. This is true
both for the preparation of U.S. periodic reports on domestic compliance with
human rights treaties and of U.S. responses to individual complaints and precautionary measures.74 Although this work is done on an ad hoc basis, without
dedicated staff and resources, the framework for a more structured response
is at least technically in place. This framework requires formal reconstitution
and the infusion of resources and staff that ideally, at least with respect to
periodic reporting functions, are functionally independent of the Ofﬁce of
70
71

72
73

74

Id. §4.
National Security Presidential Directive, Feb. 13, 2001, at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/
nspd-1.htm (abolishing the system of Interagency Working Groups established under the
Clinton administration).
See id.
Interview with Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State, Bureau of Int’l Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t of State, & Robert K. Harris, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter Lagon-Harris Interview].
For their part, responses to ILO complaints and periodic reports are prepared principally by
the U.S. Department of Labor.
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the Legal Adviser – more like the current structure for preparing the State
Department’s country reports on the human rights situation in other nations.75
It is important to note that whereas this latter mandate remains limited to nonU.S. jurisdictions, the 2006 report recognized for the ﬁrst time that the U.S.
government, too, has fallen short of international standards in some areas.76
This movement within the executive branch77 is being matched by movements within the legislative and judicial branches. The judicial branch is
increasingly, if slowly and cautiously – and in the face of certain powerful
resistance78 – referring to comparative human rights jurisprudence in resolving
domestic disputes and interpreting domestic statutory and constitutional law.79

75

76

77

78

79

The State Department has a sizable staff of attorneys working exclusively on preparing Annual
Country Human Rights Reports, a permanent staff that is assisted by the staffs of U.S. embassies
and consulates around the world. A similar mechanism could be set up through which a
permanent staff of attorneys within the State Department or other federal agency or entity,
preferably with an autonomous monitoring mandate, is assisted by the staffs of federal ofﬁces
in the ﬁfty states, together with the voluntary inputs of state ofﬁcials.
U.S. State Department, “2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” at http://www
.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/ (visited Apr. 20, 2007). See also Brian Knowlton, “U.S. Releases
Report on Human Rights in 2006,” Int’l Herald Tribune, Mar. 6, 2007.
Although President Obama has taken no action yet on a proposed Executive Order to revitalize
and strengthen the Clinton-era IAWG, he issued an Executive Order on March 11, 2009
establishing a more limited-mandate White House Council on Women and Girls that would
function under a similar interagency structure. See Executive Order No. 13506, 74 Fed. Reg.
11,271 (Mar. 16, 2009).
Justice Antonin Scalia has been the most vocal judicial opponent of referring to foreign law
in domestic jurisprudence. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). A minority of representatives within the U.S. House of Representatives has
likewise resisted this trend, introducing two House resolutions in 2004 and 2005, respectively,
that sought to legislatively preclude domestic courts from referring to “judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions” in determining the meaning of U.S. laws. See H.R. Res.
568, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005). Although voted out of committee,
the two proposals, which garnered seventy-four and eighty-four House cosponsors, respectively,
were never brought to a vote in the full House. A similar bill was introduced to the U.S. Senate
in 2005 but did not make it out of committee. It is important to note that Supreme Court
justices, including Justice Scalia, have indicated constitutional objections to such legislative
initiatives on separation of powers grounds. See Tony Mauro, “Scalia Tells Congress to Stay
Out of High Court Business,” Legal Times, May 19, 2006.
For recent Supreme Court examples, see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Laurence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 344 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002). Of course, the Court has long referred to international law in general, either
as federal common law or in interpreting domestic statutes to not conﬂict with international
treaty commitments. See, e.g., Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64 (1804); The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964). For reviews and discussion of this jurisprudence, both as a contemporary and historical
matter, see, for example, Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi and Stephani Dotson Zimdahl,
The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 743 (2005); Sarah H. Cleveland,
Our International Constitution, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2006).

From Paradox to Subsidiarity

233

The Senate Judiciary Committee, for its part, created a new Sub-Committee
on Human Rights and the Law in 2007, reauthorizing it in 2009.80 Such Senate bodies, together with the bipartisan Congressional Human Rights Caucus,
could play a critical role in coordinating with a new National Human Rights
Commission, National Human Rights Ofﬁce, and reconstituted IAWG or
PCC,81 particularly if the latter entities were given a speciﬁc legislative reporting mandate,82 to ensure that all branches of government are adhering to
their treaty-based human rights obligations. At a minimum, the playing ﬁeld
for domestic advocates in pushing their respective policy agendas has been
materially altered in recent years, changing the opportunity structure for using
human rights language to achieve distinct policy ends. Opponents and proponents have taken note, adjusting their strategies accordingly.
B. SUPERVISORY TREATY BODY SYSTEM AND THE SCOPE
OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT

Although scarcely covered by the U.S. media establishment and hence not
well known outside narrow advocacy circles,83 the United States has remained
actively engaged in the work of supranational human rights treaty bodies,
consistent with its international treaty commitments. “Human rights treaty
bodies” refer to the committees or commissions of independent experts84 set
up under key human rights treaties to supervise, through quasi-adjudicatory
and promotional powers, state party compliance with treaty undertakings.
There are currently eight United Nations (UN) human rights treaty bodies
operating under the auspices of the UN Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner on
Human Rights, four of which exercise direct supervisory jurisdiction over the
United States.85 These include the Human Rights Committee, the Committee
80

81
82

83

84

85

See David Johnston, “New Judiciary Subcommittee Is to Focus on Civil Liberties,” New York
Times, Dec. 14, 2006, A33.
See Part E infra (proposing these new entities).
Such a reporting mandate might be similar to the one given to the State Department under
the Foreign Assistance Act. The beneﬁt of a legislative mandate is that it cannot be abolished
through executive order with periodic changes in the White House.
For a discussion of the phenomenological biases of the media as a participant in the international legal process, see Monica Hakimi, The Media as Participant in the International Legal
Process, 16 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 24 (2006).
Such experts are nominated and elected by the States parties to the treaty but serve in their
personal capacities, generally for renewable four-year terms. Most treaties require them to
be persons of high moral authority and recognized competence in the ﬁeld of international
human rights law; in practice, they have various skill sets and backgrounds.
The United States is not subject to the jurisdiction of the other four: the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, and the UN Committee on Migrant Workers and their Families.
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Against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.86 The United
States is also subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, one of the two principal human rights organs of the
Organization of American States (OAS),87 as well as the International Labour
Organization’s (ILO) Committee of Experts and Committee on Freedom of
Association.88
Although not courts in the sense of having competence to issue legally
binding rulings on the matters and parties before them, these treaty bodies often exercise quasi-adjudicatory functions that closely approximate that
role.89 Most are empowered to receive petitions of alleged human rights violations from either individual or collective complainants,90 review evidentiary or
informational submissions, ﬁnd facts, interpret legal rules, and issue nonbinding decisions or recommendations. Such recommendations are increasingly
accompanied by follow-up and compliance reporting requirements, designed
to ensure that appropriate measures are taken by states to give domestic legal
effect to treaty body pronouncements. These quasi-judicial functions, exercised under jurisdictional rules and procedures highly similar to those of international judicial bodies,91 are supplemented by functions of a more overtly
86

87

88

89

90

91

Although the United States has not yet ratiﬁed the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
it has ratiﬁed the two optional protocols thereto, each of which entails a periodic reporting
obligation to the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
The other is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the contentious jurisdiction of
which the United States has not recognized. For more on the Court, see Elizabeth A. H.
Abi-Mershed, “The United States and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” Chapter 7
in this volume; see also Melish, “Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” op. cit.
The former has mandatory supervisory jurisdiction over the ILO’s core labor standards, two
of which the United States has ratiﬁed: No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor and No.
182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The latter exercises contentious
jurisdiction over collective complaints involving freedom of association regardless of whether
the member state has ratiﬁed ILO treaties; as of 2008, it has considered forty-nine complaints
against the United States. See Steve Charnovitz, The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association
and Its Future in the United States, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 90, 92 (2008).
See UN Human Rights Comm., General Comment 33, The Obligations of States Parties under
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 11, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008) (“While the function of the Human Rights Committee
in considering individual communications is not, as such, that of a judicial body, the views
issued by the Committee under the Optional Protocol exhibit some important characteristics
of a judicial decision. They are arrived at in a judicial spirit, including the impartiality and
independence of Committee members, the considered interpretation of the language of the
Covenant, and the determinative character of the decisions.”).
The UN and OAS mechanisms have individual standing rules, whereas the ILO has jurisdiction over collective complaints lodged by, and on behalf of, workers’ or employers’ organizations.
Compare, for example, the jurisdictional rules for receiving contentious complaints of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (a quasi-judicial body) and the Inter-American
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promotional nature, such as periodic reporting procedures and their accompanying committee conclusions and recommendations, the issuance of general
comments or observations, onsite visits, and general reports on distinct human
rights matters or issues.
U.S. engagement with these bodies extends over the full range of treaty body
activities, including each of the three principal types of supervisory mechanisms: periodic reporting processes, individual and collective complaints procedures, and special mandate or promotional mechanisms. Because the scope
of engagement with each of these mechanisms speaks so powerfully to the
parameters of U.S. human rights policy, each merits slightly closer attention
here.
1. Periodic Reporting Process
The quintessential function of human rights treaty bodies is a periodic reporting process.92 Periodic reporting reﬂects the subsidiary nature of human rights
law vis-à-vis domestic law and is designed to assist states in their central obligation under human rights treaty law: to ensure that protected rights have
domestic legal effect through the adoption of “appropriate” or “necessary”
measures, determined in context. States parties are thus required to submit
reports on the appropriate measures they have adopted to give effect to the
rights recognized in the treaty and on the progress and setbacks made in the
enjoyment of those rights.93

92

93

Court of Human Rights (a judicial body). Both bodies – like the UN committees and the European Court of Human Rights – require the exhaustion of domestic remedies, proof of concrete
personal harm to identiﬁed individuals, imputation of conduct-based causal responsibility to
the state for that harm, and similar ratione temporis and ratione loci requirements. The principal
difference between the two is that the case-based conclusions of judicial bodies, like the Court,
are formally binding on the parties to the dispute, whereas those of quasi-adjudicatory bodies,
like the Commission and UN treaty bodies, are recommendary in nature. An expectation exists
nonetheless that such recommendations will be given effect in the domestic jurisdiction, with
treaty bodies increasingly requesting follow-up reports on the measures taken toward this end.
An exception is the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which, despite an explicit
competence to supervise a periodic reporting process (see American Convention on Human
Rights art. 42, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1 (1969)), has declined
to formally pursue it over the years. A periodic reporting function has been set up under the
Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and guidelines have recently been drawn up by the Inter-American Commission for
the preparation of reports by States parties. See, e.g., OAS General Assembly Resolution 2074
(XXXV-O/05).
To do so, they are expected to undertake a thorough and comprehensive review of national
legislation, administrative rules and procedures, and practices to assess conformity with treaty
commitments, to determine whether new policy making is required by identifying areas of
strength and weakness, and to continually monitor the actual situation with respect to each
treaty-recognized right for progress and setbacks in levels of enjoyment and protection.
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Each of the core UN human rights treaties envisions a mandatory periodic
reporting process under the supervision of the relevant treaty body committee.
An initial report must generally be provided within one year, followed by
a periodic report every two to ﬁve years or as the Committee so requests.94
The United States has undertaken periodic reporting requirements under the
CERD, the CAT, the ICCPR, the two Optional Protocols to the CRC, and
certain ILO conventions it has ratiﬁed. Although the United States – not unlike
most other nations – has frequently been late in submitting its reports,95 it has
actively engaged with the supervisory treaty bodies in the periodic reporting
process, particularly as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become
increasingly savvy in using international procedures and pressure points to
ensure timely, substantive, and participatory reporting.
In this regard, the United States submitted its ﬁrst report under the ICCPR
to the Human Rights Committee in Geneva in 1994, defending it in 1995. This
was followed by its ﬁrst CAT report in 1999 and its ﬁrst CERD report in 2000.96
These reports were defended before the UN Committee on Torture and the
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, respectively,
in 2000 and 2001. In 2005, the United States submitted its combined second
and third CAT reports and its combined second and third ICCPR reports,97
defending each in Geneva in 2005 and 2006, respectively. It presented its
combined fourth, ﬁfth, and sixth report to the CERD Committee in 2007,
which it defended in 2008. It has regularly submitted reports as well – on a
two-year periodic basis – to the ILO Committee of Experts.98
The supervisory procedures associated with periodic reporting tend formally to be characterized as a process of “constructive dialogue” between
treaty bodies and states parties.99 After a state party submits its written report,
94
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Most human rights treaties require periodic reports to be submitted every four to ﬁve years.
CERD, by contrast, requires reports to be submitted every two years. This has led to serious
backlogs in the Committee’s ability to review states’ periodic reports and the Committee’s
increasing request for states to prepare and submit combined reports on a four-year schedule.
This delay owes to several mostly institutional factors. First, until early 1999 the United States
lacked any dedicated body with explicit competence to prepare and supervise such reports,
causing many deadlines to be missed. While a coordinating mechanism exists today, it continues to lack dedicated staff and resources, thus constraining its capacity to produce reports
on time, especially given the signiﬁcant institutional coordination and commitment needed
for their production. It is for this reason that the institutional mechanisms proposed in Part E,
infra, are so crucial.
The United States missed its CERD report due dates in 1995, 1997, and 1999 and thus submitted
its combined ﬁrst, second, and third reports as a single document in 2000.
These were submitted one and seven years late, respectively.
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs, International Labor Organization (ILO),
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/oir/ILO.htm (recognizing requirement of regular submission of U.S. reports to ILO supervisory bodies).
See, e.g., Philip Alston, U.S. Ratiﬁcation of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 365, 370 (1990) (noting
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the treaty body prepares a list of priority issues that the state party should
be prepared to discuss at a scheduled hearing in Geneva.100 On the basis
of the state party’s written report, its oral presentations, and any additional
information made available to the committee, the supervising committee prepares a public report in which it identiﬁes areas of progress and areas of
concern with respect to the state’s human rights achievement. It then draws
conclusions and sets forth recommendations for how the state party might take
further measures in areas where deﬁciencies or weaknesses were identiﬁed.
Although technically a friendly process, treaty-based reporting has become
increasingly adversarial over the years as treaty bodies have gained prominence and international authority.101 As a result, their recommendations are
often interpreted, at least by domestic and international advocacy groups and
some international media sources, as a binding “legal decision” requiring
immediate domestic execution by national authorities. This view is often reinforced by committee requests that the state party submit additional information
if committee questions were not answered fully in oral proceedings, a request
sometimes construed by advocates as a requirement to report on follow-up
measures.
U.S. participation in this process is marked by ﬁve major characteristics,
each determinative in appreciating the mediated nature of U.S. engagement
policy. First, the United States prepares extensive and detailed reports to the
committee. In contrast to many states, which often submit incomplete or
insufﬁciently inclusive reports,102 the United States closely hews to the
committee-issued guidelines in preparing its consistently lengthy and comprehensive submissions.103 These reports address each substantive rights-based
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that periodic reporting function is “based on the assumption that a constructive dialogue
between the Committee and the state party, in a non-adversarial, cooperative spirit, is the most
productive means of prompting the government concerned to take the requisite action.”).
These questions are often based on the information provided to treaty bodies in civil-societyprepared “shadow reports,” prepared to highlight and correct misstatements or generalizations
in ofﬁcial state reports; ﬁll in overlooked areas with accurate facts, details, and statistics; and
generally present an alternative view for the expert UN committee to consider in assessing
state progress and setbacks and in making recommendations for domestic improvements.
This growing prominence and global authority have in many ways emboldened treaty bodies
to be more confrontational with U.S. delegations. Cf. Murphy, op. cit. (“For the [ICJ], the
lesson [of increasing global authority unbeholden to major powers] may be not to tread lightly
with respect to the United States but, rather, to tread heavily unless doing so would be viewed
generally as bias.”).
The UN Human Rights Committee, for example, has regularly lamented the lack of comprehensiveness in state party reports. See, e.g., General Comment No. 2, op. cit., ¶1. As a
result, it has issued guidelines to assist states in preparing reports under the respective treaties.
“Consolidated guidelines for States reports under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: 26/02/2001,” CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 (2001).
The U.S. third periodic report to the UN Human Rights Committee, for example, was 120
single-spaced pages, covering U.S. achievements with respect to each of the twenty-seven
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provision in the relevant treaty, how U.S. law protects the right, the types of
claims that are regularly brought to U.S. courts to protect it, and the outcomes
of major court decisions, particularly those of the U.S. Supreme Court. In
this respect, the United States tends to be very good at reporting on formal
legal protections emanating from the three branches of government, focusing on the outcomes of high-proﬁle judicial decisions and the legislation or
policy positions enacted to give formal effect to rights. It is less good at critically describing gaps in coverage and at documenting progress or setbacks in
the statistical enjoyment of rights over the population and distinct subgroups
within it, particularly at the state level.104 It is here that the treaty bodies generally focus their questions and direct their recommendations, relying on NGO
submissions to ﬁll in the missing pieces and to ask further probing questions.
In response, the United States, keen on improving its performance, is increasingly opening the reporting process to a greater degree of transparency among
nongovernmental actors and greater substantive comprehension, explicitly
seeking input and data for its reports from U.S. NGOs105 and state attorney
generals.
Second, the United States participates in Geneva-based meetings – and
increasingly in contentious OAS proceedings106 – with large, high-level
interagency delegations. According to State Department ofﬁcials, it does so to
demonstrate the seriousness with which the United States takes the human
rights supervisory process. It thereby seeks to set an example for other states,
encouraging them to engage the process with a similar degree of seriousness
and material commitment. It is important, in this regard, to highlight that
the United States sends not only a high-level ofﬁcial spokesperson to present
and defend its report but also a full delegation of high-level ofﬁcials from
each of the major executive agencies and departments to present and answer
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substantive rights guaranteed in the ICCPR. See CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005). The United
States’ 2007 CERD Report is more than 170 pages and includes coverage with respect to each
provision of the CERD, as well as separate annexes on examples of state-level civil rights
programs, the U.S. legal position on the Western Shoshone case, and new domestic laws
adopted since 2000, when the United States submitted its ﬁrst CERD report. See U.S. CERD
Report 2007, op. cit.
In response to Committee requests for the United States to discuss state-level progress
and setbacks, the U.S. has included an annex to its 2007 CERD Report in which it
provides examples of civil rights programs in Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, and South
Carolina.
The State Department and other executive departments and agencies have increasingly been
meeting with civil society representatives, at the latter’s request, before and after treaty body
hearings in Geneva to take their views into account.
Although this has not historically been the case, a change has occurred over the last ﬁve or
six years in which larger interagency delegations are appearing at hearings before the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.
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committee questions in their respective areas of competence.107 This level
of engagement reﬂects the high standard requested of governments by the
Geneva-based committees to ensure the effectiveness of the process.108
Third, the United States consistently afﬁrms, particularly in its oral presentations to treaty bodies, that it recognizes that it is not perfect and has deﬁnite
gaps to ﬁll.109 The central message of the treaty-mandated reports is thus that
the United States “is trying in good faith to bring its domestic practices into
compliance with international standards.”110 Within this context, it formally
welcomes the views of the treaty body as part of a constructive dialogue aimed
at assisting it in identifying areas of weakness in its own internal process, afﬁrming that committee suggestions are appropriately taken into consideration.111
According to U.S. representatives, what grates U.S. ofﬁcials is not the process
107

108

109

110

111

At its most recent appearances before the UN Human Rights Committee and Committee
Against Torture, for example, the U.S. delegation comprised more than thirty government
ofﬁcials from at least six executive agencies or departments.
See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 2, “Reporting guidelines” (Thirteenth
session, 1981), U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 3 (1994), ¶4: “The Committee wishes to state
that, if it is to be able to perform its functions under article 40 as effectively as possible and
if the reporting State is to obtain the maximum beneﬁt from the dialogue, it is desirable that
the States representatives should have such status and experience (and preferably be in such
number) as to respond to questions put, and the comments made, in the Committee over the
whole range of matters covered by the Covenant.”
Although the UN treaty bodies tended to acknowledge this effort in its initial reports, they
have declined to do so in later reports as the relationship with the United States has grown
more contentious on matters relating to the Iraq War and counterterrorism measures. Compare “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America,
03/10/95,” CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995), ¶¶267–68 (expressing appreciation of high quality of
report, “participation of high-level delegation which included a substantial number of experts
in various ﬁelds relating to the protection of human rights in the country,” and well-structured
replies) with “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America,” CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (no mention of high-level delegation or
quality of process).
See, e.g., Remarks to the U.N. Committee Against Torture by Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Geneva, Switzerland, May
10, 2000 (“Although we are proud of our record in eliminating torture, we acknowledge continuing areas of concern within the United States. Although our commitment is unambiguous,
our record is not perfect.”); Remarks to the UN Human Rights Committee by Robert Harris,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Geneva, Switzerland, July 17, 2006 (noting that the
United States recognizes that it has gaps to ﬁll in its human rights record under ICCPR); see
also Brieﬁng on the State Department’s 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Mar. 6, 2007 (“We do not issue
these reports because we think ourselves perfect, but rather because we know ourselves to be
deeply imperfect, like all human beings and the endeavors that they make. Our democratic
system of governance is accountable, but it is not infallible.”).
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46
St. Louis U. L.J. 293, 308 (2002).
See, e.g., Harris Remarks, op. cit. (noting that the United States welcomes committee’s views
and that such views are appropriately taken into consideration by agencies of U.S. government).
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itself – which, they afﬁrm, is genuinely appreciated, particularly for the opportunity to orally defend U.S. policy positions on human rights internationally –
but when committee members appear unopen to dialogue on debatable issues
and insensitive to areas of simple disagreement, particularly as they relate to
U.S. jurisdictional concerns on the substantive limits of treaty body competence.112
Fourth, and relatedly, members of ofﬁcial delegations and those who prepare reports tend to recognize the genuine utility of the reporting process
for gaining a better understanding of the precise ways in which the United
States is and is not in compliance with international standards.113 That is,
despite prominent unilateralist or realist strains within many departments and
agencies of government, the process of engagement has revealed for many
the real utility of periodic reporting for gaining a better understanding of the
national reality and where the country stands vis-à-vis international human
rights law. This realization militates in favor of greater U.S. engagement –
both for purposes of pushing other states to engage to a similar degree and for
promoting the involvement of an increasing number of federal, state, local,
and nongovernmental actors in the reporting process. The U.S. government,
for example, is increasingly meeting with civil society organizations to follow
up on concerns articulated at treaty body sessions and to discuss the establishment of mechanisms for coordinating information on state and national
human rights monitoring and achievement.114
Finally, although the United States manifests a high degree of openness and
willingness to answer treaty body questions in virtually all areas of domestic
human rights policy, there are certain policy issues that it declines to address
other than “as a matter of courtesy.” These predominate in two areas: one, the
territorial scope of treaty body competence and, two, the intersection of human
rights and humanitarian law.115 The United States insists that UN and OAS
112
113

114

115

Lagon-Harris Interview, op. cit.
This appreciation, often acknowledged to be unexpected, has been consistently expressed in
multiple fora by government ofﬁcials responsible for preparing treaty reports. This is equally
true in public meetings between U.S. departments and agencies, treaty bodies, and domestic
advocacy groups and in private interviews or conversations in which this author has taken part.
See, e.g., Interviews with Steven Hill, Robert Harris, and Mark Lagon, U.S. Department of
State, Feb. 2007.
U.S. State Department ofﬁcials, as well as those from Justice, afﬁrm that they are always open
to meeting and working with domestic groups on human rights issues. Interagency meetings
involving representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense
have been held on multiple occasions with the U.S. Human Rights Network and other civil
society organizations to discuss the periodic reporting process and follow-up measures thereto.
Statement of Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs, Media Roundtable with Senior Government Ofﬁcials at presentation of U.S. periodic
report under the ICCPR to UN Human Rights Committee, Geneva, July 17, 2006 (“There are
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treaty bodies lack jurisdiction to consider U.S. human rights policy as it affects
persons outside its territorial boundaries and as it intersects with the law of
armed conﬂict, which, it asserts, prevails as lex specialis at points of intersection
and hence falls outside treaty body jurisdiction.116 The United States has, in
this sense, adopted a highly technical and legalized posture with respect to
the scope of treaty body competence, asserting its prerogative to decline to
answer questions that exceed that competence as the United States deﬁnes it.
Although this is an explicit mediating posture adopted by the United States
to shield its foreign policy and national security interests within the context
of active engagement with human rights treaty bodies,117 it has nonetheless
put the United States in an increasingly adversarial position vis-à-vis the treaty
bodies.
2. Individual and Collective Complaint Procedures
and Precautionary Measures
Just as the United States actively engages in mandatory periodic reporting
processes under all relevant treaty regimes, it likewise engages in individual
and collective communication procedures wherever they are mandatory. The
United States has not, however, optionally acceded to any such procedure.
Thus, it has not recognized the right of individuals to initiate individual communications or claims procedures under the ICCPR, CAT, or CERD, nor
has it recognized the contentious competence of the Inter-American Court of

116

117

some issues that will come up in this defense that have to do with the war on terrorism and
the United States conduct of it. It is our ﬁrm belief that those issues in large part lie beyond
the scope of the treaty, those things that have to do with conduct outside of the territory of the
United States or those that belong to the questions of law of war rather than human rights law.
Nonetheless, the United States will answer those controversial questions as a courtesy to the
committee, and importantly, as a matter of openness in the international community.”).
On the former point, see “Third Periodic Reports of States Parties due in 2003: United States
of America,” CCPR/C/USA/3 (2005), Annex 1 (“Territorial Application of the [ICCPR]”),
109–11. This posture predates but supports the U.S. “war on terror” policy of holding suspected
terrorists and “enemy combatants” outside of U.S. territory, such as in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
or on offshore vessels. Signiﬁcantly, the extraterritoriality point is pressed as a matter of human
rights treaty law, even while accepting the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004), that the U.S. judiciary may exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial abuses
taking place in loci over which the U.S. exercises effective (“exclusive”) authority and control.
This constitutional exception to the extraterritoriality principle is effectively identical to that
recognized in international human rights law generally. See, e.g., Coard et al. v. United States,
Case 10.951, Report N◦ 109/99, Sept. 29, 1999, Inter-Am.Comm.H.R, para. 37 (“In principle,
the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality or presence within a particular
geographic area, but on whether, under the speciﬁc circumstances, the State observed the
rights of a person subject to its authority and control.”) (emphasis added).
See discussion infra Part D.1.
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Human Rights, the properly judicial (as opposed to quasi-judicial) organ of the
regional human rights system.118 These adjudicatory and quasi-adjudicatory
procedures provide legal standing for individuals within a state party’s jurisdiction to bring contentious claims alleging that the state is responsible, through
its conduct, for violating the individual’s treaty-protected rights. Although most
human rights treaty bodies can issue only ﬁndings and recommendations, not
legally binding rulings,119 they nonetheless act in an adjudicatory capacity in
considering the claims that come before them – ﬁnding facts, issuing legal
conclusions and remedial recommendations, and initiating follow-up mechanisms to supervise compliance with their case-based recommendations.
There are, however, two mandatory mechanisms in international human
rights law that allow individuals to bring human rights complaints against the
United States, as well as one mechanism for collective complaints. The ﬁrst
is the case-based contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (Commission). The second is the precautionary measure or
early warning/urgent action procedure recognized respectively by the Commission and the UN human rights treaty bodies.120 Finally, the United States
is subject to a collective complaints procedure regarding compliance with
ILO labor rights treaties, through which labor and employer organizations
may bring complaints against the United States before the ILO Committee
on Freedom of Association.121 The United States recognizes and engages with
each of these three sets of procedures, appearing and presenting arguments at
all procedural stages of litigation.
With regard to individual complaints procedures, the most signiﬁcant and
extensively used of the two applicable to the United States is the quasiadjudicatory petitions process of the Inter-American Commission on Human
118

119

120

121

Each of these nonmandatory procedures requires the deposit of an independent instrument
of jurisdictional recognition for operativity.
The exception, of course, is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the ﬁndings of which
are “ﬁnal” and “binding” on all OAS Member States that have accepted its jurisdiction. See
American Convention on Human Rights, op. cit., arts. 67–68.
The formal competence of treaty bodies to issue these measures is generally established in their
respective rules of procedure. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, art. 25, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 12 (2007) at 171 (“In serious and urgent cases,
and whenever necessary according to the information available, the Commission may, on its
own initiative or at the request of a party, request that the State concerned adopt precautionary
measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons.”). For information on the CERD’s urgent
action or early-warning procedure, see Ofﬁce of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights,
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Monitoring Racial Equality and NonDiscrimination, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
These will not be substantively addressed here. For an assessment, see Charnovitz, op. cit.
The full range of cases and complaints against the United States can be accessed at International Labour Organization, International Labour Standards, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/
caseframeE.htm (follow “United States” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
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Rights. Formally established in 1959, the Commission is mandated under the
OAS Charter to “promote the observance and protection of human rights and
to serve as a consultative organ of the [OAS] in these matters.”122 In this regard,
the Commission has both quasi-adjudicative and promotional functions.
Persons within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States at the
time of an alleged violation can therefore bring human rights complaints
through this supranational mechanism for violation, to their detriment, of
any of the rights recognized in the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, including the rights to health, education, property, life, due
process, judicial protection, and nondiscrimination.123 To date, the majority
of cases lodged against the United States have involved persons on death row
claiming due process denials with respect to the rights to life and to judicial
protection,124 including through failure to provide consular notiﬁcation to
nonnationals. This U.S. case pattern owes primarily to limited public awareness in the United States about the regional human rights system and its
adjudicatory competence over concrete instances of domestic human rights
abuse.
Nevertheless, the Commission has considered a growing number of U.S.
cases beyond the death penalty context, increasingly so in recent years. These
have involved the rights of indigenous persons to ancestral territory,125 voting
122

123

124

125

Charter of the Organization of American States art. 106, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951); see also id. arts. 3, 16, 51, 112, 150. The Commission has afﬁrmed that, consistent with its Statute and Rules of Procedure, it has jurisdiction to
consider individual petitions lodged against the United States, as with all thirty-ﬁve OAS member states, by virtue of the United States’s 1951 ratiﬁcation of the OAS Charter. See, e.g., Sánchez
v. United States, Petition 65/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 104/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc.
5 ¶ 50 (2006) (“United States of America deposited its instrument of ratiﬁcation of the OAS
Charter on June 19, 1951 and has been subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction since 1959,
the year in which the Commission was created.”); see also Roach v. United States, Case 9647,
Report No. 3/87, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.71. doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, International Conference of American States, 9th Conf., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. L./V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948).
Article 1 of the Commission’s Statute deﬁnes the human rights the Commission is competent
to apply as “[t]he rights set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation
to the States Parties thereto” and “[t]he rights set forth in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, in relation to the other member states.” OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 12 at
163 (2007).
See, e.g., Medina v. United States, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 91/05,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc 5 (2005); Workman v. United States, Case 12. 261, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 33/06, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007) (admissible). A great number of these
cases have dealt with failures to provide consular notiﬁcation under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations.
Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.117.
doc. 7 rev. 1 (2002); Cherokee Nation v. United States, Case 11.071, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 6/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.a5, doc. 7 (1997).
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rights in the nation’s capital,126 summary deportations,127 abortion,128 abuses
committed during U.S. military action abroad where effective authority or
control was maintained over the alleged victims,129 capital punishment of
minors,130 and the rights of interdicted refugees and detainees held in Immigration and Naturalization Service detention facilities and at Guantanamo
Bay.131 They have likewise involved freedom from extraordinary rendition, the
right not to be deported where HIV treatment is not available in the return
country,132 border controls,133 the right to reparation for civil rights abuses,134
welfare reform,135 and the right to police enforcement of domestic violence
restraining orders,136 among others.
Although U.S. responsibility for rights violations is frequently found, the
majority of cases lodged against the United States with the Commission are
found inadmissible, either in pre-admissibility vetting procedures137 or after
admissibility hearings. This is principally because of jurisdictional defects
in petitioners’ arguments, including failure to properly exhaust domestic

126

127

128

129

130

131

132
133

134

135

136
137

Statehood Solidarity Committee v. United States, Case 11.204, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
98/03, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.114, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003).
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, Case 8-03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 56/06, OEA/Ser.L/
VII.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007); Armendariz v. United States, Case 526-03, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 57/06, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007).
“Baby Boy” v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54,
doc. 9 rev. 4 (1981).
Coard v. United States, Case 10.451, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106,
doc 6 rev. (1999) (U.S. attacks on Grenada); Disabled Peoples’ International v. United States,
Case 9213, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 198, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (U.S. attacks on
Grenada); Hill v. United States, Case 9213, Inter-Am., Report No. 3/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91,
doc. 7, at 201 (1996) (closing case after full reparation provided to alleged victims of U.S. attack
on civilian hospital in Grenada); Salas v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 31/93, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.85, doc. 9 rev. (1993) (U.S. invasion of Panama).
See, e.g., Patterson v. United States, Case 12.439, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 25/05,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 doc. 5 (2005) (17 years old when committed crime); Thomas v. United
States, Case 12.240, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 100/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118 (2003) (17 years
old when committed crime); Roach v. United States, Res. No. 3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 doc. 9
rev. 1, ¶¶ 46–49 (1987).
Haitian Ctr. for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 doc. 7 rev. at 550 (1997); Ferrer-Mazorra v. United States, Case 9903,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/01, OEA/L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 1188 (2000).
These two cases do not yet have formal admissibility reports.
Sánchez v. United States, Petition 65/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 104/05, OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.124 doc. 5 (2005) (found inadmissible).
Shibayama v. United States, Petition 434-03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 26/06, OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.127 doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007).
Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign v. United States (1999, dismissed without
prejudice for failure to identify individual victims).
Gonzales v. United States, Petition 1490-05, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/07 (2007).
In this case, no public record of the ﬁling is maintained.
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remedies, lack of victim standing, failure to state a prima facie claim, or
lack of ratione temporis, ratione personae, or ratione loci jurisdiction. These
defects most frequently stem from petitioners’ conﬂation of the case-based and
promotional competences of the Commission and an effort to extract strong,
absolutist human rights statements from it without framing the controversy as
a concrete justiciable case.138 In this respect, the U.S. position often rests on
reminding the Commission of the limited nature of its jurisdiction and the
importance of not exceeding it or acting as a court of fourth instance in any
particular case.
Within this context, the United States participates reliably in individual
petitions processes before the Commission, as it has since at least 1977, the
year President Carter signed the American Convention on Human Rights.139
As the cases have become more varied and complex, U.S. participation in
hearings has likewise become more active, extensive, and substantive, with
strong positive effects for the system as a whole. Although the United States
has frequently argued that the Declaration, as a nontreaty, creates no binding
obligations for it, its submissions nonetheless consistently address both the
admissibility and merits of the underlying claim. The United States today
substantively briefs and argues all questions posed by alleged victims and their
representatives in each stage of case-based proceedings140 at the Commission’s
Washington, D.C., headquarters, at times arriving with full interagency delegations of experts in the distinct ﬁelds under consideration.141 It increasingly
also invites local or state authorities in whose jurisdiction the alleged violation
took place.
At the same time, while the United States hastens to emphasize that the
ﬁnal recommendations of the Commission are in fact just that – nonbinding

138

139

140

141

See Melish, “Rethinking the ‘Less as More’ Thesis,” op. cit., 207–74 (discussing common
jurisdictional errors in framing contentious claims); Tara J. Melish, “The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights: Defending Social Rights through Case-Based Petitions,” in
Malcolm Langford, ed., Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative and
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Although earlier cases had been lodged against the United States, it was in 1977 that the
ﬁrst case to proceed to a merits decision was submitted. See “Baby Boy” v. United States,
Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶ 1 (1981). The
United States extensively briefed this abortion-related case, using the regional instruments’
travaux préparatoires to support its argument that regional norms protecting the right to life
did not proscribe abortion absolutely, but rather allowed it to proceed under reasonable state
regulation.
This includes pre-admissibility, admissibility, merits, and follow-up/compliance stages. With
respect to the latter, the United States attended its ﬁrst follow-up meeting in March 2007 to
discuss compliance with the IACHR’s recommendations. See Dann v. United States, Case
II.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. C.H.P. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. (2002).
This is particularly true in cases dealing with national security issues.
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recommendations – it likewise takes measures to consider the propriety of
those recommendations and, to the extent that state agency behavior is implicated, to give state agents the opportunity to independently consider and give
effect to the Commission’s conclusions and recommendations. Similar to the
practice of other federal nations, decisions of the regional body are procedurally transmitted to the responsible federal department or agency and/or
state attorney generals for follow-up, within the bounds of their responsibilities, competence, and discretion.142 In this sense, the U.S. State Department
treats the Commission’s recommendations in much the same way it treats ICJ
decisions that affect state and local agents: it transmits the recommendations
or decision to the competent authority, leaving it to them – in function of
federalism considerations – to determine the appropriate response under the
circumstances.143 Speaking on the issue most recently in Medellı́n, the U.S.
Supreme Court has appeared to endorse this approach.144
The United States responds in a similar way to requests for precautionary
measures, whether by the Inter-American Commission or UN treaty bodies,
such as the CERD.145 Precautionary measures are urgent interim measures
of protection designed to prevent the occurrence or continuance of alleged
human rights abuses that threaten irreparable harm, particularly until the
merits of the underlying claim is considered. They are issued based on a
prima facie assessment, without prejudgment on the underlying merits, of
written communications that suggest abuse may be occurring.146 Although
the United States regularly contests the competence of treaty bodies to issue

142

143

144
145

146

Interview with Steven R. Hill, Att’y Adviser, Ofﬁce of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State,
in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Hill Interview].
For a discussion of the U.S. response to ICJ provisional measures and merits decisions in the
Breard, LaGrand, and Avena cases, see Murphy, op. cit. (“The initial fallout from the decisions
on the merits in LaGrand and Avena is a story of the federal government encouraging the
several states to take into account the decisions of the ICJ, without actually telling the states
that they must do so as a matter of federal law.”) (noting that “the United States sought to
implement [provisional] measures . . . principally by encouraging the commutation of death
sentences of the relevant convicts by governors or par ole boards” and by “embark[ing] on
an aggressive campaign to educate and train state law enforcement ofﬁcers regarding U.S.
obligations arising under the Vienna Convention, to the point of printing cards that ofﬁcers
were to carry with them and read out when arresting an alien”).
Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
The CERD Committee issued an “urgent action” request under its early-warning procedure to
the United States in March 2006 with respect to the Western Shoshone Peoples of the Western
Shoshone Nation, giving the United States four months to respond on the measures it has
taken in response. The United States has responded both in writing directly to the Committee
and in Annex II of its 2007 CERD Report, op. cit., in which it provides background information
on the case and U.S. responses to the underlying claim over the years.
See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 25,
op. cit. (“The granting of such measures and their adoption by the State shall not constitute a
prejudgment on the merits of a case.”).
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such measures, the State Department nonetheless follows a policy of formally
transmitting requests for precautionary measures as an informational notice
to the appropriate attorney general or responsible federal agency.147 It also
engages in associated hearings on the propriety of interim measures and on
follow-up thereto, reporting on the measures it has taken to ensure that precautionary measure requests are brought to the attention of the relevant body
or bodies and, where compliance follows, on the steps taken by that body in
response to the measures. Although far from the norm, federal and state agents
have on occasion complied with precautionary measure requests issued by the
Inter-American Commission.148
In sum, although the United States asserts that these contentious complaints
procedures generate nothing more than recommendations for the United
States to take under advisement – and participates in associated proceedings
expressly on that basis – it nonetheless treats the process as a formal, adjudicatory one.149 It actively engages in all stages of proceedings, employing the full
set of procedural rights available to it to defend U.S. policy interests within the
jurisdictional constraints of the Commission’s competence. Where defects are
identiﬁed, processes are at times initiated to consider whether further measures are necessary to address the underlying concern.150 This is true of both
individual complaints procedures under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
147

148

149

150

Hill Interview, op. cit. Such transmittals do not propose or encourage any particular action,
but are sent to the relevant authority for that authority to respond to in its discretion.
See, e.g., Ramos v. United States, Case 12.430, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 1/05,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 7 ¶ 89 (2005) (noting U.S. indication that federal district court
judge in Texas had postponed setting an execution date in light of the petition before the
Commission and request for precautionary measures) (“The Commission observes that this
arrangement has given practical effect to the Commission’s precautionary measures by preserving Mr. Moreno Ramos’ life and physical integrity pending the Commission’s consideration
of his complaint, and the Commission commends the efforts taken within the Texas judicial
system to preserve Mr. Moreno Ramos’ right of effective access to the inter-American human
rights system.”).
Notably, following submission of the Baby Boy case to the IACHR in 1977, four members of the
U.S. House of Representatives sent a letter to the IACHR in 1979, “in a spirit of cooperation
and with the intent of furthering the work of the Commission,” requesting an opinion on
“whether, if the United States loses, it would be subject to trade and diplomatic sanctions
similar to those imposed upon Cuba by the O.A.S. following, and partially on account of,
the human rights violations of the Castro regime?” It also requested suggestions on “how
legislation might be shaped in order to eliminate any doubts as to U.S. compliance with
IACHR standards in this regard.” “Baby Boy” v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Res. No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981), ¶19.
In other instances, the United States will indicate that it is taking measures to address the
issue even while asserting that the Commission lacks competence to consider it. See, e.g.,
Medina v. United States, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 31/05, ¶ 43 (2005) (asserting Commission’s lack of competence over Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, but
submitting nevertheless that the United States takes its obligations thereunder “very seriously
and has since 1998 undertaken an intensive, on-going and now permanently institutionalized
effort to improve compliance by federal, state and local government ofﬁcials . . . includ[ing]
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Commission and the collective complaints mechanism of the ILO, in which
U.S. participation is equally extensive.151
3. Other Promotional Mechanisms
The United States also actively engages with UN, OAS, and ILO treaty bodies
in other noncontentious ways aimed at facilitating more robust human rights
promotion at the domestic level. This may include coordinating with civil
society on treaty-based requirements to prepare national programs of action
to give treaty commitments domestic effect152 or issuing invitations to UN
and OAS special rapporteurs and independent experts to come to the United
States to undertake onsite visits or otherwise discuss issues under their special
mandates. The United States has, for example, authorized and cooperated with
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as it has undertaken onsite
visits to Florida, Puerto Rico, New York, California, Kansas, Pennsylvania,
Louisiana, and Texas to look into alleged abuses in the areas of state and
federal detention facilities and with respect to migrant laborers and their
families.153 U.S. cooperation is also expected should the Commission take
up pending proposals to investigate other alleged abuses in the United States,
such as housing discrimination and inappropriate use of electroshock weapons
by local police forces.
Similarly, the United States regularly accepts and facilitates country visits
by UN special rapporteurs and independent experts who request invitations
to visit the United States to engage in constructive dialogue with federal and
state ofﬁcials, NGOs, and civil society more broadly – most recently by the UN
Special Rapporteurs on the subjects of protecting human rights while countering terrorism,154 human rights of migrants,155 and racial discrimination. Such
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152

153
154

155

the publication of a 72-page brochure on Vienna Convention requirements as well as pocket
reference cards for arresting ofﬁcials and a training video”).
As of January 2008, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association had decided forty-nine
cases involving the United States, cases in which it frequently recognized the nation’s reliable
and engaged participation.
ILO Convention 182, for example, requires ratifying states to develop a National Program
of Action on ensuring child labor rights. The U.S. government initiated a process of review
with civil society organizations but ultimately concluded that no additional measures were
necessary.
For a list of all IACHR on-site visits, see http://www.iachr.org/visitas.eng.htm.
Press Release, OHCHR, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants to Visit United States,
UN Doc. HR/07/04 (Apr. 27, 2007) (announcing a U.S. invitation for country visit in May
2007).
See Eliane Engeler, “U.N. rights expert to probe U.S. treatment of illegal immigrants [sic],”
Associated Press, Apr. 27, 2007 (reporting on U.S.-facilitated visit in May 2007, with scheduled
stops in California, Arizona, Texas, Florida, Georgia, New York, and Washington, D.C.). The
UN expert was, however, denied access to certain facilities in Texas by local authorities.
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UN experts are mandated to develop a regular dialogue with relevant governmental and nongovernmental actors, exchange information, make recommendations, and identify and promote best practices on measures to respect
and ensure fundamental human rights. Consistent with the U.S. approach
to periodic reporting processes, U.S. ofﬁcials have at times noted that special
rapporteurs, through the noncontentious dialogue they engender with an array
of domestic governmental and nongovernmental actors, represent one of the
most promising ways of promoting change within the United States.156
C. INTEREST MANAGEMENT: THE PUSH-PULL OF DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY AGENDAS

As the preceding section’s examination reveals, U.S. engagement with international human rights treaty bodies is quite robust. The question of interest,
then, is how this level of engagement can be reconciled with popular notions
that the United States actively resists the domestic application of human rights
norms and thumbs its nose at human rights treaty body regimes? The answer,
I argue, lies in interest management. Speciﬁcally, it resides at the intersection of domestic and foreign policy pressures, and the mediating postures the
United States employs to steer a middle course through them. As with all international tribunals, engagement with human rights bodies involves important
push-pull dynamics among a plurality of interest groups, with some urging
greater engagement (the “push toward” factor) and others resisting engagement (the “pull away” factor). These push-pull vectors operate simultaneously
at the foreign policy level and at the domestic policy level. The U.S. position
has modulated within these countervailing tendencies, resting at momentary
middle grounds within the four corners of the dynamic157 as interest politics
change and distinct strategic opportunities evolve.
What appears clear, however, is that the United States is moving decisively
toward greater engagement with international human rights treaty bodies.
This shift is due both to growing pressures to engage at the foreign policy level
and to a gradual diffusion of interests in domestic constituencies opposed to
engagement. The net effect of the two dynamics, both accelerating since the
1990s, is an ever more robust engagement policy, albeit one that operates
within clearly parametered constraints that represent the continuing power of
“pull back” interests.
156
157

Hill Interview, op. cit.
Viewed diagramatically, this dynamic may be seen as operating over a plane with domestic
and foreign policy interests along one axis and push-pull tendencies along another. The U.S.
policy position locates itself within this four-cornered plane at convergence points along the
various and shifting vectors.
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Although the motivations for each shift are independent of each other, their
effects are mutually reinforcing and equally constitutive of the parameters of
U.S. human rights policy. To demonstrate the various levers in this interestmanagement process, the following two sections look, respectively, at the
push-pull dynamic as it plays out, ﬁrst, at the foreign policy level between
“realist” and “institutionalist” persuasions in the foreign policy establishment
and, second, at the domestic policy level between groups I call “insulationists”
and “incorporationists.”
Because these labels are so important to the analysis, it should be emphasized that the four corresponding groups are neither ideologically based nor
exclusive in their membership. Rather, each bundles adherents to one of four
distinct instrumental approaches to interest achievement, each directed to fostering a political environment most conducive to a given foreign or domestic
policy agenda. Their memberships are thus variable and politically contingent, with adherents straddling or moving into or out of groupings depending
on the precise issue at stake and shifting appreciations of policy opportunities.
1. Foreign Policy Interests: Net Push Toward Greater Treaty
Body Engagement
A body of scholarship has arisen of late, looking more closely at the foreign
policy dimension of U.S. human rights engagement and domestic policy making. In particular, whereas accounts of the U.S. human rights paradox often
focus narrowly on domestic politics and the partisan cleavages that historically
linked human rights with “anti-Americanism” and thus assured for forty years,
through veto-player politics, that the United States would neither ratify newly
adopted human rights treaties nor adopt broad-based “human rights” campaigns at home, this new literature turns attention back to the countervailing
inﬂuence of diplomatic and foreign policy pressures on changing formal U.S.
behavior on human rights questions within its own jurisdiction.158
This inﬂuence cannot be ignored. Just as it was determinative in inﬂuencing
the federal response to the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s,
when the international human rights regime was ﬁrst emerging,159 so, too,
is it determinative today, ﬁfty years later, as that regime has matured into a
set of legitimacy-bestowing international instruments and institutions. Two
intellectual camps have been most determinative in this regard, both heavily
158

159

See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy
(Princeton University Press, 2000); Carol Anderson, Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations
and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955 (Cambridge University Press,
2003).
See Dudziak, op. cit., chaps. 3–5.
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represented in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. They include groups
broadly referred to as “realists” and “institutionalists.”160
Realists include those who, following either classical or neo-structural versions of international relations’ realism theory, understand State behavior as
inﬂuenced by one of two realpolitik determinants: the raw power of a more
powerful State or an objective expectation of material beneﬁt, such as trade
beneﬁts, economic assistance, or debt reduction.161 Realists in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment thus tend to reject the usefulness of international institutions or norms, seeing them as mere window-dressing for real power and
interest. They seek instead to preserve the unconstrained prerogative of the
United States, as a world superpower, to protect national interests and respond
to foreign threats by all available means, including unilateral power whenever
necessary.
Institutionalists, on the other hand, see greater instrumental utility in engaging actively with both international institutions and global norms – including human rights norms. While they, too, believe that States act exclusively
in accordance with their instrumental interest,162 they see these interests as
being increasingly interwoven with participation in international cooperative,
peace-building, and dispute-resolution institutions.163 U.S. engagement with
international institutions thus constitutes for institutionalists an important and
instrumental foreign policy tool for promoting and defending U.S. interests
abroad, while conferring key reputational beneﬁts, ever more salient in global
politics particularly in the international human rights ﬁeld.164
While realists dominated U.S. human rights policy during the Cold War,165
and remain highly inﬂuential in the foreign policy establishment today, institutionalists have gained increasing prominence over the last two decades with
the dramatic proliferation of international institutions and rapid expansion of
the international human rights architecture. Within this context, the push-pull
dynamic over U.S. human rights policy as a foreign policy objective has shifted
160
161

162

163

164

165

For a brief overview of “realist” and “institutionalist” positions, see Murphy, op. cit.
For inﬂuential classical accounts of realism, see, for example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); and
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill 1979). More recent “neo realist”
scholarship has sought to reﬁne these classical understandings by drawing upon concepts in
game theory and law and economics. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, The Limits of
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005).
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 Yale L.J. 2599, 2649 (1997)
(referring to both as “instrumental interest theories”).
See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984).
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823
(2002) (suggesting a reputation-based model of state compliance with international law).
See generally Hartmann, op. cit.
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determinatively toward institutionalists, those favoring active U.S. engagement
with supranational human rights treaty regimes. For this group, human rights
engagement serves two primary strategic foreign policy goals: ﬁrst, renewal
of U.S. moral leadership in multilateral settings and, second, promotion of
human rights and democratic reforms in other countries. Both are directed to
furthering national security and global public order objectives, independent
of any domestic policy implication.
First, institutionalists appreciate that the international standing of U.S.
diplomats and their ability to lead in international processes of global dispute resolution are compromised by the nation’s failure to ratify core human
rights instruments and engage in their supervisory procedures. This failure,
which has left the nation increasingly in the formal company of rogue or
failed states,166 renders it out of step with its democratic partners and subjects
it to charges of hypocrisy by less democratic nations where the United States
seeks human rights improvements or security safeguards.167 On a real and
practical level, this impairs the United States’ ability to get its national security
and other global security priorities accomplished within multilateral settings,
at times making disagreement with the United States a “principled” human
rights stand in itself for nations.168 In this sense, ratiﬁcation and engagement

166

167

168

The United States stands alongside Somalia, a nation lacking a functional government, as the
only two nations among 194 UN Member States that have not ratiﬁed the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. The United States likewise stands among only eight nation-states not to
have ratiﬁed the CEDAW.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, “Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty
(CEDAW),” 34 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 263, 269 (2002) [hereinafter Koh, CEDAW] (“[F]rom
my direct experience as America’s chief human rights ofﬁcial, I can testify that our continuing
failure to ratify CEDAW has reduced our global standing, damaged our diplomatic relations,
and hindered our ability to lead in the international human rights community. . . . In particular,
our European and Latin American allies regularly question and criticize our isolation from
this treaty framework both in public diplomatic settings and private diplomatic meetings.”)
(reﬂecting testimony to Congress); Statement of Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, in U.S. Congress, Nov.
1979 (afﬁrming to Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “failure . . . to ratify [ICCPR,
ICESCR, CERD, and CAT] has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the conduct of [U.S.] human
rights policy,” undermining its “credibility and effectiveness”) (cited in Moravcsik, op. cit.,
at 194).
The United States has found that it is increasingly on the losing side of votes at the UN. U.S.
representatives have, accordingly, recognized that the mere fact that the United States takes a
strong stand on an issue may cause a number of states to vote against it, even if they have no
independent interest in doing so. A recent illustration occurred in a 2006 vote in a UN treaty
drafting committee regarding the inclusion of a politicized reference to “foreign occupation”
in the treaty’s preamble. Little support had been expressed in the drafting committee for the
phrase outside of one regional block. Nonetheless, upon U.S. insistence on a state-by-state rollcall vote on the issue (in a treaty otherwise agreed to by consensus), the United States could
garner the support of only four other nations. An overwhelming 102 states voted afﬁrmatively to
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serve as a tool through which the United States can reseat itself within the
“international community,” reassert its moral leadership role, and hence better
promote its national security agenda in multilateral settings, where most international work gets done. For institutionalists, this has been a particular priority
following the widely internationally condemned unilateral actions taken by
the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks.
The second factor, most commonly articulated by the U.S. State Department, involves recognition that full compliance by the United States with
international human rights treaty body procedures increases the visibility and
legitimacy of the procedures themselves, ratcheting up expectation levels for
their regular and concerted use, and thereby prodding other states to take the
procedures more seriously. Indeed, U.S. executive agencies recognize that
human rights treaty bodies – by providing an international spotlight for gross
abuses, giving voice to individuals and civil society groups seeking greater
human rights protections and transparency at home, and providing legitimacy
to domestic human rights and democracy movements – have initiated important conversations and processes in countries around the world, particularly
in transitional states.169 They also recognize that while the U.S. failure to ratify speciﬁc treaties has not likely caused other states to forego ratiﬁcation, it
may embolden some to turn ratiﬁcation into an empty political act, used as
a rhetorical device to claim greater commitment to human rights than the
United States without making corresponding changes in their policies and
practices at home.170
In this sense, although the foreign policy establishment may remain skeptical, or at best agnostic, about the usefulness of engagement for the United
States’ domestic human rights record, it nonetheless fully recognizes and values the importance of treaty body engagement for promoting human rights

169

170

retain the text, with 8 states abstaining. The dearth of support the United States could muster
in an ofﬁcial UN vote of this nature sent an unmistakable message. A similar message was
conveyed in the November 2006 General Assembly elections of members of the International
Law Commission, the ﬁrst such election in which the U.S. nominee failed to be elected
to the international body. See ILC, 2006 election of the International Law Commission, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/2006election.htm (visited Apr. 25, 2007).
See White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Mar. 16,
2006 (supporting human rights treaty bodies as an explicit part of the U.S. National Security
Strategy), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (visited Apr. 20, 2007). In
December 2006, the U.S. State Department issued “Guiding Principles on Non-Governmental
Organizations,” a set of ten principles to guide U.S. human rights policy around the world,
in recognition that NGOs “are essential to the development and success of free societies and that they play a vital role in ensuring accountable, democratic government.” See
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/77771.htm (visited Apr. 20, 2007).
With respect to the frequency of treaty ratiﬁcation as an empty political act, see generally Oona
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L. J. 1935 (2002).
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and democracy in less democratically stable states.171 By actively and constructively engaging with these procedures – through high-level government
participation, comprehensive reporting, well-prepared and legally argued oral
and written interventions, civil society participation, and a high degree of
transparency – the United States thus seeks, through its example, to encourage other states to do the same. It is, in this sense, constitutive of the United
States’ already heavy human rights investments in its broader national security
agenda,172 a key strategy for promoting good practices in other states and hence
contributing to global security as a whole.173
These two general “push” factors appear to be the dominant inﬂuences
motivating U.S. engagement policy with international treaty bodies. They are,
however, blunted at the margins by certain “pull away” or “realist” tendencies.
These, led by foreign-policy-focused national security entities, such as the
National Security Council and Department of Defense – with the legal buttress
of the U.S. Justice Department174 – tend to be little concerned by most of what
human rights tribunals do and hence have less interest in determining U.S.
engagements with them. They are more concerned with the implications of
U.S. engagement with other international courts and tribunals discussed in this
volume, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International
Court of Justice (ICJ),175 that more directly touch on state-to-state national
security and international defense prerogatives. This follows from the fact
that human rights tribunals do not tend to deal directly with interstate or
transjurisdictional disputes that may involve threats to national security or
other interests emanating from abroad176 – for which realists seek to maintain
171
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176

It serves, in this sense, to help restore a balance between ratifying nations whose formal treaty
commitments ﬁnd analogues in domestic policy and practice and those that do not.
The United States invests heavily and plays an active role in promoting human rights abroad.
This takes shape through its annual country reports on the human rights situation of 194
countries around the world, its substantial bilateral and multilateral aid, support of international
human rights treaty bodies, and substantial diplomatic efforts.
In this respect, although some note that U.S. ratiﬁcation has little effect on other states’ decision
to ratify or not, see Moravcsik, op. cit. (ﬁnding little empirical evidence to support common
claim), the level and scope of U.S. participation in treaty body processes or lack thereof can be
expected to have a notable effect on the scope of other states’ participation, given the ratchet-up
effect it has on community expectations.
The U.S. Department of Justice under the George W. Bush administration has played a central
role in crafting legal arguments to resist international engagement and provide justiﬁcation
for “war on terror” policies that often put the United States at loggerheads with the rest of the
world. In so doing, it has increasingly been at policy odds with the U.S. Department of State.
Cf. Neil Lewis, “Justice Dept. under Obama Is Preparing for Doctrinal Shift in Policies of
Bush Years,” New York Times, Feb. 2, 2009, at A14.
See chapters 6 and 4, respectively.
Optional interstate complaint mechanisms, though rarely used, are in fact established under
most human rights treaties. Notably, the United States has recognized the competence of the
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a supple and unconstrained response capability. Rather, they deal exclusively
with U.S. conduct vis-à-vis persons subject to its own jurisdiction. As such,
the geopolitical calculations of engagement tend to be distinct from, and less
sensitive than, those related to most other international tribunals.
Realist tendencies nonetheless recognize that too full an engagement with
human rights treaty bodies might function in practice to constrain U.S. warmaking or defense functions, especially as exercised abroad. Foreign policy
realists thus pull back in areas where this might occur. That is, whereas institutionalists, for the reasons noted earlier, tend to prevail on the question of
engagement once treaty ratiﬁcation has been effected, their realist counterparts
play an important role in policing the boundaries of human rights supervision,
“pulling back” against the institutionalists’ “push forward” wherever human
rights supervision may conceivably circumscribe U.S. national security discretion and war-related undertakings.
The United States has mediated these push-pull concerns by adopting an
engagement policy that participates fully in human rights treaty body mechanisms, except to the extent they purport to address extraterritorial concerns or
matters that overlap with international humanitarian law or the law of armed
conﬂict. That is, the United States has adopted a foreign policy position that
supports active U.S. engagement with human rights treaty bodies in all but
these two sensitive areas deﬁned as beyond the jurisdictional competence
of international human rights supervision. Although these positions put the
United States in an increasingly adversarial posture vis-à-vis human rights
treaty bodies, given extraterritorial abuses committed in response to the 9/11
terrorist attacks and the U.S. war against Iraq and Afghanistan,177 they may be
seen as a core mediating technique between U.S. institutionalist and realist
positions with respect to achieving its varied foreign policy objectives.

177

UN Human Rights Committee to examine interstate complaints against it under the ICCPR.
See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781–01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992).
The U.S. “pull-back” posture has the express effect of opening a space to which contested practices may be removed without the threat of supervisory censure by human rights treaty bodies.
This has created growing international alarm as the United States has increasingly moved “war
on terror” abuses off-shore, including the holding of “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay,
third-party states, and off-shore vessels, and engaged in the practice of extraordinary rendition.
See, e.g., Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the
Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333 (2007).
Prior to the U.S. presentation of its second and third periodic report to the UN Human
Rights Committee in July 2006, a member of the UN Committee lamented privately to this
author the fact that the United States had not submitted its report on time, the report being
due before the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Had the report been submitted on time, the Committee
would not have had to focus so narrowly on the high-proﬁle abuses in Guantanamo, Abu
Graib, and other extraterritorial loci, and could have addressed itself more fully to the more
general human rights issues affecting the U.S. population as a whole.
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2. Domestic Policy Interests: From Pull to Push – The Evolution
of Domestic Social Struggles
The foreign policy considerations just described have dominated in determining current U.S. engagement modalities with human rights treaty bodies over
the last decade. The prior question of whether the United States will in fact
ratify a given treaty, and thus open itself to treaty body engagement, remains
a decision in which domestic politics are distinctly paramount. The pushpull dynamic on U.S. decision makers at this level functions not between
foreign policy institutionalists and realists but between domestic groups we
may term “insulationists” and “incorporationists.” The former seek to insulate
domestic law from the inﬂuence of international human rights constructions,
ﬁnding a domestic environment free from human rights methodologies and
migrations more amenable to achieving their substantive political policy preferences. They oppose U.S. ratiﬁcation of human rights treaties and vigorously
object to the use of human rights norms by domestic courts. Incorporationists,
by contrast, ﬁnd the mediating inﬂuence of international human rights law
on domestic politics helpful to their domestic policy agenda, which generally favors broader individual rights interpretations, with fewer permissible
restrictions. They thus seek to incorporate international human rights norms
and human rights methodologies into domestic law and decision-making processes, through treaty ratiﬁcation, local monitoring and interpretation initiatives, treaty body engagement, grassroots mobilization, judicial oversight, and
direct implementing legislation at local, state, and federal levels.
This push-pull dynamic has played out in virtually every domestic social
struggle since the international human rights regime ﬁrst emerged sixty years
ago. Thus, the civil rights era demands of incorporationists in the ﬁfties and
sixties for the federal government to ensure respect for internationally protected human rights guarantees of racial equality were quickly countered by
insulationists’ initiatives to launch “states’ rights” movements,178 red-baiting
campaigns against rights advocates (and internationalism generally), and the
fateful Bricker Amendment, a concerted attempt to constitutionally insulate
domestic law from all treaty-related modiﬁcations.179 These insulation initiatives, intersecting with Cold War politics, led to a series of actions and political
178

179

These movements, which included the founding of a “states’ rights” political party, sought to
insulate local segregationist and abusive policies from the illumination of federal constitutional,
statutory, and treaty law.
For an animating description of the process through which the proposed constitutional amendment (and a watered-down version of it) failed, see Anderson, op. cit. Had it passed it still of
course would have required approval in three-quarters of U.S. states to take effect. U.S. Const.,
art. V.
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compromises that ensured that human rights remained off the domestic policymaking agenda for the next quarter century. Since the 1970s, this dynamic
has played out with similar intensity over “family values,” abortion, parental
rights, and personal lifestyle-choice debates, with incorporationists seeking
broad human rights statements from international treaty bodies to incorporate into domestic advocacy and litigation strategies and insulationists seeking
to foreclose all reference by domestic legislatures and courts to international
decisions or comparative rights jurisprudence.180
In this politicized struggle over the control of legal rights meaning, domestic
policy insulationists – fewer in number but better in organization, funding,
and insider/beltway political contacts – have historically been dominant.181
The reasons for this, at least from the perspective of treaty ratiﬁcation, are
reviewed by Professor Moravcsik in his discussion of the “U.S. human rights
paradox.”182 They center on two factors: ﬁrst, the extreme decentralization
and fragmentation of U.S. political institutions, which make them uniquely
amenable to veto-group politics, and, second, a strong conservative minority
that has consistently utilized veto players, most notably in the U.S. Senate,
to achieve its insulationist agenda. Indeed, employing a culturally resonant
rhetoric sounding in constitutional democracy, this minority has historically
been successful in rallying partisan afﬁliates and mobilizing veto players to
block ratiﬁcation of human rights treaties, either by bottlenecking them in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee or by foreclosing the ability to achieve
super-majority advice and consent in the full Senate.
The powerful political and ﬁnancial lobby of these interest groups and
their unique control over veto players in the political process – particularly
over Republican majorities in the Senate – explain the U.S. historic failure
to ratify human rights treaties apace with similarly minded nations, those
equally committed to domestic human rights guarantees.183 It nonetheless
fails as a reliable explanatory framework for predicting U.S. human rights
engagements in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Such an explanation would have to
180
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See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (seeking to
preclude domestic courts from referring to “judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign
institutions” in determining the meaning of U.S. laws).
Liberal advocacy and community-based groups readily recognize that they have been insufﬁciently successful in organizationally linking their grassroots campaigns and local support with
beltway politics, and hence have had a much less effective inﬂuence in Washington than their
numbers should indicate.
See Moravcsik, op. cit.
It also helps to explain why the United States, after ratifying the ICCPR, CERD, and CAT
in 1992 and 1994, did not ratify the CRC and CEDAW from 1994 to 2006, when Republicans
held majorities in the Senate and “family values” groups were actively lobbying beltway veto
players against ratiﬁcation.
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account for three closely related facts: one, U.S. ratiﬁcation of an increasingly
broad spectrum of human rights treaties in the 1990s that failed, over time,
to generate or sustain strong issue-speciﬁc oppositional lobbies (including the
ICCPR, CERD, CAT, and child-protective labor rights treaties); two, active
U.S. engagement in the international supervisory regimes corresponding to
these treaties, including in areas of substantive overlap with nonratiﬁed treaties,
such as the CRC, CEDAW, and ICESCR; and, three, the altered opportunity
structure both of the above factors create for domestic advocates – that is,
those pushing for greater engagement, and those pulling away from it – as
they perpetually recreate and evolve their strategies to better achieve distinct
substantive policy preferences in changing political environments.
That is, a fully explanatory description of U.S. human rights politics must
account not only for the structural potential for mobilized political lobbies to
block treaty ratiﬁcation.184 It must account as well for the shifting incentive
structure for them to do so over time and the relative receptivity of the population (and hence potential veto players) to traditional insulationist arguments.
As these environmental factors change, so too does the importance of “extreme
decentralization” as a structural condition favoring – rather than disfavoring –
insulation. At the same time, insulationism, like incorporationism, has always
been an instrumental strategy for its proponents, supported to create a domestic political environment most conducive to particular policy agendas. As soon
as it ceases to bring comparative advantage, it will be discarded and replaced
by a new set of strategies and supporting ideologies. This is precisely what we
are beginning to see today.
The United States is thus faced in the twenty-ﬁrst century with a new
set of domestic pressures in its human rights engagement policy. It is no
longer exclusively a push-pull dynamic between “liberal” and “conservative”
interest groups, with the latter consistently prevailing – as they did from the
1950s to 1980s – through their unique ability to block ratiﬁcation of human
rights treaties, and hence, together with a particular brand of politicallyresonant rights absolutism, preempt human rights conversations from deepening domestically. Rather, with U.S. ratiﬁcation of core human rights treaties in
the 1990s, it is increasingly becoming a push-push dynamic in the twenty-ﬁrst
century. That is, liberal interest groups, true to their incorporationist heritage,
continue to push for greater U.S. engagement with human rights treaties and
treaty bodies as a means of bringing domestic law, policies, and practice more
fully into line with internationally recognized human rights norms, norms
184

The mere existence of a vocal conservative minority and institutional amenability to veto
politics as a treaty-blocking option does not, in itself, speak to the utility of insulationist
strategies to the conservative political agenda.
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they have spent decades constructing.185 Conservative interest groups, for their
part, faced with a growing incorporationist reality, have increasingly realized
that insulationism alone may not be helpful to their agendas, particularly
as they relate to lifestyle, personal choice, and “family values” issues. Many
such groups are thus urging the United States not to disengage with international human rights bodies but rather to engage more fully – albeit with a
distinct agenda. That is, they do not seek the domestication of presently recognized international norms, as do liberals, but rather – in a strategic reversal of
process – the internationalization of socially conservative rights constructions
more amenable to their domestic policy agenda, which may then be subject to
incorporation at some later date. Where opportunities emerge, traditional insulationists are increasingly using partisan political connections to press the U.S.
diplomatic (and legislative) corps to undertake this agenda on their behalf.186
Because this transition is so important for understanding current U.S.
human rights politics, it is useful to highlight the constitutive processes that
led to it. The techniques the United States adopts to mediate between these
dueling push-push pressures will be taken up more fully in Part D.
I. Diminishing U.S. Receptivity to Insulationism
Historically, insulationism has been employed by socially and politically conservative interest groups as a way to bypass the mobilizing inﬂuence of human
rights law on those wishing to effect equality or dignity-based change in the
U.S. social structure. Because such change is rhetorically consistent with
the promise of the U.S. Constitution – indeed, with the country’s national
narrative187 – it has been necessary to create an ideational structure that pits
international human rights law against U.S. constitutional democracy, framing
the former as undemocratic and even anti-American. This is possible through
a rhetorical manipulation of international human rights law that equates it
with absolutist, externally deﬁned policy outcomes, intrinsically and automatically superior to domestic determinations. In fact, both sides of the political
spectrum have tended to rely on rights-absolutist constructions to appeal to
their respective constituencies, one side afﬁrming that international treaty law
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Notably, they have often helped construct these norms in the mold of strong U.S. constitutional
rights protections.
See, for example, discussion in Part C.2.III infra.
See Jack M. Balkin, “Brown as Icon,” in Balkin ed., What “Brown v. Board of Education” Should
Have Said 5 (NYU Press, 2001) (describing as the “Great Progressive Narrative” that “widely
held and often repeated story of deep resonance in American culture, which sees America’s
basic ideals of liberty and equality as promises for the future to be achieved eventually through
historical struggle”).
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requires the immediate modiﬁcation of domestic law to conform strictly to
international treaty body views and policy preferences, the other that international law constructions conﬂict with deliberative democracy at home.
It is in fact precisely this rights absolutism that is responsible for the
contentiousness of human rights treaty law engagements in U.S. domestic
politics and, speciﬁcally, the historic ability of veto politics to successfully
block human rights treaty ratiﬁcations. That is, opponents have mobilized
inﬂuential veto players by representing human rights law as a doctrine of
foreign-determined meaning imposed on nonconsenting domestic populations. Nationalistic urgency is then tied to ratiﬁcation-blocking campaigns by
asserting that ratiﬁcation will force the United States to adopt a set of externally
deﬁned policies that are morally or socially objectionable to a large segment
of the population. Although this once took the form of imagining UN bodies
as communist-inspired institutions that would force communities to desegregate their schools, eateries, pools, and public accommodations and lead to
widespread miscegenation188 – issues that could mobilize powerful domestic
constituencies against ratiﬁcation – it now asserts that adhesion to currently
unratiﬁed human rights treaties, such as the CRC and CEDAW, will require
immediate mandatory legalization of same-sex marriage, provision of abortion
and contraception on demand, decriminalization of prostitution, the turning
over of child rearing to the state, and other measures that could not currently
be achieved through national-level democratic processes alone.189
It is this caricatured vision of human rights treaty law – one permitting of no
national discretion in the crafting of “appropriate” policies – that gives rise and
animating force to “national sovereignty,” “states’ rights,” and other “rightscultural” objections.190 These objections, although plainly instrumental given
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See, for example, William Fleming, Danger to America: The Draft Covenant on Human Rights,
37 A.B.A. Journal 739, 794-99 (1951) (claiming that the Draft Covenant on Human Rights is the
“perfect embodiment of . . . unmitigated socialism”); Frank E. Holman, International Proposals
Affecting So-Called Human Rights, 14 Law & Contemp. Probs. 479, 483 (1949 (claiming that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will force the United States to allow interracial
marriages).
The same strategy has been used with the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
with opponents arguing in the 1970s that it would lead to women being drafted by the military
and to public unisex bathrooms. Today it is warned that its passage would compel courts
to approve same-sex marriage and deny Social Security beneﬁts for housewives and widows.
See Juliet Eilperin, “New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment,” Washington Post,
Mar. 28, 2007, A1, A4 (citing arguments of Eagle Forum President Phyllis Schlaﬂy and other
conservative opponents); see also Phyllis Schlaﬂy, Time to Unsign CEDAW (Feb. 14, 2007) at
http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2007/feb07/07–02-14.html (visited Apr. 20, 2007).
It also gives rise to academic critiques of human rights advocacy. See, e.g., David W. Kennedy,
The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 99
(2001).
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the subsidiary structure of human rights law, have high political traction
in the U.S. popular mind-set and hence are effective mobilizing tools for
capturing key veto players to block ratiﬁcation when perceived as politically
advantageous.
This blocking process reliably works, however, only to the extent a politically
inﬂuential minority can be convinced, or can convince core constituencies, of
two critical factors with respect to any given human rights treaty: one, that ratiﬁcation will compel the immediate adoption of laws and policies determined
by external (not domestic) decision makers; and, two, that such policies are
socially or morally repugnant or otherwise contrary to group interests. Both
propositions have become increasingly difﬁcult to sustain over the past decade,
as the U.S. ratiﬁcation record reveals.
First, the idea that human rights treaty ratiﬁcation will compel the United
States blindly to adopt externally deﬁned policies is today unsupportable. As a
legal matter, the United States has removed all basis for doubt over the issue
by adopting the consistent practice of attaching non-self-execution clauses
to human rights treaties upon ratiﬁcation.191 Such clauses stipulate that any
change to domestic law required by international treaty commitments must
be implemented through the ordinary legislative process, in which federal,
state, and local voices may all be heard, not through direct judicial constructions unmediated by “deliberative democracy.”192 This policy, directly responsive to rights-absolutist constructions that sustain “states’ rights” and “national
sovereignty” rhetoric, effectively removes the key mobilizing rationale behind
policy-driven opposition to ratiﬁcation initiatives.193 At the same time, it has
become increasingly clear, as a factual matter, that U.S. ratiﬁcation of the
ICCPR, CERD, CAT, ILO Convention 182, and the two CRC optional protocols – and submission to the jurisdiction of their supervisory treaty bodies –
has not forced the United States to adopt extremist policies that were not fully
vetted by domestic political processes. There is no reason to believe that this
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In providing its advice and consent to the ICCPR in 1992, for example, the Senate declared
that “the provisions of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.” 138 Cong.
Rec. S4781, at S4784 (1992). The Senate stated that the declaration was meant “to clarify that
the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts.” S. Rep. No. 102-23, at
15 (1992).
In its decision in Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) the Supreme Court appeared to
adopt a different, more expansive interpretation of non-self-execution that does not conform
to the Senate’s stated intent in attaching such clauses to human rights treaties. Medellı́n, 128
S. Ct. at n.2.
This concern over direct judicial enforcement of human rights treaty law tends to be the
principal objection of opponents of U.S. human rights incorporation. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith,
Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law? 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 327
(2000).
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will not likewise be true with U.S. ratiﬁcation of additional treaties, such as
the CRC, CEDAW, CRPD, and the ICESCR.
Second, given broad social, cultural, and attitudinal changes in the United
States over the last two decades, domestic policy changes claimed to be
required by human rights treaty ratiﬁcation simply are not sufﬁciently unpalatable to U.S. interest groups in the twenty-ﬁrst century to sustain veto politics
for all but a small number of content-speciﬁc treaties. Such treaties are generally those associated with women and children’s role in the family and
their access to contraception, abortion, and “integral health services.” These
issues – like those on sexual orientation, marriage, prayer, and Israel – are
those on which socially conservative minority groups continue to hold powerful domestic sway.194 This narrowing environment in which veto politics can
effectively function follows from the changing interest politics and shifting
political alliances that social struggle and norm internalization have brought
with time. Indeed, as the principal social struggles turned in the past halfcentury from race and Cold War divisions to “moral values” and “lifestyle
choice” issues, old social alliances broke down and the treaty-opposition
agenda narrowed, becoming more issue speciﬁc and less capable of mobilizing
inﬂuential players across broad social sectors.195 At the same time, many politically and ﬁnancially inﬂuential domestic groups – such as the U.S. business
and legal communities – that once reliably opposed incorporation have today
become, for a diversity of self-interested and non-self-interested motivations,
active proponents of U.S. ratiﬁcation of human rights treaties.196 The U.S.
business community, for example, has taken energetic part in ILO treaty drafting processes (particularly where child labor protections are at issue), actively
lobbying the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for speedy ratiﬁcation and
attaining it even under strong Senate Republican majorities.197
194

195

196

197

Signiﬁcantly, this sway was magniﬁed in the eight years of the George W. Bush presidency,
given the special access such groups had to the White House and formal positions of power.
Interestingly, it has necessitated that many conservative groups, long opposed to internationalism, have had to extend their strategic embrace to like-minded allies beyond domestic
borders.
The American Bar Association was a powerful and highly inﬂuential opponent of human
rights treaties in the late forties and ﬁfties, see, e.g., Fleming, op. cit. (citing arguments of
the ABA President); it today actively supports ratiﬁcation of CEDAW, CRC, ICESCR, and
the American Convention, albeit with a standard set of reservations, understandings and
declarations (RUDs).
This was true with both ILO Convention 182 and the two optional protocols to the CRC, each
ratiﬁed under Republican Senate majorities with the support of the U.S. business community.
See, e.g., “U.S. Business Community’s Letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor”, Sept. 23, 1999, at http://www.uscib.org/
index.asp?documentID=1352 (visited Apr. 20, 2007) (providing reasons U.S. business
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Given the nature of the U.S. political structure, these shifting alliances
have led to a predictable outcome. With broad national support for human
rights treaty ratiﬁcation generally, targeted pro-ratiﬁcation lobbying by certain
inﬂuential groups, and veto players mobilizable only with respect to limited “family value” subject matters, the United States proceeded to ratify the
ICCPR, CERD, CAT, and a variety of labor and child rights treaties in the
1990s and early 2000s. It will not be long before additional treaties are ratiﬁed,
particularly where coordinated civil society ratiﬁcation campaigns intersect
with Democratic control of the U.S. Senate, as will be the case in at least 2009
and 2010.
II. Creeping Incorporation, Despite Insulationist Obstruction
At the same time, it has become increasingly clear that strategies focused on
insulation alone – most notably, ratiﬁcation blocking and the inclusion of
a standard package of reservations, understandings, declarations with treaty
ratiﬁcation198 – are no longer reliable in insulating the U.S. domestic system
from human rights methodologies and migrations. This has resulted from
the many innovative and constantly adapting strategies undertaken by incorporationists over the years, designed to circumvent the blocking potential of
traditional insulationist tactics. Whereas these traditional tactics have focused
on top-down insulation, mobilizing federal veto players through rhetorical
appeals to states’ rights and federalism-based safeguards on localized experimentation, the new incorporationist strategies seek in fact to operationalize
these appeals: they start at the grassroots and incorporate upward. In this regard,
it is important to underscore that while “extreme decentralization” or “political
fragmentation” has been identiﬁed as a structural factor of the U.S. political
system that favors top-down insulation,199 it is – just as critically – a structural
factor of the U.S. political system that favors ﬁlter-up incorporation.200 The

community, including U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable, supports U.S.
ratiﬁcation). The U.S. business community has also become a strong and inﬂuential supporter
of universal health insurance in the United States. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, “What’s the One
Thing Big Business and the Left Have in Common?” New York Times, April 1, 2007.
198 For the package of Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations (RUDs) under the CERD,
ICCPR, and CAT, see 140 Cong. Rec. S7634–02 (daily ed., June 24, 1994), 138 Cong. Rec.
S4781–01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992), and Cong. Rec. S17486–01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). Of
course, not all RUDs are aimed at insulation; many are required by constitutional constraints
and are fully consistent, in both letter and spirit, with international law.
199 See Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” op. cit., at 186–90, 197.
200 In view of this in the judicial ﬁeld, William Brennan famously called on state courts to continue
to expand strong individual rights protections under state constitutions, given federal judicial
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ability of the two in our Madisonian democracy to “resist and frustrate the
measures of the other”201 has been one of the deﬁning characteristics of U.S.
human rights politics from the late twentieth to early twenty-ﬁrst centuries.
This can be seen in a wide variety of modern incorporationist tactics.
First, with ratiﬁcation of certain domestically popular human rights treaties
impeded at the federal level by veto politics, incorporationists have gone
straight to their local and state governments seeking direct localized incorporation, with growing success rates. With respect to CEDAW and the CRC, for
example, governmental bodies in scores of U.S. states, territories, cities, and
localities have adopted resolutions or instruments endorsing the conventions
or adopting them on behalf of their jurisdictions.202 These initiatives have
at times been accompanied by innovative community-based supervision and
other follow-up procedures to monitor local-level progress in achieving treatyrelated commitments and to ensure implementation of locally relevant solutions to the problems identiﬁed. Initiatives in San Francisco,203 Berkeley,204
“backsliding” in the 1970s. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489–504 (1977).
201 “Federalist 46” (James Madison) (discussing U.S. federal structure); cf. Moravcsik, op. cit., at
197 (“The institutional odds against any fundamental change [in U.S. human rights policy] in
Madison’s republic are high.”)
202 See, e.g., Chicago City Council, Resolution (Feb. 11, 2009) (resolving to “advance policies and
practices [that] are in harmony with the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child in all city [sic] and organizations that address issues directly affecting the City’s children.”); Koh, CEDAW, op. cit., at 274 and nn. 48–50 (“Far from CEDAW imposing unwanted
obligations on local governments, local governments are in fact responding to the demands
of their citizens, who have become impatient at the lack of federal action to implement these
universal norms into American law.”).
203 For a copy of the San Francisco city ordinance, see San Francisco, Cal., Administrative Code,
ch. 12K (2001), at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedﬁles/cosw/cedaw/pdf/appenda.pdf (visited
Apr. 20, 2007). The San Francisco initiative represents an experiment in localized replication
of UN periodic reporting, constructive dialogue, and expert recommendation processes. It
speciﬁcally establishes a local CEDAW Task Force, composed of eleven elected representatives from both government and civil society, to work with the Human Rights Commission
and city departments to identify discrimination against women and girls and to implement
human rights principles at the city level. For related documents, see http://www.sfgov.org/
site/dosw_page.asp?id=19725 (visited Apr. 20, 2007). See generally Stacy Laira Lozner, Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW Ordinance and the New
York City Human Rights Initiative, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 768 (2004).
204 On February 27, 2007, the Berkeley City Council adopted a resolution requiring the city
manager to supervise a periodic reporting process on the city’s progress in eliminating racial
discrimination, in accordance with the CERD. See Resolution No. 63,596-N.S. Eliminating
Racial Discrimination. The Ofﬁce of the City Manager thereupon created a template and
sent it to every city agency in Berkeley seeking information on racial discrimination. The ﬁrst
Berkeley City report, submitted on June 26, 2007, was likewise to be sent to the UN CERD
Committee in anticipation of its February 2008 review of the United States as a whole, as well
as the attorney general of California.
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New York City,205 Pennsylvania,206 and Massachusetts207 have been particularly noteworthy, although forms of localized human rights incorporation are
apparent at the grassroots throughout the country.208 City and state governments are, in response, increasingly taking a human-rights-based approach
to community problem solving, including with respect to the few treaties
that vocal conservative minorities continue to be able to block at the federal
level.209
Second, even where federal ratiﬁcation is attained, non-self-execution
clauses have posed a prima facie, if often overstated, dilemma for domestic
human rights advocates. These jurisdictional clauses bar domestic courts from
entertaining private causes of action arising directly under treaty law, requiring
instead that independent causes of action be identiﬁed under U.S. statutory,
In New York City, a bill was introduced to the city council in late 2004 to turn CEDAW
and CERD into statewide principles of governance, to be interpreted and applied by state
and city human rights commissions with competence over local disputes, reported on by city
government, and periodically reviewed by a city task force. See Bill, Int. 512-A “New York City
Human Rights Government Operations Audit Law.” The bill would require that city government departments and programs review their policies and programs to determine their effects
on women and racial minorities and report on those impacts for review by a city task force. For
information on the New York City Human Rights Initiative, http://www.nychri.org/frame.html
(visited Apr. 20, 2007). The bill is up for reintroduction in 2009.
206 In 2002, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed a resolution establishing a House
committee to “study and investigate the integration of human rights standards in Pennsylvania’s
laws and policies.” See House Resolution 473 (2002). In 2003, House Resolution No. 144
reestablished the select committee to continue its work. Public hearings were held throughout
the state on the rights to health, housing, employment, transportation, and nutrition, and the
House Select Committee’s conclusions and recommendations were issued on November 30,
2004.
207 In Massachusetts, House Bill No. 706 was proposed in 2005 to establish a special commission
to review the integration of international human rights standards into the commonwealth’s
laws and policies. It would authorize the state legislature to investigate human rights abuses
through a series of public hearings, drawing conclusions and making recommendations for
changes in state and local policy.
208 In Chicago, for example, a local city council adopted a right-to-housing bill that brought in
signiﬁcant federal dollars. “National truth commissions” or “community hearings” to expose
locally identiﬁed deﬁciencies in U.S. policies and practices vis-à-vis core human rights instruments have also been undertaken locally around the country. See, e.g., Poor Peoples’ Economic Human Rights Campaign, National Truth Commission: Shining a Light on Poverty in
the USA, at http://www.economichumanrights.org/ntc_report1.shtml (visited Apr. 20, 2007).
Efforts at local periodic reporting on human rights compliance are also being advanced in
Portland, Oregon, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
209 This is particularly true with respect to CEDAW and the CRC. The United States has also
not ratiﬁed the ICESCR and American Convention. The reasons, however, do not appear to
be veto politics but simply the lack of any organized domestic constituency pushing strongly
for ratiﬁcation of either. That is, although there is no vocal minority actively obstructing
ratiﬁcation, neither is there yet any strong domestic advocacy movement pushing for ratiﬁcation.
205
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constitutional, or common law. Incorporationists have responded by increasingly pressing domestic courts to apply human rights treaty law not directly, but
rather indirectly – used as a nonbinding interpretive aid or source of persuasive
authority in discerning meaning under independent private causes of action.210
U.S. courts, with their long historical pedigree of reference to international
law, foreign practice, and foreign court judgments, have often been willing to
adopt this approach, particularly with respect to state and federal constitutional
provisions that are direct analogues to treaty-based norms, such as due process
and cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.211 State courts, the principal
protagonists in cooperative judicial federalism, may be especially amenable to
such human rights migrations in interpreting state constitutional guarantees.
This is particularly true where such guarantees have been directly inﬂuenced
in their drafting by international human rights law212 or where they include
normative protection for rights – such as those to health, education, welfare, or
human dignity – that have no direct federal constitutional parallels and thus
for which comparative foreign law and human rights sources are particularly
useful.213 Although insulationist resistance to this judicial methodology
remains sharp,214 the movement toward greater U.S. judicial reliance on transjurisdictional human rights dialogues is unmistakable; it represents an area
of growing U.S. human rights incorporation of ratiﬁed, and even unratiﬁed,
treaty law.215
210

211

212

213

214

215

In the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 term, all nine justices endorsed the view that treaty interpretations by international tribunals were entitled to “respectful consideration” by U.S. courts.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2683 (2006); id. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Cleveland, op. cit.; Jackson, “Constitutional Comparisons,” op. cit. at 109 (“references
to foreign and international sources occur episodically in constitutional decisions throughout
the [Supreme] Court’s history”); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law,
98 Am. J. Int’l L. 43, 43–45 (2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in
Constitutional Interpretation, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 82, 83–84) (2004).
See, e.g., Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational
Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15, 21–27 (2004) (describing inﬂuence of Universal
Declaration of Human Rights on text of Montana Constitution).
See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International
Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 359 (2006).
This resistance was perhaps most powerfully manifested in two resolutions introduced to the
U.S. House of Representatives in 2004 and 2005, respectively, although neither came to a full
vote. Each expressed the sense of their cosponsors that “judicial determinations regarding the
meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform
an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.” H.R. Res. 568,
108th Cong. (2004), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c108:1:./temp/∼mdbsmtQvNi::
(visited Apr. 20, 2007); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
D?c109:2:./temp/∼mdbsmtQvNi:: (visited Apr. 20, 2007).
The methodology, given the noncontrolling nature of its inputs, allows domestic judges
to draw not only on the growing set of international human rights treaty norms that the
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Third, as with non-self-execution clauses, incorporationists have not been
deterred by declarations or understandings attached to human rights treaties
upon ratiﬁcation that purport to afﬁrm that U.S. laws are fully in compliance
with treaty norms and hence require no modiﬁcation. Rather, incorporationists
have persistently used treaty body procedures – particularly periodic reporting
and contentious complaints – to draw attention to perceived gaps and deﬁciencies in U.S. law, policies, and practices and to press government ofﬁcials to
respond to identiﬁed problems within a human rights framework. They have
done so by working not only to attain strong issue-speciﬁc conclusions and
recommendations from treaty bodies but, most important, to then ensure that
those conclusions and recommendations are effectively addressed through
increasingly institutionalized mechanisms and participatory processes at federal, state, and local levels. At the same time, “shadow report” procedures that
accompany periodic reporting processes216 are now regularly used by incorporationists as a teaching and awareness-raising tactic, employed as a means
to train local communities in how to use human rights methodologies and
understandings to address problems of local concern and to frame dialogues
with governmental entities. The grassroots analyses produced from shadow
reporting exercises are then used not only for formal reporting purposes in
Geneva217 but, most signiﬁcantly, for pressing local, state, and federal ofﬁcials
for meaningful, socially relevant reforms in domestic communities.
Finally, the continued success of federal veto politics in blocking certain
treaties, such as the CEDAW and CRC, that raise sensitive issues for socially
conservative minorities has not stopped domestic advocates from using international treaty body supervision to engage those very same issues, albeit under

216

217

United States has ratiﬁed – including their case-speciﬁc interpretations by treaty bodies and
foreign courts in factually-similar cases – but also norms that the United States has not ratiﬁed
but that are widely seen as legitimate guiding principles for the conduct of nations, such as
those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or CEDAW. See generally Jackson, “Constitutional Comparisons,” op. cit. at 111 (noting several U.S. Supreme Court opinions
between 1949 and 1970 referring to UDHR).
“Shadow reports” are parallel reports to the ofﬁcial treaty body reports prepared by the U.S.
government. They aim to highlight and correct misstatements or generalizations in ofﬁcial
U.S. reports; ﬁll in overlooked areas with accurate facts, details, and statistics; and generally present an alternative view for the expert UN committee to consider in assessing U.S.
progress and setbacks in human rights enjoyment under the supervised treaty and in making
recommendations for improvements.
The U.S. Human Rights Network has played an important role in coordinating the large
numbers of domestic advocates who travel to Geneva to participate in the supervisory process,
both by consolidating issue-speciﬁc and local shadow reports into a single accessible U.S.
NGO report and in coordinating advocates in making timely, effective statements to the UN
committees and in presenting appropriate information that is easily accessible to Committee
experts as they question U.S. representatives.
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other treaties. Pressed by civil society advocates, the UN Human Rights Committee, Torture Committee, and Racial Discrimination Committee thus regularly question U.S. representatives – who provide detailed responses – on the
measures taken to give legal effect to rights related to women’s reproductive
health and safety, gender violence, children’s rights abuses, discrimination in
housing, education, health care, indigenous land rights, and employment, as
well as to the disparate impacts of a wide range of U.S. policies on grounds of
race, ethnicity, age, sex, religion, and sexual-orientation.
There are in fact virtually no substantive issues arising under the CEDAW,
CRPD, CRC, or ICESCR that cannot in some way be addressed under the
ICCPR, CERD, and CAT supervisory procedures. The same is true of the contentious individual complaints procedure supervised by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, which allows complaints to be lodged against
the United States with respect to the full spectrum of internationally recognized rights. Incorporationist strategies have thus altered in fundamental ways
the incentive structure that has historically justiﬁed mobilizing veto players to
block certain treaties. Today, that incentive structure has largely been reversed:
given U.S. commitments under the ICCPR, CERD, CAT, ILO treaties, and
the American Declaration, there is little functional reason to oppose – and
growing functional reasons to support – U.S. ratiﬁcation of the CEDAW,
CRPD, CRC, ICESCR, and the American Convention.218
III. Responding to Incorporation’s Advances: Reappropriating Rights
This just-described reality has fundamentally changed the political environment in which traditional opponents of treaty ratiﬁcation pursue their own
domestic policy agenda, complicating their efforts to cordon off the domestic
legal system from international interpretations that might differ from their
preferred views. Many appear to be realizing that old strategies focused on
ratiﬁcation blocking alone are insufﬁcient and that failure to reassess their
strategies may mean missing out on critical agenda-advancing opportunities.
Such interest groups have thus appeared increasingly to focus critical energies on ensuring that new international agreements reﬂect their interests and
agendas at the drafting stage.
218

This is particularly true with respect to the American Convention nonratiﬁcation of which
insulates the United States from no new obligations but rather serves only to prevent the
United States from nominating and electing U.S. nationals to serve as judges on the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. This follows from the close substantive parallels between
the American Declaration and American Convention and the fact that the Court’s jurisdiction
is not mandatory upon ratiﬁcation of the Convention; a separate opt-in instrument must be
ﬁled with the OAS. See American Convention, op. cit., art. 62.
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The most notable of these shifts involves the increasingly active participation of traditionally insulationist NGOs in international human rights fora.
Many such groups now have a regular and active lobby at UN meetings and
conferences, especially those related to women, children, health, and family
structure. A strong, but single, example has been the drafting negotiations
behind the new UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD), in which the U.S.-based “pro-life” movement maintained a highly
visible presence and sustained political lobby over the four-and-a-half years of
the treaty’s negotiation. It did so with a core aim of reshaping the international
meaning of rights-based terms related to reproduction, family, child rearing,
and “life,” using political afﬁnities within the Bush administration to compel
the U.S. government to pursue its policy agenda in the negotiation process.
In fact, although the United States announced at the start of the treatydrafting process in 2003 that it did not intend to participate actively in the
negotiating process,219 under sustained pressure from socially conservative
activist groups it changed course at the penultimate session in early 2006.
The United States announced the reason for its reentry as a manifestation
of its strong interest in shaping the terms of the new human rights treaty –
principally out of its long-term interest in ensuring the strength and consistency of international law as a general matter, but also, speciﬁcally, to avoid
the inclusion of any language that might be substantively objectionable to
the United States.220 The actual textual amendments proposed by the U.S.
delegation, however, spoke more forthrightly to its immediate motivations.
These included: strengthened language on the role of the family in dependent
caregiving; the deletion of references to “health services,” a term understood
by antiabortion groups as an international code word for abortion services; and
the insertion of “and worth” after each treaty reference to “inherent dignity,”
a proposal associated with the embrace of the human fetus within the protective scope of human rights law. It also included the addition of a new draft

219

220

The United States provided oral testimony essentially declaring no need for an international
instrument given the availability of national laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability and declared its intention not to ratify the Convention. See Boyd Statement, op. cit.
(“It is the position of the United States today that . . . the most constructive way to proceed is
for each Member State, through action and leadership at home, to pursue within its borders
the mission of ensuring that real change and real improvement is brought to their citizens
with disabilities. Thus we hope to participate in order to share our experiences . . . but given
our comprehensive domestic laws protecting those with disabilities, not with the expectation
that we will become party to any resulting legal instrument.”).
This ofﬁcial change of policy was declared and explained by the U.S. delegation in publicinformation side meetings at the Seventh Session of the Ad Hoc Committee charged with
negotiating the treaty text. This author served as UN representative of a U.S.-based disability
organization in the treaty drafting process.
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article – the ﬁrst of its kind in international human rights law – guaranteeing
a right not to be denied food or ﬂuids when dependent on life support, a
thinly disguised attempt to internationalize the Terri Schiavo case in human
rights terms.221 While the United States failed to achieve sufﬁcient support
for removal of “health services,” it did succeed in getting substantial textual
revisions to the health and family provisions, the addition of “and worth,” as
well as inclusion of the essence of its food and hydration provision.222
On the basis of these successes, the conservative NGO movement has
intimated support for U.S. ratiﬁcation of the CRPD. At a minimum, it has
signaled that the time for wholesale rejection of international human rights
law has passed. In speaking of the CRPD, a conservative commentator recently
wrote in the Weekly Standard:
Can anything good come out of the United Nations? Actually, yes . . . The
positive impact [of conservative NGO participation in the CRPD drafting
negotiations] teaches a valuable lesson. Many conservative organizations
eschew obtaining NGO status with the United Nations because they loathe
internationalism, disdain the U.N., and expect America not to be bound by
these agreements.
But such standofﬁshness is woefully shortsighted. Like it or not, many of the
most important social and legal policies of the twenty-ﬁrst century are going
to be materially inﬂuenced by international protocols such as this one. These
agreements are molded substantially behind the scenes by NGOs – most of
which are currently leftist in their political outlooks and relativistic in their
social orientation. This makes for a stacked deck. If conservatives hope to
inﬂuence the moral values of the future, they are going to have to hold their
collective noses and get into the game.223

We should increasingly expect to see this: a more active engagement by
traditionally insulationist NGOs in the construction of normative meaning at the international level – accompanied by more vigorous pressure on
221

222

223

This author monitored all UN Member State proposals as they were made. Although the U.S.
drafting proposals had partisan undertones and derivations, the United States played a positive
role overall in mediating diverse international interests within the negotiations. Its renewed
participation in the drafting process in 2006 was welcomed by all governments and civil society
actors.
The much longer draft provision was, in a ﬁnal compromise deal, signiﬁcantly condensed
and consolidated into a subprovision of the right-to-health article, which reads: “States Parties
shall: . . . (f) Prevent discriminatory denial of health care or health services or food and ﬂuids
on the basis of disability.”
Wesley J. Smith, “A Worthwhile U.N. Initiative! A Welcome Defense of the Disabled from
an Unlikely Organization,” Weekly Standard, Jan. 29, 2007, Vol. 12, Issue 19.
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sympathetic U.S. ofﬁcials to engage human rights organs in pursuit of this
norm-reappropriation agenda.224
Such a policy was in fact almost adopted twenty-ﬁve years ago by the
U.S. antiabortion movement, which – given a legally and politically unamenable domestic environment – came close to converting to incorporationism. Indeed, whereas states’ rights and other insulationist arguments prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, when race and poverty were the dominant social
struggles and human rights law clearly favored desegregation and racial equality initiatives, the political climate shifted in the 1970s, as the cultural wars
transitioned toward Vietnam, women’s rights, and lifestyle choices. Speciﬁcally, in the loosened political climate of the seventies, “rights cultural” or
“states’ rights” arguments no longer served the substantive policy agenda of
opponents of abortion, contraception, and alternative family structures. These
groups increasingly found themselves on the losing side of both federal and
state legislation and high court decisions.
Consequently, in 1977, sensing a potential opportunity in the U.S. signature
that year of the American Convention on Human Rights, the U.S. antiabortion
movement turned to international human rights law. Catholics for Christian
Political Action and Lawyers for Life ﬁled a contentious complaint, Baby Boy
v. United States, with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on
behalf of an aborted fetus, alleging that domestic abortion law, at state and
federal levels alike, violated international human rights law.225 Speciﬁcally,
they saw strategic potential in the American Convention’s guarantee of the
“right to life,” a legal protection that, according to Article 4 of the treaty’s text,
begins “in general, from the moment of conception.” Drawing on this favorable
provision (sans the introductory qualiﬁer), the U.S. antiabortion petitioners
asserted that an absolute prohibition on abortion, permitting of no restrictions,
was mandated by the United States’ international law commitments and that
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As an example of U.S. ofﬁcials carrying out conservative social movement agendas abroad,
two conservative members of the U.S. House of Representatives went so far as to send a letter
to the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in early 2007, in anticipation of the Rapporteur’s scheduled trip to Nicaragua to
meet with women’s groups and the government. In it, the Special Rapporteur was instructed
not to discuss a legislative bill then before the Nicaraguan Congress that proposed adding life
and health exceptions to the country’s comprehensive abortion ban, threatening cuts to U.S.
ﬁnancial support of the Inter-American Commission if he did.
Speciﬁcally, petitioners alleged that the United States was in violation of “Baby Boy’s” right
to life given its failure to respond appropriately to the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s 1977
acquittal of a manslaughter conviction of the treating doctor and, by extension, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. See “Baby Boy” v. United
States, Res. 23/81, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. (Mar. 6, 1981),
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the United States was legally bound to follow this international construction
of rights-based meaning.
Had the U.S. antiabortion movement won this case, its activists would
undoubtedly have demanded that U.S. law submit to the authoritative and
ﬁnal conclusions of international human rights treaty bodies. As it turns out,
they lost. The Inter-American Commission, over two dissents, agreed with the
U.S. government’s position that the right to life does not mandate an absolute
prohibition on abortion but rather allows for reasonable restrictions in line
with domestic political choices.226 By the time the 4–2 decision was issued
in 1981, however, the political winds had again shifted in the United States
and, with Ronald Reagan in the presidency, the domestic political climate
had become distinctly amenable to the conservative “family values” policy
agenda. Consequently, the mantle of “states’ rights” and “national sovereignty”
was again taken up to insulate local decision-making structures – in which
absolutist constructions of the right to life could still effectively be pursued – from
the inﬂuence of evolving human rights law and international constructions,
which have consistently rejected rights absolutism.
These conservative advocates may today rue that they did not take a more
dualist approach twenty-ﬁve years ago – pushing for conservative constructions
at the international level, while insulating domestically until those constructions were more fully consolidated. This is the process that appears to be being
pursued today.227
D. MEDIATING TECHNIQUES FOR PROMOTING U.S.
ENGAGEMENT: ASSERTING CLEAR LINES AND RECURRING
(SELECTIVELY) TO SUBSIDIARITY DOCTRINE

What do these instrumental realignments mean for the United States and
its future engagement with human rights treaty bodies? The U.S. position is
often presented, inaccurately and unhelpfully, as monolithically opposed to
human rights treaty body engagement. In fact, it is most useful to view U.S.
human rights policy in ﬂuid and responsive terms: as a careful mediation
between distinct political pressures – from realist and institutionalist tendencies at the foreign policy level, liberal and conservative and/or incorporationist
226

227

Alongside Brazil, the U.S. government had expressly opposed an absolutist meaning of the
right to life in the drafting of the American Convention in 1969, as well as in the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. See id.
It can be seen in multiple international fora – both in norm-creating conferences and meetings
of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and regional organizations of States and in
the increasing involvement of conservative U.S. organizations in policy debates on abortion
in countries around the world.
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and insulationist persuasions at the domestic policy level, and “political process” versus “legal process” preferences more generally. The United States, in
its policy positions, mediates these pressures, bowing more or less to one or
the other at distinct political conjunctures and with shifting electoral politics.
Yet, importantly, as its engagement practice reveals, it does so always within
the parameters of a clearly articulated and jurisdictionally focused set of legal
principles that frame and anchor the U.S. policy position.
These principles, drawn from the lettered texts and doctrines of international
law, serve as essential mediating tools in the articulation of U.S. human rights
policy. Indeed, as presently invoked, they appear to be advanced with a distinct
policy aim: to set bright-line rules with respect to the scope of treaty body
competence in precisely those areas that make conservative critics, at both
domestic and foreign policy levels, most politically exercised. The resulting
U.S. posture at once accommodates those concerns, particularly as articulated
through federalism, sovereignty, and national security objections – the priority
concerns of domestic policy insulationists and foreign policy realists – while
opening a viable political space in which active U.S. engagement with human
rights treaty bodies may feasibly be pursued, both as an international project
(as has been the case to present) and a national one (a challenge still pending).
Signiﬁcantly, the United States justiﬁes this policy response not through
resort to any exceptionalist notion of its power or political culture but rather
through formal, repeated, and insistent resort to two of international law’s most
foundational building blocks: the doctrine of sovereignty and the principle of
subsidiarity. Both doctrines are not only applicable to and regularly recurred
to by all nations of the world in their own engagement policies but are foundational to the very rule of law and effective protection of human rights in the
global public community. As such, formal U.S. reliance on them as the basis
for its treaty body engagement policy lays a sturdy foundation for constructively
advancing U.S. human rights policy toward the future, especially as advocates
seek to strengthen and build the domestic dimension of the subsidiarity relationship. Their strategic use as a mediating device in U.S. engagement policy
nonetheless comes clearly into focus upon considering that the United States
currently invokes them before treaty bodies exclusively in their negative components: as doctrines of non-interference and deference in domestic political
processes. Largely absent from the discourse is a parallel focus on their more
positive aspects of assistance and support in strengthening domestic processes
of human rights enforcement.
The current U.S. policy posture with respect to international treaty body
engagement has three framework parts: (1) a bright-line, doctrinal statement
of the substantive and spatial boundaries of treaty body jurisdiction, with a
view to preserving the ﬂexibility of foreign policy responsiveness in times of

274

Tara J. Melish

war or threats to global public order; (2) a close attention to the technicaljurisdictional boundaries of “contentious” dispute mechanisms versus “promotional” ones, narrowing access to the former and preferring reliance on the
latter; and (3) an aggressive insistence on the nonbinding nature of all international treaty body decisions and conclusions, aimed at underscoring the
primacy of domestic political process.228 These three positions are advanced
in virtually all international treaty body engagements, frequently as a direct
preface to legal briefs and oral arguments. The ﬁrst draws heavily on the negative dimensions of sovereignty doctrine, the latter two on those of subsidiarity.
While domestic advocates often view these three positions as a manifestation of the United States’ stubborn refusal to accede to the binding rules of
international law, they are, in many respects, just the opposite: a mediating
posture that relies on the formal rules of international law to allow the United
States to engage with supervisory human rights bodies on the widest diversity
of subject matters feasible at a given political conjuncture. This rule-based,
jurisdictional approach serves a number of ends. On the one hand, it creates a
rhetorical or juridical comfort zone in which both conservative minorities can
be politically appeased and foreign policy objectives pursued within the formal
letter of U.S. human rights treaty commitments; this allows the United States
to attend to oppositional concerns while simultaneously confuting charges of
exceptionalism. On the other hand, and most consequentially from the domestic standpoint, by changing the relevant vocabulary of resistance, it functions
to diffuse and transcend the “rights cultural” rhetoric that has historically given
rise to exceptionalist demands at home. Indeed, that rhetoric has served as the
primary basis for mobilizing domestic resistance to human rights treaty ratiﬁcation and engagement, used to caricature human rights law in absolutist terms
as contrary to and in direct conﬂict with U.S. constitutionalism, democracy,
and sovereignty.229

228

229

Although the three are frequently in tension, each plays a necessary role in deﬁning the level
of U.S. engagement with international treaty bodies at any given time. Advocates seeking a
shift in levels or degrees of U.S. engagement would do well to pay close attention to how
their strategies affect the equilibria achieved by these mediating techniques with respect to the
underlying competing pressures.
Although rarer to ﬁnd in the U.S. State Department, which consistently takes a more multilateralist and international law-based approach, this “rights cultural” rhetoric continues to be
used by some attorneys in the U.S. Department of Justice as a rationale for why the United
States should not ratify human rights treaties. For a recent published example, see Tracey R.
Justesen and Troy R. Justesen, An Analysis of the Development and Adoption of the United
Nations Convention Recognizing the Rights of Individuals with Disabilities: Why the United
States Refuses to Sign this UN Convention, 14(2) Hum. Rts. Brief 36, 39–41 (2007). For a counterperspective, see Tara J. Melish, The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong
Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14(2) Hum. Rts. Brief 37, 46 (2007).
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The jurisdictional aggressiveness of the U.S. human rights policy may thus
most proﬁtably be interpreted as a mediating strategy in itself, designed to transcend this rhetorical and absolutist view of human rights law, and to bring it
back in line with the actual foundations of human rights law. Thus, U.S. practice is to insist before human rights treaty bodies that the United States will not
accept human rights law on absolutist terms. Rather, the United States underscores, it will accept human rights law and treaty body engagements only under
terms that allow it (1) to engage in legitimate self-defense if national security
is threatened, (2) to be the primary and ﬁnal interpreter of how international
law commitments will be translated into domestic laws and policies, and (3) to
ensure that those laws and policies are determined in the ﬁrst instance by the
political branches rather than the courts. These positions do not contradict but
rather are fully consistent with international human rights law, which is based
on the principle of subsidiarity and the sovereign decision-making authority
of democratic states.230 What sets U.S. human rights policy apart from other
states, then, is not its insistence on these legal principles – which other states
equally expect to be respected in their relationship with treaty bodies – but
rather its forthrightness and hyperlegalized defense of them in international
contexts.231 This jurisdictional aggressiveness is often popularly misconstrued
as a rejection of human rights law itself, rather than simply a rejection of
absolutist constructions of that law. U.S. exceptionalism in this respect is often
more a question of tone and political sensitivity than of content.
It is here, however, that the mediating nature of the U.S. position is clearest.
Although the aggressiveness of U.S. insistence on the primacy of domestic
law and the limits of treaty body jurisdiction operates, in many ways, as a
liability, it is also a goal: a rhetorical tactic to appease domestic opponents of
human rights engagements by making clear that, in actively engaging with
230
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“Sovereignty,” in this sense, refers not to antiquated international law notions of a “sovereign’s
sovereignty” – the prerogative to do as the sovereign pleases within the domestic jurisdiction,
insulated from international law – but rather to the modern democracy-based notion of “the
people’s sovereignty.” W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 866, 869 (1990); see also id. at 872 (“International law
is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty, but, in its modern sense, the object of
protection is not the power base of the tyrant who rules directly by naked power or through the
apparatus of a totalitarian political order, but the continuing capacity of a population freely to
express and effect choices about the identities and policies of its governors.”) (emphasis added)
(“[T]he word ‘sovereignty’ can no longer be used to shield the actual suppression of popular
sovereignty from external rebuke and remedy.”).
That is, the United States is not exceptional in accepting treaty commitments only to the
point of political feasibility. It is exceptional only in its forthright and aggressive defense of that
policy in international and domestic fora, a defensiveness attributable both to the nation’s own
hyperlegalized culture and, relatedly, to the ﬁerceness of domestic politics on the underlying
issues.
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human rights treaty bodies, the United States has not surrendered any of its
sovereignty, constitutional commitment to a federal form of government, or
ability to engage in national defense. It demonstrates that the United States
has staked out a ﬁrm legally based position from which it can safely and
reliably defend democratic institutions against perceived over-reaching by
international treaty bodies. With these assurances in place, opponents may be
willing to relinquish their “rights cultural” arguments that human rights law
conﬂicts with American constitutional democracy. It may thus open the door
to a more sustainable human rights policy over the long term, especially at the
domestic level.
1. Carving Out “No-Go” Zones: The Substantive Parameters
of Treaty Body Competence
The ﬁrst mediating strategy employed by the United States draws on
sovereignty doctrine to assuage realist and institutionalist pressures at the foreign policy level.232 As discussed, whereas institutionalists in the foreign policy
establishment push for greater U.S. treaty body engagement, foreign policy
realists pull away from it, seeing international human rights supervision as
an unnecessary and unwelcome constraint on the United States’ power and
prerogative to respond by all means necessary to foreign threats, particularly in
times of war and armed conﬂict. With an eye toward appeasing both interests,
the United States has adopted a mediating policy focused on the parameters of its sovereign consent to treaty body jurisdiction. It supports a policy of
“full” jurisdictional engagement with international human rights treaty bodies
within their ratione materiae and ratione loci competence. The United States
then deﬁnes these jurisdictional parameters, using positivist international law
doctrines, as exclusive of alleged abuses arising, ﬁrst, in situations of armed
conﬂict, and, second, extraterritorially – both traditional areas of strong foreign
policy sensitivities. It resorts to the full set of internationally accepted methods
of treaty interpretation, consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, to support this jurisdictional interpretation, including ordinary
meaning, the travaux préparatoires, state practice, the context surrounding the
treaty at its conclusion, and the views of eminent public jurists.233
232

233

Professor Murphy refers to a similar tension as the antinomy of exceptionalism versus sovereign
equality. Murphy, op. cit.
See, e.g., “Third periodic reports of States parties due in 2003: United States of America,”
CCPR/C/USA/3 (2005), Annex 1 (“Territorial Application of the [ICCPR]”), pp. 109–11 (relying
on ordinary meaning, travaux préparatoires, U.S. practice, context at conclusion, and views of
eminent public jurists, identiﬁed expressly as proper means of interpretation under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties). Although the U.S. interpretation is not always persuasive,
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Although this posture has become the focal point of scholarly and advocacy
critique of U.S. human rights policy since 2001 – given deliberate removals
of rights-abusive conduct to extraterritorial loci and other recent “war on terror” abuses – it is useful to take a step back and view it in larger perspective,
outside of abusive applications, for what it represents at its core: a mediation
tactic. Faced with powerful pressures to disengage entirely with international
supervisory bodies should competence be exercised over U.S. military interventions or “war on terror” subjects – as the United States has done with other
international tribunals, such as the ICC234 or ICJ235 – the U.S. decision to
remain actively engaged in human rights treaty procedures while carving out
limited subject matter “no-go” zones may be viewed, more positively, as a
compromise strategy to conserve U.S. human rights engagement in all other
areas of domestic human rights abuse. This is an enormous ﬁeld, and U.S.
willingness to engage it should not be minimized.236
It is important to note, moreover, that the U.S. position in this regard is
not new. It represents a long-term policy on the part of the U.S. government,
regularly raised in international fora wherever U.S. conduct in situations of
war, war-related recovery, or conﬂict abroad has been challenged.237 Initially
advanced in the 1950s as a pragmatic concern in the ICCPR drafting process
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it is prima facie credible. More important, it is consistently and persistently advanced across
international supervisory jurisdictions. This is true before the Committee Against Torture,
the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and even
special mandate procedures, such as UN Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts.
In May 2002, President George W. Bush renounced the United States’ prior signature of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, asserting in a letter to the UN SecretaryGeneral that “the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December
31, 2000.”
The United States withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1986, following the
Court’s adverse decision against it in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). On March 7, 2005, following another merits
loss, it terminated the Court’s treaty-speciﬁc jurisdiction over it with respect to alleged breaches
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. See Journal of the United Nations: Programme of Meetings and Agenda, No. 2005/48, at 13 (Mar. 12, 2005) (reporting UN SecretaryGeneral’s receipt of U.S. withdrawal notice to Convention’s Optional Protocol).
It covers areas such as discrimination, political participation, due process, health, housing,
prison conditions, education, labor rights, and access to justice. U.S. opening to international
supervision with respect to these domestic areas represents an important advance. This, of
course, is not to say that advocates should not continue to challenge the legitimacy of the
“no-go” zones, particularly unjustiﬁable uses of them to commit human rights abuse. It is only
to say that U.S. human rights policy should not be judged exclusively on the basis of no-go
zones.
From 1992 to 1999, for example, the United States made these arguments in litigation before
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights involving its responsibility for the incommunicado detention of 17 civilians during the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. See Coard et al.
v. United States, Case 10.951, Report N◦ 109/99, Sept. 29, 1999, Inter-Am.Comm.H.R (1999).
Although the United States argued in the alternative that it had not violated the rights of the
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with respect to the U.S.-led post–World War II recovery process in Europe and
Japan,238 it in many ways today reﬂects the United States’ self-awareness as the
world’s sole remaining military superpower in a world in which international
law constitutes “an effective but limited structure.”239 In consequence of that
awareness, and consistent with realist pressures, the United States has persistently rejected jurisdictional recognition of treaty body authority in situations
of extraterritorial and armed conﬂict. This posture enables it to maintain maximum ﬂexibility to respond to threats to national security and global public
order – including the leeway to engage in what has been termed “operational
noncompliance”240 – without having to justify its conduct before international
expert bodies through resort to legitimate or permissible restrictions on rights,
such as those required to protect the rights and security of others.241
Signiﬁcantly, in rejecting treaty body supervision in these limited areas, the
United States does not claim immunity from the binding rules of international
human rights and humanitarian law, nor that human rights or humanitarian
abuses do not occur within no-go zones. Rather, its argument is a narrow
jurisdictional one: Treaty bodies, as a technical matter, lack jurisdiction over
alleged victims under either the American Declaration or the Geneva Conventions, its principal arguments centered on questions of admissibility – that is, that the Commission lacked
jurisdiction over the law of armed conﬂict, which prevailed as lex specialis, and, secondarily,
over the extraterritorial conduct of a State.
238 The resulting language in art. 2 of the ICCPR (“within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”) remains at the center of the U.S. policy position on the extraterritorial scope of human
rights treaty obligations. See “Third periodic reports of States parties due in 2003: United States
of America,” CCPR/C/USA/3 (2005), Annex 1, 109–11.
239 W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 3, 9–10 (2000).
240 Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 189, 191
(2006) (deﬁned as “noncompliance that keeps a partially effective system, such as international
law, operational by reconciling formal legal prescriptions with changing community policies or
by bridging the enforcement gap created by inadequate community mechanisms of control”).
241 Human rights law is in fact designed to allow for this sort of practical accommodation. It
expressly allows for justiﬁed restrictions on the enjoyment of rights, both in the general interest
and, speciﬁcally, in times of national emergency. Human rights bodies consistently, moreover –
whether explicitly or implicitly – provide a higher margin of discretion to states in crafting
such justiﬁed restrictions in national security situations. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom,
Judgment of 18 Jan. 1978, Eur. Ct. H.R., Series A, no. 25, para. 214; Lawless judgments of 7
April and 1 July 1961, Eur. Ct. H.R., Series A, nos. 2 & 3. Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, has accordingly urged the United States to
adopt this human-rights-based approach: rather than argue that human rights law does not
apply in situations of armed conﬂict and thereby resist supervision, the United States might
more usefully argue that its actions represent “justiﬁed” conduct in times of war or armed
conﬂict within the frame of human rights law. Press Release, Ofﬁce of the High Comm’r for
Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, U.N.
Doc. HR/07/51 (Mar. 28, 2007). The United States has decided that it prefers not to take this
course, at least not at present or as an exclusive option.
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the United States in such areas, given the United States’ historically based and
persistently expressed position on the scope of its treaty undertakings. Under
this view, human rights complaints in this sensitive foreign policy and rightsbalancing area are valid but best reserved to political mechanisms of control:
media attention, political pressure, congressional oversight and investigation
mechanisms, international censure, and diplomatic pressure. These controls
are understood as best capable of advancing the shared community goal of
global human rights protection – both in most effectively restoring fundamental rights protections as soon as any national or global threat diminishes242 and
by removing a structured disincentive to responsive unilateral action in situations of humanitarian crisis or other threats to global public order to which
the international community cannot or will not respond.243
This is, however, the only area in which the United States should be
expected to refuse supervision in its engagement policy. It is a bow to the
power of foreign policy realists, enabling the United States to continue its otherwise substantively plenary engagement policy and thereby attend to other
domestic and foreign policy pressures and agendas.
2. Preferring “Political” to “Judicial” Controls in Human Rights
Supervision and Interpretation
The second set of mediating tactics operates to accommodate the tension not
between realists and institutionalists but between engagement as a foreign
policy objective and domestic-level resistance to that engagement by those
who view it as a threat to constitutional democracy. Such domestic resistance,
often rooted in simple partisan political preferences, generally manifests itself
in two classic arguments. The ﬁrst involves classic federalism concerns.244 The
second departs from the perceived “undemocratic” nature of treaty bodies, in
the sense that their members are not elected by nor directly accountable to
U.S. citizens and relatedly are called on to interpret treaties that reﬂect global
242
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For a supportive view of this approach in the United States’ domestic jurisdiction in times
of war, see William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Rights in Wartime (Random
House, 1998) (discussing suspension of habeas corpus and other civil rights protections in times
of war in United States).
It may, in this sense, be viewed as part of a global constitutive process that, although open to
abuse under certain ideological postures, functions over the long term to build more enduring
international institutions and community mechanisms of control.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390
(1998) (asserting that treaty power is inconsistent with principle that the national government’s
powers are limited and enumerated and that states have rights to legislate independently in
certain spheres, concluding that government must therefore “make a choice”: human rights
treaties or American federalism).
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majoritarian mores, not necessarily U.S. ones.245 This counter-majoritarian
critique, paralleling similar critiques at the domestic level with respect to
the role of the U.S. judiciary in interpreting broadly worded constitutional
rights, is ampliﬁed where international tribunals are concerned, particularly
given rhetorical assertions that such courts will compel the United States to
adopt foreign rights constructions that conﬂict with democratically determined
domestic understandings. This follows not only from the fact that treaty-based
human rights norms tend to be drafted at a high level of generality, open to
widely diverse interpretations by different social and cultural mediators,246 but
also from common objections that international “experts” or “judges” have
no necessary connection to the United States and are elected principally by
foreign sovereigns that may have interests or agendas averse, or even hostile,
to those of the United States.
Signiﬁcantly, both of these “states’ rights” and “democratic deﬁcit” objections are voiced most vehemently in one area of particular insulationist concern: the possibility of direct judicial enforcement of human rights treaty
law. Insulationists object to such enforcement both by U.S. federal courts247
and by supranational human rights treaty bodies exercising adjudicatory or
quasi-adjudicatory powers.
The United States answers these objections through the regular use of three
speciﬁc procedural devices drawn from the negative dimension of the principle
of subsidiarity. Each is designed to preserve the primacy of political control
mechanisms (the preferred decision-making environment of insulationists) by
limiting the jurisdictional competence of judicial or quasi-adjudicatory bodies
over raw human rights complaints.
See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 57, 59
(2004) (discussing his view of “international countermajoritarian difﬁculty”); Curtis A. Bradley,
International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev.
1557, 1558 (2002–03) (“By transferring legal authority from U.S. actors to international actors –
actors that are physically and culturally more distant from, and not directly responsible to, the
U.S. electorate – these delegations may entail a dilution of domestic political accountability.”);
cf. John O. McGinnis and Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law? 59 Stan.
L. Rev. 1175 (2007) (limiting critique to “raw international law,” that is, that which has not
been endorsed by the domestic political process).
246 See, e.g., Goldsmith, op. cit. at 338–39 (“In and among pluralistic democratic societies, there is
a reasonable scope for disagreement about what broadly worded human rights norms require.
When the human rights community demands that the United States make international
human rights treaties a part of domestic law in a way that circumvents political control, it
evinces an intolerance for a pluralism of values and conditions, and a disrespect for local
democratic processes.”).
247 Id. at 332 (“Domestic incorporation of the ICCPR . . . would constitute a massive, largely
standardless delegation to federal courts to rethink the content and scope of nearly every aspect
of domestic human rights law.”).
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The ﬁrst involves the regular attachment of non-self-execution declarations
to human rights treaties upon ratiﬁcation. Such declarations assert that treaty
norms do not create private causes of action for direct enforcement by the
domestic judiciary. Rather, to be judicially cognizable they must ﬁrst be given
locally relevant content in domestically enforceable implementing legislation.
This tactic bows directly to institutionalists and indirectly to incorporationists,
but, in a concession to insulationists, insists that any incorporation be done by
domestic legislatures or other political processes, not courts.
The second subsidiarity-based mediating tactic extends the same principle
upward, from the domestic judiciary to the international treaty body system.
It takes advantage of the fact that international treaty law generally makes
judicial or quasi-judicial complaints mechanisms optional for States parties. In
an effort to mediate competing institutionalist and insulationist pressures, the
United States thus afﬁrmatively accepts the jurisdiction of human rights treaty
bodies for purposes of active and regular engagement, but only with respect to
non-adjudicatory functions. Where given a choice, the United States reliably
declines to accept the contentious jurisdiction of treaty bodies, voluntarily
submitting only to periodic reporting and other promotional functions that
focus on “constructive dialogue” with international supervisory bodies, not
rights “adjudication.” U.S. compliance with treaty obligations can thereby be
discussed and debated in general ways, without an international adjudication
that a speciﬁc policy or practice has violated the rights of distinct individuals
and hence requires a speciﬁc remedial response, independent of domestic
appreciation of the matter.
Finally, a third set of subsidiarity-based procedural devices is used in the few
instances in which the United States is in fact mandatorily subject to international adjudicatory or case-based claims processes as a requirement of membership in a given intergovernmental organization.248 In such circumstances,
the United States trains heavily on the subsidiarity-based jurisdictional rules
that limit treaty body competence over contentious cases, such as the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement, the “fourth instance formula,” and
strict ratione materiae, personae, loci, and temporis limitations. These procedural devices, recognized in all international adjudicatory fora, are designed
to give effect to the principle that human rights treaty bodies should never
arrogate to themselves functions that can more immediately and effectively
be undertaken at more local levels. U.S. engagement practice is correspondingly characterized by an emphasis on the extensive opportunities the litigant
is or was afforded to address the issue through domestic legal and political
248

The OAS and ILO have such compulsory membership requirements.
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processes and the ultra vires nature of international jurisdiction where domestic processes provide full due process of law and effective redress to the alleged
victim.
3. Retaining Full Remedial and Policy-Making Discretion
The United States employs a fourth mediating technique likewise derived
from subsidiarity’s negative dimension. This technique draws not on procedural devices designed to limit the exercise of adjudicatory competence, as
do the former three, but rather on a subsidiarity-based doctrine of substantive
deference applicable once competence is in fact asserted. Premised on the
understanding that local actors are in the best position to appreciate the complexity of circumstances on the ground and, correspondingly, to understand
what measures may be most effective for internalizing human rights values
in distinct contexts, that doctrine mandates that a certain margin of discretion
be given to competent authorities in the determination of rights abuse and in
the crafting of appropriate responsive measures to it.249 This subsidiarity-based
deference doctrine is given regular effect in treaty body practice: both through
the standard of review used to assess state compliance with treaty undertakings
and, more broadly, through the general recognition that treaty body conclusions are recommendatory in nature only, providing states ample leeway to
tailor responses appropriately to local conditions and constraints.
This fourth subsidiarity-based mediation tactic is articulated in U.S. engagement practice through regular U.S. assertions that all treaty body conclusions and recommendations, although welcome and appropriately taken into
broader political account, are nonbinding and have no independent domestic legal force. Such nonbindingness is asserted with equal degrees of force
with respect to the ﬁnal recommendations issued by treaty bodies under contentious individual complaints procedures and those derivative of constructive dialogue and periodic reporting. By doing so, the United States seeks
to underscore its full retention of plenary discretion to adopt its policies the
way it chooses, notwithstanding U.S. submission to and engagement with
international supervisory procedures.
In making this assertion, the United States does not afﬁrm anything that is
new to international law: the nonbinding nature of human rights treaty body
supervision is, as a matter of international human rights law, uncontroversial,
as is the ability of states parties to adopt measures of their sovereign choosing
249

For a discussion of this doctrine as it has developed in the European system, see Howard
Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human
Rights Jurisprudence (Utrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996).
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in giving effect to treaty obligations.250 Rather, the United States uses this policy to speak directly to domestic constituencies, underscoring to insulationists
that U.S. engagement will not force it to adopt policies that have not been
fully mediated through the democratic process. This important mediating
tactic nevertheless puts increasing strain on U.S. relationships with international tribunals. It also invites charges of paradox and double standards from
domestic and international quarters alike, who often read U.S. assertions of the
nonbindingness of the views and recommendations of treaty bodies as an assertion of the nonbindingness of the treaty commitments themselves. The U.S.
government labors to clarify this distinction at the international level, consistently afﬁrming its full acceptance of all treaty obligations duly undertaken.
Consistent with interest management, it works less hard to make the distinction
clear at the domestic level.
∗

∗

∗

In light of the foregoing analysis, one might expect the United States to adopt
the following postures toward treaty body engagements over the coming years.
Reﬂecting a careful management of the underlying interest-group pressures,
each reﬂects the continuing application of the sovereignty and subsidiaritybased mediation techniques just discussed.
 The United States will continue to ratify internationally popular human
rights treaties, accelerating the process where coordinated domestic lobbying campaigns converge with Democratic majorities in the Senate.
Such treaty ratiﬁcations will likely consist of the CRPD and CEDAW,
as ﬁrst priorities; the American Convention on Human Rights and the
CRC, as second priorities; and, ﬁnally, the ICESCR.251
 These treaties will continue to be accompanied by non-self-execution
clauses and other declarations and understandings designed to protect
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See, e.g., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OC-13/93 (Ser. A) No. 13, ¶ 29 (1993) (authority of Commission
to ﬁnd violation does not confer “authority to rule as to how a legal norm is adopted in the
internal order,” which “is the function of the competent organs of the State”). There are, of
course, limits to the measures that a state can adopt and still purport to be giving effect to
treaty obligations. These limits are generally expressed in the idea of an appropriate “margin
of appreciation” to be granted a state, given local actors’ greater appreciation of the facts on
the ground, or the “reasonableness” of government conduct in aiming to achieve a given end,
taking account of conﬂicting duties, burdens, and resource constraints.
The United States is unlikely to ratify the Migrant Workers Convention, a treaty that – unlike
other core UN human rights conventions – has not received a high level of support from the
international community.

284

Tara J. Melish

the primacy of domestic political processes in the determination of the
scope and contours of domestic human rights protections.
 The United States will continue to participate actively in periodic reporting processes at the UN level, as well as through other promotional mechanisms envisioned in UN, ILO, and OAS law. In so doing, it will take a
leading international role in identifying ways to make the process more
efﬁcient and less cumbersome for government actors, especially as its
reporting obligations continue to grow with the ratiﬁcation of new treaties.
 The United States will continue to decline to accept the contentious
jurisdiction of UN treaty bodies.
 All individual contentious complaints of human rights abuse against the
United States will instead be processed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in which the United States will continue to
actively and constructively engage. This follows largely from the United
States’ greater familiarity with the system’s rules and actors and ability to
inﬂuence its direction and growth.
 The United States will ratify the American Convention with a view to
seating a U.S.-nominated judge on the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. This will be undertaken to better inﬂuence the direction of interAmerican jurisprudence, increasingly important to the United States as
more contentious U.S. cases are brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
 The United States will not, however, accept the Court’s jurisdiction
over U.S. cases. This policy will continue for the foreseeable future,
at least until the United States has a greater degree of conﬁdence in
the Court’s self-imposed jurisdictional limits and, most decisively, has
established a politically based institutional setup for determining the
content of effective remedies at the domestic level.252
 The United States will continue to resist international supervisory jurisdiction over extraterritorial abuses and those committed in armed conﬂict,
even as it takes measures to prevent such abuses or to respond to them
once they occur.
Notably, U.S. human rights policy should be expected to embrace these
engagement postures irrespective of party control of the White House. Indeed,
whether the White House occupant is a liberal Democrat or a conservative Republican, she or he will face the same powerful set of competing
252
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interest-group pressures at both the foreign and domestic policy levels, and
will need to ﬁnd a principled yet ﬂexible way to balance and accommodate
them in a single policy posture.253 In this complex interest-management process, the mediating techniques derived from the principles of subsidiarity and
sovereignty should be expected to continue to play a dominant role. This is
both because of their ﬁrm doctrinal (and hence ideologically neutral) basis
in international law and because of their inherent ﬂexibility in responding to
new sets of evolving pressures and demands.
It is not, then, stasis that should be expected in U.S. human rights engagement policy, but rather continually evolving and responsive interactions
among a wide variety of domestic and international actors, each with vastly
different, often conﬂicting interests. The three predictable constants will be
an active attention to the foreign policy beneﬁts of engagement, a continuing emphasis on the primacy of domestic-level democratic decision-making
processes, and adherence to a core set of doctrinally anchored mediating
techniques designed to effectively mediate the two.
E. HONORING SUBSIDIARITY DOCTRINE IN FULL: FROM
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE TO DOMESTIC CHALLENGE

This chapter has aimed thus far to disentangle some of the motivating pressures
and interests that are constitutive of today’s U.S. human rights policy. In so
doing, it has endeavored to demonstrate that U.S. human rights policy is
best viewed not as a static or ﬁxed structural given but rather as a careful
mediation among the varied interest groups that successfully exert power
and sustained inﬂuence on U.S. policy makers. This vantage point serves a
number of important ends. Most signiﬁcantly, it serves as a civic reminder
that U.S. policy making is neither structurally predetermined nor undertaken
hegemonically in a political vacuum; it is determined by domestic actors with
agency, creativity, and constantly adapting political strategies that interact with
each other and their environment as part of a constitutive, contested, constantly
evolving process.254 In this respect, it is vital to underscore the deep irony that
results in too heavy a focus by scholars and advocates on the ﬁxedness of the
“U.S. human rights paradox,” whether attributed to U.S. rights culture, U.S.
253
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In an interview given aboard Air Force One, President Obama responded to a question about
the release of Guantanamo detainees by asserting that “there is still going to be some balancing
that has to be done and some competing interests that are going to have to be addressed.”
“Reassurance on the Economy, and Addressing Afghanistan,” New York Times, Mar. 8, 2009,
at A1.
See generally William M. Reisman, Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence to Interpret
Treaties, 15 Yale J. Int’l L. 316, 323–30 (1990) (noting that law is never static; it changes as parties
continually shape behavior in accordance with law, in reliance on it, and in the context of
multiple factors that shape and limit options).
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global hegemony, or “the deep structural reality of American political life.”255
That irony lies in the fact that civil society, pressed with the constant assertion
that the United States does not or will not engage domestically on human
rights matters, may stop seeking engagement. In a political democracy, when
any group ceases to persistently pursue constructive policy engagement, its
interests cannot be expected to be represented in mediated political outcomes.
This political reality is, in fact, directly reﬂected in today’s U.S. human
rights engagement policy. That policy has been determined at the intersection
of pressures from three primary interest groups: foreign policy institutionalists, foreign policy realists, and domestic policy insulationists. Notably absent
in the equation are domestic policy incorporationists. Although these vital
social protagonists have been vigorously active at the local level, working
with grassroots communities and effecting local change through a variety of
innovative initiatives aimed at local government, incorporationists are the ﬁrst
to underscore that they have been least effective in mobilizing their broad
base of constituents to inﬂuence national policy makers and beltway politics,
through, for example, coordinated lobbying and nationally directed political
action campaigns. The unremarkable consequence is that incorporationist
interests are not today meaningfully reﬂected in U.S. treaty body engagement
policy. Rather, reﬂecting institutionalists’ concerns for international diplomacy, that policy has been pursued principally, if not wholly, as a foreign
policy objective. It is directed to demonstrating to other nations the United
States’ strong commitment to human rights, to international law, and to participation in international institutions, not to effecting domestic self-reﬂection,
civic discussion, and constructive change within the internal legal order.
Indeed, the most notable aspect of U.S. treaty body engagement policy
today is precisely its lack of any explicit goal of strengthening domestic human
rights protection. To the contrary, the U.S. position has been that the nation
already has strong domestic rights protections and that, beyond certain modiﬁcations determined to be necessary before ratiﬁcation, it does not need to
make additional internal changes in its laws and policies.256 Accordingly, even
as the United States recognizes before international bodies that it is not perfect, has gaps to ﬁll, and that human rights fulﬁllment is evolutionary, there
is currently no institutional mechanism in place to systematically gather and
process information from domestic actors on how the United States could
improve its human rights protections. Likewise, although the United States
prepares reports for submission to treaty bodies with a high degree of comprehension and detail, complying strictly with the technical aspects of its
255
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reporting requirements, it lacks any formal institutional mechanism to receive
systematically the inputs of civil society into that process, to circulate outputs,
to debrief the nation on its ﬁndings, or to encourage national reﬂection on
how identiﬁed deﬁciencies might be remedied.
From a democracy standpoint, it is here that the central puzzle of U.S.
human rights policy is located: how can such overt lack of institutional attention to facilitating domestic deliberative human rights processes be reconciled
with the United States’ formal insistence, as part of its treaty body engagement
policy, on the secondary role of international treaty bodies and the primacy of
domestic processes in the interpretation and protection of international human
rights treaty norms? The disconnect lies in the United States’ selective and partial use of the tools of international human rights law’s subsidiarity principle to
mediate the conﬂicting pressures faced from dominant interest groups. That
is, in its treaty body engagement policy, the United States carefully invokes
only the negative half of subsidiarity’s project: the “non-interference” principle, the notion that discretion should be left to more local units to determine
the content of rights without intervention or assistance from “higher” ones.
This exclusive fragment of subsidiarity doctrine corresponds directly to the
political coordinates at which the policy agendas of U.S. institutionalists and
U.S. insulationists intersect – the former favoring treaty body engagement, the
latter resisting any domestic effects thereof.
The problem is that the structural integrity of human rights law cannot
endure subsidiarity’s expedient fracture into constituent halves; it is constituted
irreversibly of both the non-interference principle and that of intervention or
assistance, each of which serves as a structural check on the other in the service
of human dignity. Indeed, just as subsidiarity’s negative dimension guards
against drift into centralized bureaucracy or authoritarianism, so, too, does its
positive dimension stand as a bulwark against collapse into simple devolution
or pure unchecked discretion. By invoking only subsidiarity’s negative side
and, then, only vis-à-vis the U.S. relationship with international treaty bodies –
not within the U.S. body politic itself – the United States undermines ﬁrst
principles of international human rights law, reimagining it as a simple exercise
in local devolution.
This partial recognition accounts for why supervisory treaty body concern
is so often raised in relation to U.S. reliance on certain doctrinal tools emanating from subsidiarity’s negative dimension (such as the non-self-execution
doctrine), despite such tools’ solid foundation in international human rights
law and broad parallel use by other nations.257 Indeed, that concern arises not in
257
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relation to the tools themselves, which, in conjunction with subsidiarity-based
monitoring mechanisms, are fully sanctioned by international law. Rather,
it relates to their regular employ in the absence of effectively functioning
domestic monitoring and supervisory mechanisms that reﬂect subsidiarity’s
afﬁrmative dimension. Thus, for instance, although both the United States
and Canada apply the non-self-execution doctrine in implementing human
rights treaties, international concern tends to be expressed with respect to the
former only. This is because Canada employs the doctrine not in isolation
but in symmetry with an integrated system of national, provincial, and local
human rights institutions.258 These institutions are mandated to serve in a
subsidiarity capacity – internalizing and domesticating human rights values in
locally relevant, democratically sanctioned, and indigenized ways, as close as
possible to the individual yet within a supportive national structure.
A fuller recognition of the comprehensive nature of subsidiarity thus illuminates the central U.S. human rights challenge for the future: How to give
substance to the afﬁrmative aspects of subsidiarity in national human rights
policy, while continuing to honor and respect the negative aspects. Indeed, this
appears to be the path most capable of effectively accommodating all domestic
interest groups. This is true both at the foreign policy level and, most directly,
at the domestic level in mediating the vital tensions between incorporationists
and insulationists – the former seeking greater incorporation of human rights
methodologies and monitoring arrangements into the domestic legal and political system, the latter wishing to protect the primacy of domestic legal process
and the boundaries of state consent. A focus on subsidiarity principles serves
both ends. It does so by allowing the contested struggle over the meaning of
rights, and their application to concrete, real-world situations, to take place
within domestic control mechanisms, yet aided by the methodological framework and general subsidium of monitoring and implementation mechanisms
at the local, state, and federal levels.
The central challenge for the future, therefore, lies in ﬁguring out how
to implement creative tools and institutionalized mechanisms to advance
such processes at the national and subnational levels – that is, to erect the
constitutive scaffolding necessary to link the individual, family, civic solidarity associations, and local, state, and national governments in a common
subsidiarity-based project that places human dignity at its center. Such tools
should be designed to listen to local and national communities as they discuss
258
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and debate the contours of their own rights, to solicit their solutions for how to
respond to deﬁciencies, and then to parlay those notions into concrete legislative, advocacy, and executive proposals at local, state, and federal levels. This
project will, moreover, require a rethinking of traditional incorporationist
objections to classic subsidiarity tools like the non-self-execution doctrine,
shifting perspective to embrace them as democracy-enhancing and deliberationforcing tools – ones that do not block human rights incorporation but rather
actively aid the process of internalizing human rights norms in locally relevant
ways.
By doing so, advocates may succeed – through organized pressure, active
engagement, and a constructive shift in human rights strategy to accommodate
the genuine democracy-based interests of all groups – in compelling the United
States to expand its treaty body engagement policy beyond its current status
as an exclusively international project, into a genuinely domestic one. That
project would be one self-consciously based in the principle of subsidiarity,
designed to support and sustain the localized decision-making capacities of
U.S. communities to continually self-reﬂect on where they are, where they
want to go, and how to get themselves there, within the methodological frame
of international human rights law. In this way, the international treaty body
system can serve its true subsidiary purpose.
The question is, how do we structure this? International human rights law,
in function of its basis in subsidiarity doctrine, tends to offer an institutional
outline, even while recognizing the wide variety of institutional arrangements
that states adopt to govern themselves.259 At the national level, two general
levels of institutional supervisory arrangements are called for: one for state
implementation, the other for state monitoring. Both should be established in
the United States as a matter of priority.260
The following two sections consider each of these national-level institutional
arrangements as they might proﬁtably be established in the United States.
Each of these arrangements is nevertheless fully replicable at “lower” levels
of political organization – by states, counties, cities, and towns. Indeed, such
institutional layering of supervisory authority is core to subsidiarity’s premise,

See, e.g., CRPD, op. cit., art. 33, (recognizing need of states parties to establish national
implementation mechanisms “in accordance with their system of organization” and national
monitoring mechanisms “in accordance with their legal and administrative systems”).
260 Drawing expressly on the proposals in this chapter, as well as the recommendations of a
Blueprint Advisory Group, a formal proposal to establish both national mechanisms was submitted to the Obama administration in October 2008. See Catherine Powell, Am. Constitution
Soc’y for Law & Politics, Human Rights at Home: A Domestic Policy Blueprint for the New
Administration (2008), available at http://www.acslaw.org/ﬁles/C%20Powell%20Blueprint.pdf.
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ensuring that decision making and monitoring occur as close as possible to
the individual.
1. A National Ofﬁce on Human Rights Implementation
and Inter-Agency Coordination Body
The ﬁrst national institutional arrangement required by an effective subsidiarity-based regime is an executive branch “focal point” on implementation.261 Ideally in the form of a National Ofﬁce on Human Rights Implementation, such a focal point would be dedicated to taking care that the nation’s
international human rights treaty undertakings are appropriately implemented
in the domestic jurisdiction.262 As the national face for human rights implementation efforts, the focal point should be based in the Executive Ofﬁce of
the President and led by a person of recognized competence and expertise in
the ﬁeld of human rights. That individual, through the National Ofﬁce, would
be responsible for overseeing national efforts on human rights matters.
Importantly, as an orchestrating body, its purpose would not be to take
over the administrative functions of other agencies, nor to be responsible for
implementing programs or policies, outside those on transparency, capacitybuilding, human rights training, and small grants programs for innovative
local human rights initiatives. Rather, consistent with subsidiarity, it would
be dedicated to taking care that the nation’s human rights commitments were
being appropriately implemented in the domestic jurisdiction, through each of
the nation’s many competent departments and agencies. To this end, it would
be assisted at the federal level by a coordination mechanism composed of a
senior-level representative from each of the major agencies and departments of
government.263 Each member would be personally responsible for overseeing,
coordinating, and reporting on human rights mainstreaming efforts in her or
his department, as well as responding to agency-related complaints of human
rights abuse. The National Ofﬁce on Human Rights would act as a back-stop
on these efforts, providing coordination, a mechanism for the sharing of best
There is an increasing emphasis in international law and development theory on ensuring
government focal points. Such focal points generally take the shape of a dedicated ofﬁce
within government or other policy-coordinating body. See, e.g., CRPD, op. cit., art. 33(1)
(“States Parties . . . shall designate one or more focal points within government for matters
relating to the implementation of the present Convention. . . . ”).
262 The U.S. Constitution invests the President with the power and duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3. This undertaking includes enforcement
of treaties, which form part of the “supreme Law of the Land.” Id. Art. VI.
263 See CRPD, op. cit., art. 33(1) (“States Parties . . . shall give due consideration to the establishment or designation of a coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related
action in different sectors and at different levels.”).
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practices, encouragement, and advice. To ensure this essential orchestrating
role, the coordination mechanism should ideally be chaired by the head of
the National Ofﬁce on Human Rights.
While the United States lacks any executive branch focal point for domesticlevel human rights treaty implementation, it has formally established a coordination mechanism. Envisioned by President Clinton’s 1998 Executive Order
13107 and reorganized under President Bush’s 2001 National Security Presidential Directive, that mechanism must be revitalized and given life through new
infusions of personnel, resources, and speciﬁc human rights mainstreaming
mandates, with appropriate corresponding tools of transparency and sanction
where deﬁciencies are identiﬁed in agency or department conduct.
It is essential, however, that such a revitalized coordination mechanism
be accompanied by a National Ofﬁce on Human Rights Implementation.
Without a centralized, permanent, and dedicated focal point to orchestrate
the human rights mainstreaming work of agency and department heads, the
coordination mechanism alone will not be maximally effective. This has been
the experience of the current Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on
Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations, which has not
functioned other than in an ad hoc fashion. This experience owes in large part
to the absence of a dedicated executive focal point that has human rights treaty
implementation as its exclusive mandate and area of expertise. Rather, the
PCC has been headed by the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, for whom domestic-level human rights treaty implementation may be
neither a priority nor interest.
A National Ofﬁce on Human Rights Implementation would thus work
with a coordination mechanism to ensure that each of the critical functions
expressed in Executive Order No. 13107 are carried out by the appropriate
authority or authorities, including the following:
 responding to inquiries, requests for information, and complaints about
violations of human rights obligations that fall within each authority’s
areas of responsibility;
 coordinating the preparation of treaty compliance reports to the UN,
OAS, and other international organizations;
 coordinating responses to contentious complaints lodged with the same
organizations;
 overseeing a review of all proposed legislation to ensure its conformity
with international human rights obligations;
 ensuring that plans for public outreach and education on human rights
provisions in treaty-based and domestic law are broadly undertaken;
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 ensuring an annual review of U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings to human rights treaties; and
 ensuring that all nontrivial complaints or allegations of inconsistency
with or breach of international human rights obligations are reviewed
to determine whether any modiﬁcations to U.S. practice or laws are in
order.264
In addition to these competences, the National Ofﬁce on Human Rights
Implementation would likewise have the important mandate to report to
Congress and to the nation annually on national human rights progress and
to make recommendations on new legislation or policies that might periodically be required on the basis of information received. In this way, Congress
would be regularly informed of human rights implementation measures taken
throughout the nation and could supplement efforts where gaps in coverage
were identiﬁed or new forms of spending were required.
The National Ofﬁce would also, however, play an important facilitation
role with respect to the human rights implementation initiatives undertaken
by state and local authorities. It could collect information, share best practices,
provide publicity, shine a national spotlight on abusive situations, and promote
the scaling up of the nation’s most successful local experiments with human
rights implementation. The Ofﬁce would act as a centralizing repository for
information generated from a variety of programs, agencies, and private sector
sources on national human rights achievement, problem areas, and setbacks
and could be held to political account for failures to supervise or intervene
where systemic or gross abuses were uncovered.
In short, the National Ofﬁce on Human Rights Implementation would
serve as the nation’s focal point for ensuring that federal, state, local, and private entities were adequately supported and incentivized to implement effective and appropriate human rights policies for themselves, as close as possible
to affected individuals. In this way, its mandate would be to help obviate
the need for individuals to seek human rights protections and enforcement
at international or even national levels. Rather, consistent with the positive
dimensions of subsidiarity, it would function to ensure those protections were
provided effectively at the immediate site of abuse.
2. United States Commission on Human Rights
Yet, an implementation mechanism alone is not enough to ensure an effective
national system of subsidiarity-based protection for human rights. An executive
264
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focal point must be accompanied by a fully institutionalized national-level
monitoring framework to ensure that all individuals have the ability to participate in national-level scrutiny and public oversight of U.S. human rights
implementation commitments.265 Such a body, ideally in the form of a U.S.
Commission on Human Rights, would serve as an independent check on
implementation failures, providing a forum through which individuals could
report abuses and seek political or quasi-judicial address at the domestic level,
before needing to recur to international treaty bodies.
To be maximally effective it should be instituted and ﬁnanced by government, but functionally independent of the political branches, consistent
with the Paris Principles.266 Most countries honor this function by creating
a national human rights commission or ombudsperson’s ofﬁce, bodies that
can be further replicated within subnational political units, as close to the
individual as necessary.267
Many U.S. states and cities in fact have bodies called “human rights commissions” or “human relations commissions.”268 Few, however, interpret their
mandate as extending beyond investigating complaints of discrimination.269
A U.S. Commission on Human Rights would serve to encourage states and
localities to broaden their own mandates to encompass the full ﬁeld of rights
recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the treaties
ratiﬁed by the United States. A subsidiarity-based relationship would then be
engaged in which the national body would serve to support the human rights
protection and promotion activities of more local commissions, ensuring that
protection efforts are provided throughout the nation’s diverse communities
at the level closest to the affected individual.

See, e.g., CRPD, op. cit., art. 33.2 (“States Parties shall . . . maintain, strengthen, designate or
establish within the State Party, a framework, including one or more independent mechanisms,
as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the present Convention.
When designating or establishing such a mechanism, States Parties shall take into account
the principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and
promotion of human rights.”).
266 National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (“The Paris
Principles”), G.A. Res. 48/134, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/134 (Mar. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Paris
Principles].
267 The International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions counts
more than 100 national human rights institutions worldwide. U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2006/CRP.5
(2006), n. 4.
268 There reportedly are only three states – Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi – that do not
have any form of a state or local human rights or human relations commission. See Kenneth
L. Saunders & Hyo Eun (April) Bang, “A Historical Perspective on U.S. Human Rights
Commissions,” Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Executive Session on Human
Rights Commissions & Criminal Justice, No. 3 (June 2007), at 11.
269 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has a similarly limited mandate.
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Within this subsidiarity orientation, the U.S. Human Rights Commission
would have a broad promotional and protective mandate.270 It would be able
to issue relevant reports and guidelines on rights-respecting behavior by distinct social actors. These would include nonbinding guidelines or guiding
principles on appropriate conduct in prisons, police stations, administrative
agencies, and other fora in which human rights abuses frequently occur, as
well as the power and responsibility to make regular (nonbinding) recommendations to all relevant stakeholders, including particularly Congress, executive
agencies and departments, and the legislatures of the many states. Such recommendations would be offered in a constructive spirit of cooperation, indicating
areas of concern and offering assistance in identifying the most effective measures of response in consultation with affected citizens and local or national
authorities.
A national human rights commission would also engage in regular human
rights education and training programs,271 as well as receive complaints from
individuals about alleged human rights violations, initiate investigations, offer
mediation services, arrive at ﬁndings, and issue recommendations to the parties and/or to relevant local authorities.272 It would be competent to hold
nationwide thematic hearings on distinct human rights issues, especially where
common themes emerged from state and local hearings, and engage in independent monitoring of national human rights conditions through a variety
of means, including investigations, inquiries, and surveys. In this respect, it
could gather statistics from local and state human rights commissions on the
numbers and types of issues and complaints they were addressing, and ensure
the broad availability of human rights documents and materials. It would
thereby serve as an important conduit for receiving and processing the results
of localized discussions, policies, and experiments around the nation, with a
view to discussing and sharing them among a national audience.
A U.S. Commission on Human Rights would thus self-consciously be based
in the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring that its interventions were aimed at
supporting local decision making, participatory engagement, and communitycentered implementation processes. Its work would be directed to supporting
270
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Paris Principles, op. cit., Part A, ¶ 2 (“A national institution shall be given as broad a mandate
as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its
composition and its sphere of competence.”).
The Paris Principles explicitly afﬁrm that national human rights institutions “shall, inter
alia, have the following responsibilities. . . . To assist in the formulation of programs for the
teaching of, and research into, human rights and to take part in their execution in schools,
universities and professional circles; [and] [t]o publicize human rights and efforts to combat
all forms of discrimination . . . by increasing public awareness, especially through information
and education and by making use of all press organs.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 3(f)-3(g) (emphasis added).
Cf. id. Part D.
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localism, states’ rights, and the vital experimentation they foster, while serving
in a capacity to illuminate problematic areas where national policy intervention may be necessary in function of subsidiarity’s positive assistive aspect.
In this way, a U.S. Human Rights Commission would serve as an independent check to ensure that individuals throughout the United States had
effective local mechanisms through which their rights could effectively be
protected in meaningful and appropriate ways at the immediate site of abuse,
without needing to resort to international human rights treaty bodies for additional assistance and support.
F. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIZING SUBSIDIARITY

In his statement before the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, U.S.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher afﬁrmed that “[i]n the battle for democracy and human rights, words matter, but what we do matters much more.”273
This continues to be the slogan of the U.S. State Department in its engagement policy with international human rights treaty bodies. That is, the United
States engages such bodies in a procedurally exacting, substantively responsive, and high-level way, with the aim of setting an example for other states in
deepening their own sovereign engagements with human rights treaty body
supervision.
Yet what the United States in fact does in its engagement policy constitutes
only half of what it seeks to encourage other states to do. The United States does
not wish to encourage other states to use treaty ratiﬁcation primarily as a foreign
policy tool, formally preparing and presenting reports, answering questions,
and then leaving the process in Geneva, away from the critical reﬂection of
domestic constituencies. Such a process would serve no useful domestic-level
purpose, either in terms of strengthening democratic institutions or enhancing
human dignity. To the contrary, the United States aims to use its inﬂuence
to encourage the world’s governments to bring those international processes
and commitments home, to discuss them with civil society, to monitor their
own internal human rights progress, and to work to correct areas of deﬁciency
through local innovation, transparency, and corrective experimentation. That
is, the United States aims to ensure that international supervision truly serves its
intended subsidiary purpose: to accompany and impel forward domestic processes of human rights monitoring, supervision, and remediation at national,
municipal/state, and local levels.
In this respect, if the United States genuinely wishes to set a positive,
constructive example for other states, it must – as Secretary Christopher
273
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underscored – not only talk the talk, but walk the walk, demonstrating through
self-directed action its commitment to domestic human rights processes. This
cannot include engagement with the mere formalisms of international treaty
obligations, using them to shield domestic processes from the inﬂuence of
treaty body engagement. Rather, it must include engagement with the substance and spirit of them. This means institutionalizing domestic processes for
using treaty body engagement as the impetus for a regular conversation and
self-analysis of how well we are in fact standing up to human rights commitments, as we understand them in our complex and diverse communities and
in the concrete contexts in which we live. It means monitoring national-level
statistics and collecting regular information from the states with respect to
each recognized right, regularly listening to citizens about the ways in which
they feel their rights are or are not being addressed, actively considering their
proposals for effective solutions, and systematically analyzing complaints of
abuse and what remedies are in place to address them. Within this process,
the inputs of international actors and comparative national experience can be
highly instructive, even as they are never determinative for the precise contours of U.S. policy. That is, human rights engagement is not only or even
principally about having a conversation at the international level; it is about
starting and sustaining a domestic conversation, one that begins at the smallest and most local of places and works its way up to town, state, and federal
authorities, within a national facilitative structure.
A U.S. treaty body engagement policy structured in this way – with the
focus on domestic processes and responsive accountability to local needs –
would go a long way toward transforming U.S. human rights policy from a
noted example of paradox for the rest of the world to a genuine model of how
human rights law and international treaty body engagement can be used, in
function of subsidiarity principles, to deepen democratic processes, strengthen
civil society participation, and internalize human rights protections in locally
relevant, factually responsive, and genuinely meaningful ways.

